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IAbstract
China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has increased considerably
in the last few decades. The development of China's OFDI has distinct features,
in particular the fact that the major investors undertaking large-scale deals are
state-owned enterprises. However, they have few competitive advantages
compared with their international counterparts. As mainstream theories have
difficulty in providing a reasonable explanation of China's OFDI, this thesis
analyses the Chinese government's home country measures (HCMs) and their
effects on OFDI, contributing to the understanding of the institutional analysis
in international business.
Based on the analyses of26 key policies and regulations, the Chinese
government's role as a supervisor to examine and approve OFDI activities is
addressed, as well its role as a promoter to support the Chinese enterprises'
investment in the international economy. Regarding the administration,
regulations for examining and approving the OFDI projects have been relaxed,
which supports the improvement ofOFDI. However, the outcomes of post-
investment monitoring and extraterritorial controls are under question. The
Chinese government supports OFDI largely by means of special funds and
preferential loans issued by the institutions and banks. Additionally, China's
OFDI information system primarily functions to provide data and information
for policy formulation and complement the financial support.
Employing data of 50 largest Chinese business groups ranked by overseas
assets, their overseas subsidiaries and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, it
is understood that their motivation for undertaking OFDI is to address their
competitive disadvantages rather than to exploit their competitive advantages.
The case studies ofChinalco's investment in Rio Tinto and Geely's acquisition
of Volvo provide insights into the relationship between the Chinese
government and investors. Rather than fully compromising the government's
national planning, the Chinese enterprises take their corporate interests as
priority during the OFDI progress. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the
convergence between the nation and the enterprises' interests rather than the
institutional factor alone has contributed to China's OFDI.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction
China has made outstanding economic progress since the economic reforms in
1978. Various economic reforms have been carried out, many acquiring their
own Chinese characteristics. The in-depth understanding of the impact of
China's different reforms, particularly the industrial policies used, remains an
important issue. This study looks at the fast development of China's outward
foreign direct investment (OFDI) and the emergence of multinational
enterprises (MNEs), in particular after 2003, which witnessed the beginning of
a new era with distinct economic features. China is a particularly interesting
and special case to study OFDI. This is because state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
are main investors and the Chinese government plays an important role in the
implementation of the 'going out' policy. A number of so-called home country
measures (HCMs) have been implemented.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD)
reports 'Home Country Measures' (UNCTAD, 2001), which categorise HCMs
for developed countries for the first time, excluding HeMs issued by
developing low income countries. HeMs are divided by governments in
advanced economies into six groups, which include policy positions to
encourage FDI to developing countries, information provision and technical
assistance, technology transfer, financial and fiscal incentives, investment
insurance, and market access regulations, as well as extraterritorial controls
(UNeTAD, 2001). Policy positions to encourage OFDI have to benefit the
home country as well as host developing countries. They are always linked to
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other substantive policies. Financial support may be used with development
assistance to developing countries, including grants, loans or equity
participation. Fiscal incentives include such things as providing general tax
reductions, tax exemptions, deferrals or credits for taxation of overseas
earnings. Publishing and disseminating information on the investment climate
and potential opportunities can help overcome market imperfections. On the
other hand, extraterritorial controls are recognised as disincentives to OFDI
rather than incentives. To apply national laws or regulations to overseas TNC
operations may cause conflicts of political jurisdiction between home and host
countries. (UNCTAD, 2001)
Many scholars argue that these measures have exerted considerable influence
on the Chinese OFDI and led to the formation of MNEs. However, very little is
known about these measures or their effects. To date only a few studies have
provided a broad view of China's OFDI-related policies and regulations (Luo
et al., 2010, Ren et al., 2010, Voss et al., 2008). None of these studies,
however, has been supported by extensive empirical evidence. With regard to
studies targeting at OFDI as a whole or Chinese MNEs, they also in general
lack specific details of these important institutional factors even though their
importance is constantly emphasised (for example, Buckley et aI., 2007, Cui
and Jiang, 2010, Deng, P., 2010).
The purpose of this research is to analyse, in more detail, the effects of China's
HCMs on OFDI. This is achieved through an investigation of how the policies
and regulations have developed and how they have been implemented. It
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investigates at the extent to which Chinese enterprises, especially SOEs and in
particular large business groups, are influenced.
This chapter sets out the main research objectives and provides an overview of
the key findings in anticipation of further chapters. In particular, it draws from
translations from a range of important Chinese official government
publications and documents which in general have not been extensively
commented upon. These documents are obtained from websites such as
www.people.com.cn which reports important national level conference, for
example, the National Congress, with key points translated into English.
1.1 Introduction
To promote overseas expansion and to utilise its huge amounts of foreign
reserves better, among other things, the Chinese government has initiated and
made great efforts to implement the 'going out' policy. As early as 1979, for
example, the 'Fifteen measures regarding economic reforms', issued by
China's State Council (the highest decision making body), put forward the idea
'to go abroad to do business' (Li and Xu, 2008). This was one of the first times
that the Chinese government mentioned outward investment in its state policy
and therefore stands as a landmark. At that time, China was not confident in
enterprises' capability to undertake overseas expansion, which resulted in a
number of HCMs to restrict, examine and approve OFDI projects and to
constrain access to foreign exchange. SAFE's 'Measures on Foreign Exchange
3
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Administration for Overseas Investment', for example, was one such way in
which restrictions were imposed.
During the initial period ofOFDI development, China's institutional system
regarding OFDI concentrated on the administrative inspection and foreign
exchange supervision. According to Jiang Zemin's report at the 16th National
People's Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), during the I3-year
period 1984-1997, only 1,008 Chinese enterprises had invested a total of
USDI.396 billion abroad (Jiang, 2002).
At the 15th National Congress of the CPC in 1997, Jiang Zemin proposed to
'strive to improve the level of opening up', and to 'encourage overseas
investment that can develop China's comparative advantages and for the better
use of domestic and foreign markets and resources' (Jiang, 1997). During this
period, the Chinese government encouraged SOEs with competitive strengths
to invest in setting-up factories overseas, mainly in Africa, the Middle Asia, the
Middle East, the Central Europe and South America (Li and Xu, 2008).
Afterwards, the Chinese government promulgated a number of measures to
promote overseas processing trade, for example, 'the opinion on the
encouragement of enterprises to engage in overseas processing and assembly
businesses' by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation in
1999.
Since 2001 China has been a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTD).
In this year, the 'going out' strategy was officially written into 'the Outline of
4
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the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development',
delivered at the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People's Congress. This
was, therefore, an important milestone and one of the turning points in the
Chinese outward investment. The five-year plan stated that the implementation
of the 'going out' strategy encouraged outward investment, which enabled
development of China's comparative advantages and expansion of the scope,
approach and method of international economic and technological cooperation
(CPC, 2001). In addition, the government supported enterprises taking
advantage of foreign intellectual resources and establishing research
institutions and design centres in foreign countries (CPC, 2001). Thus even in
2001 some of the key elements of China's going out strategy were being put in
place. In particular, the role of foreign markets as targets for the acquisition of
new technologies and 'intellectual resources', as well as the need for 'finance',
emerged. Indeed, a considerable share of the burgeoning literature on Chinese
OFDI today concerns such themes. The government, moreover, recognised the
need to develop adequate mechanisms properly to facilitate OFDI.
Furthermore, at the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, Jiang Zemin
re-emphasised that China's international economic and technological
cooperation and competition should be undertaken on a broader scale, in more
spheres and on a higher level, make the best use of both international and
domestic markets, optimise the allocation of resources, expand the space for
development and accelerate reform and development by opening up (Jiang,
2002). Furthermore, enterprises with comparative advantages and with various
forms of ownership should be encouraged and supported in OFDI activities, in
5
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order to increase the export of goods and labour and to shape a number of
strong multinational enterprises and brand names (Jiang, 2002).
Since 2002, the central government has foreseen that China's OFDI would
expand into more countries, regions and industries. In addition to the emphasis
on resources, which may include labour, natural and intellectual resources,
Beijing also expected Chinese firms, including SOEs and private ones, to level
up their strengths in both 'international and domestic markets' through outward
investment. According to the tenth five-year plan, moreover, during the period
2001-2005, the Chinese government was to concentrate on promoting
enterprises to acquire foreign advanced technology through OFDI. To this end
the establishment of HCMs to support OFDI was first proposed.
Itwas expected that China would launch policies and regulations to develop
the supportive service system in the following years. This raises the following
questions: What are these supportive measures? What do they concern, on
finance, foreign exchange, taxation, or information services? Are they useful in
promoting OFDI? Are they extensively adopted by enterprises? These
questions will be addressed in Chapter 6, which discusses the Chinese
government as a supporter of China's OFDI.
Subsequently, the 'going out' strategy was repeatedly mentioned and
emphasised by the Chinese government at the national congresses. 'CPC
Central Committee's decision on a number of issues on improving the socialist
market economic system' underlined 'empowering enterprises with more
6
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autonomy of overseas operations and improving the monitoring mechanism of
foreign invested enterprises' (CPC, 2003). As well as encouragement, the
government also pays attention to supervision. What are the monitoring
measures? What are their particular concerns? Do enterprises really obtain
more autonomy, which means the liberalisation ofHCMs?
At the Tenth National People's Congress, 'the Outline of the l lth Five-Year
Plan for National Economic and Social Development' elaborated on the focus
of2006-201O. Regarding the 'going out' strategy, the Chinese government
would nurture and develop China's multinational corporations through cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, stock participation, listing, mergers and
reorganisations (NPC, 2006). The Chinese government additionally highlighted
the expansion of overseas resources in accordance with the principles of
enjoying equality and mutual benefits and complementing one other with
advantages. It was also expected that the support and guarantee systems for
outward investment, the strength of co-ordination, risk management and
supervision of overseas state-owned assets would be improved.
As indicated in the 11th five-year plan, China has been establishing a regime of
monitoring and supporting OFDI. In addition, the preferred entry mode choices
of China's OFDI in 2006-2010 were cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) and overseas listings. Due to energy security considerations, China
also needed to highlight overseas resource development. More questions will
be addressed. What are the Hf'Ms at this stage? What is the divergence from
previous policies? Are they restricted or relaxed? If relaxed, then to what
7
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extent? These questions will be answered in Chapter 5, based on the analysis of
China's administrative measures.
Regarding the Chinese enterprises, do they adopt cross-border M&As as the
primary entry mode choice? Do they invest massively in developing overseas
resources? Furthermore, what is the motivation of Chinese MNEs undertaking
OFDI? Are they completely politically driven, following the government's
guidance without concerns on making profits or losses? Or, do they consider
outward investment as a business activity? Chapter 7 will address the
motivations of the Chinese investors. Furthermore, Chapter 8 will provide
more details on two selected examples for further understanding the
relationship between enterprises and the government.
In summary, this research is based on a simple, practical question: how do
China's home country measures ofOFDI affect Chinese MNEs' overseas
expansion? To investigate the key elements of this phenomenon, the objective
of this research is to analyse, in detail, how China's OFDI related policies and
regulations developed and are implemented and to what extent the Chinese
enterprises, especially state-owned enterprises and business groups are
influenced. While starting from a practical problem, this objective implies
much about the relationship between government and business and the role
actors have in shaping the understanding ofHCMs and their effects on OFDI
performance. A contribution to the understanding of the institutional analysis
in international business is attempted by investigating the effects of these
factors on OFDI behaviour and Chinese transnational corporations (TNCs).
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1.2 Flow of chapters and brief results
This chapter provides an introduction to the research questions and key
contributions, and is followed by Chapter 2 critically which reviews the
existing literature on international business theories, especially the motivations
of China's OFDI and the institutional effects. Chapter 3 presents a detailed
review of the development of China's OFDI, the role of the Chinese
government departments, and the progress made by Chinese TNCs following
the 'going out' policy. Chapter 4 focuses on the methods, interpretation of
official documents and multiple case studies, used in this thesis. The strengths
and weaknesses of the methods (descriptive analysis, case study and
econometric analysis) and data collected (at aggregate and firm -levels) by
extant research are also discussed.
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 describe the empirical studies conducted, where key results
are presented with relevant evidence. Chapters 5 and 6 assess the effects of the
Chinese government as a supervisor and a promoter, respectively, based on the
interpretation and discussion of 26 key home country measures. Regulations to
examine and approve OFDI projects have been relaxed, and this supports the
improvement of OFDI. However, the outcome of post-investment monitoring
is under question, which requires further work. The Chinese government has
also set restrictions to prohibit capital flight and to avoid redundant round-
tripping investment through listing on overseas stock exchanges. These
extraterritorial controls are useful to some extent, but problems still exist. For
9
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example, Chinese TNCs have attempted to avoid inspection through offshore
holding companies. In spite of supervision, the Chinese government has
promoted OFDI by means of financial support and information services. It is
evident that Chinese TNCs take advantage of special funds and preferential
loans issued by the institutions and banks when investing abroad. In addition to
assisting TNCs with information about host countries, China's OFDI
information system primarily functions as a provider of data and information
for policy formulation, complementing the financial support.
Chapter 7 finds evidence from Chinese TNCs' overseas activities, establishing
offshore holding subsidiaries and undertaking cross-border M&As, to evaluate
the institutional effects. Chapter 8 applies the in-depth analysis of Chinalco' s
investment in Rio Tinto and Geely's acquisition of Volvo. Chinese TNCs
invest abroad to address their competitive disadvantages rather than to exploit
their competitive advantages (Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Child and Rodrigues,
2005, Deng, 2004, 2007, Luo and Tung, 2007). In addition, rather than fully
compromising to the government's national planning, Chinese enterprises
regard their corporate interests as priority during the OFDI progress.
Accordingly, it is assumed that the convergence between the nation and the
enterprises' interests rather than the institutional factor alone have contributed
to China's OFDI.
Chapter 9 concludes the whole thesis, with a discussion of the contributions of
the present study to the existing literature and offers policy recommendations
and suggestions for future research work.
10
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The mainstream perspectives on international business provide the theoretical
context to understand the rationale ofOFDI, which assume that firms invest in
foreign countries to exploit competitive advantages (Barney, 1991, Buckley
and Casson, 1976, Dunning, 1981, 2001). Recent researches (for example,
Cantwell and Tolentino, 1990, LaB, 1983, Wells, 1977, Wesson, 1999) suggest
that OFDI from developing countries cannot be well explained by findings
generated from the research on developed countries. Contributors have tended
to expand other perspectives. Section 2.1 reviews extant literature on the
internationalisation of firms in both developed and developing countries.
It is also significant to note that the mainstream theory strongly views foreign
direct investment (FDI) through an economic lens, without considering the
political or social factors of a developing country. Section 2.2 focuses on the
discussion of the institutional theory, which considers both the positive and
negative effects of the intervention of home country government on firms'
internationalisation.
The internationalisation of Chinese TNCs is a good example to expand the
international business theories due to China's unique features, such as the
government involvement in the economic development, large Chinese firms
being singled out as 'national champions', and TNCs receiving support and
protection from the Chinese institutions (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The
following two sections focus on the literature on China's OFDI development.
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Section 2.3 discusses the motivations of China's OFDI and other concerns
derived from China's unique features, in particular their relationship with the
government. Section 2.4 reviews the role of the Chinese government in the
process of 0 FD I. It is vital to look at incentives and restrictions of the
government intervention. Section 2.5 concludes and highlights the key insights
gained from this review.
2.1 Mainstream perspectives
Mainstream perspectives on the strategy of MNEs are based on the concepts of
internalisation (Buckley and Casson, 1976, Rugman, 1981, Williamson, 1975,
1979), transaction costs (Coase, 1937, Hennart, 1988) and monopoly advantage
(Hymer, 1960). In brief, they state that the imperfection of global markets and
the characteristics of intermediate products have motivated multinational
companies to utilise internal transactions to substitute external market dealings.
Up to now, the most widely received theoretical framework for MNEs is the
eclectic or ownership, location, and internalisation (OLI) paradigm (Dunning,
1981, 1986). Dunning hypothesises that the inclination of countries to invest
overseas is determined by the stage of economy development (proxied by GOP)
or GDP per capita) and the advantages of OLI. Considering the transaction
costs, companies are inclined to be internalised if the administrative exchange
costs are lower than the market ones. Derived from the OLI theory, Dunning
and Narula (1996) propose the investment development path (lOP), which
argues that a country or region's net outward direct investment position is
systematically related to its level of economic development.
12
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Extant findings are based on the research on large MNEs from developed
countries and regions like the United State of America (USA), Europe and
Japan. They are usually private-owned firms with advanced technologies and
world brands. The internationalisation of these firms began decades ago, at
least for most of the Fortune Global 500 companies, which was a different
world in terms of the degree of integration and openness to the world in which
MNEs from advanced or developing countries operate today. Accordingly, the
motivations (why go abroad) and processes (how) of China's TNCs may differ
from the mainstream perspectives.
Since these theories were applied to explain the MNEs' activities, scholars
have debated whether they can be applied to FDI from developing countries.
The majority of them agree that the mainstream theories work. The theories
will function even better if it takes the characteristics of FDI from developing
countries into account (Cantwell and Tolentino, 1990, Kojima, 1978, Lall,
1983, Lecraw, 1993, Wells, 1983).
2.1.1 Product life cycle and small-scale technology
Vernon (1966, 1974) explains the conditions when developed countries are
ready for exports and direct production, technology transfer and direct
investment in his international product life cycle theory. For Vernon, product
innovation and technological advantages are crucial to a firm's development at
home and then abroad. This model is included because it is useful in explaining
13
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why MNEs from developing countries invest in other less developed countries
(LDCs), for example, China's investment in Southeast Asia and Africa.
In the late 1970s and the 1980, the emergence of MNEs from developing
countries received academic attention for the first time. Based on the product
life cycle theory, Wells views the internationalisation of enterprises from
developing countries as a stage in the product life cycle (Wells, 1977). He also
utilises the small-scale technology theory to explain and analyse the source of
developing countries' advantages on outward investment competition (Wells,
1983). The small-scale technology theory is attributed to previous theories in
terms of ownership or firm-specific advantages. Therefore, it assumes that
MNEs from late industrialising economies (LIE) should organise large-scale
cross-border investment only after having obtained international experience
and consolidated particular advantages. Nonetheless, China's inward and
outward FDI almost began to grow in the same period, though at a different
pace. China thus has limited experience of overseas operations before investing
outside China.
2.1.2 Technological change
Lall (1983) suggests that MNEs from different developing countries may have
considerably different ownership advantages. Moreover, his research shows
that in many process industries, such as petroleum refining, paint production
and textiles, technologies used in developed and developing nations are
identical. Hence these firms can merely enjoy marginal technological
14
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advantages. Lall also emphasises that ownership advantages are the outcome of
a process of conscious accumulation of technological knowledge, which has
important implications for future study. With regard to the theories on
'technology and technological change', Cantwell and Tolentino (1990) indicate
that technological and innovative change is one of the determinants in
international activities and is also related to the increase oftheir outward FDI.
Therefore, the industry and location distribution of outward FDI from
developing countries change gradually and can be predicted, which promotes
industry alternation and upgrade in horne countries.
Research on MNEs from LIE has received renewed academic attention since
the I990s. As summarised by Van Hoesel (1999), research interests are
primarily observed in five aspects. First, the importance of OFDI from LIE as a
whole has increased substantially, both in absolute and in relative terms.
Second, many authorities in developing economies promote more liberal policy
other than capital export restrictions decades ago. Third, Asia has increasing
dominance as a horne region in overseas investment. Fourth, OFDI from LIE is
no longer market seeking by nature. Regarding some newly industrialising
economies, they do not have L advantages as a result of rising wages and local
currency appreciation. Then labour-intensive manufacturing industries are
moved to cheaper locations which become exporters. Finally and most
interestingly, the so-called 'upward investments', which indicate FDI flows
from developing countries to developed countries, have attracted increasing
consideration. Thereafter, ownership advantages do not seem to be relevant in
developed host countries.
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2.1.3 Latecomers perspectives
Some researchers, however, argue that an unconventional framework has to be
introduced to firms from emerging economies, which are often regarded as
latecomers with a relative disadvantage in ownership capabilities. For example,
Wesson (1999) suggests that emerging economies have to catch up with
developed countries in terms of technology and know-how and to develop a
business environment supportive of international competitiveness. Dunning
and Rugman (1985) point out that the conventional theory principally explains
how MNEs locate their non-financial and proprietary assets. The question they
are interested in is how to be successful in overseas investment. Moon and
Roehl (2001), instead, focus on the key question 'what is the fundamental
motivation for a firm to go abroad?'. Their imbalance theory indicates that
enterprises without ownership advantage are also able to succeed in the global
market if they can learn and acquire new technology or management to
improve their competitiveness.
The 'Late development' thesis has worked well when applied to OFDI from
Japan (Dore, 1973) and subsequently Four Asian Tigers, namely, Taiwan,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). It also
provides the theoretical foundation for my institutional study on China.
Furthermore, FDI benefits to host countries regarding macroeconomic growth
and social and environmental benefits, and the magnitude of the benefits
depends on the efforts and context of host countries (for example, OECD,
2002). On the other hand, FDI also brings benefits to home countries. For
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example, Hill (2005) summarises that the capital account of the home country's
balance of payments benefits from the inward flow of foreign earnings. In
addition, benefits arise from employment effects and valuable skills learned
from foreign markets. This also helps explain why home country governments
encourage OFDI by taking the role as a promoter and supporter.
2.2 The institutional perspectives relevant to OFDI
The home country's specific domestic institutional environment is basically
omitted in the OFDI research (Voss et al., 2009). The establishment of
institutional theory has been emerging, particularly in recent years (Buckley,
Clegg et al., 2008, Buckley et al., 2006, Meyer and Nguyen, 2005, North, 1990,
Scott, 2002, Wright et al., 2005). It has the potential to explain the influence of
the home, host and supranational institutional environments on Chinese MNEs'
OFDI choices.
2.2.1 Within the context of developed countries
The new trade theory emphasises the importance of appropriate government
intervention in trade and economic development (Helpmam and Krugman,
1985, Krugman, 1979). Due to imperfect competition and the existence of
economies of scale, a country's economy may not be in the best condition.
Under such circumstances, government intervention may shelter enterprises to
enable them to mature in home country and then to develop in the international
market. In conclusion, if a particular industry in a relatively inferior position
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with no comparative advantage, appropriate policy interventions can improve
the economic operation.
Porter's Diamond model (1990) offers a diamond framework that can help
understand the comparative advantages of nations or regions in global
competition. The role of government in the Diamond model is 'acting as a
catalyst and challenge; it is to encourage - or even push - companies to raise
their aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive performance ... '
(Porter, 1998). The government has to encourage companies to raise their
performance, stimulate early demand for advanced products, focus on
specialised factor creation, and stimulate local rivalry by limiting direct
cooperation and enforcing antitrust regulations (Porter, 1998). In summary, it
can be claimed that government policy cannot help companies become
competitive. The success of a government is to provide a favourable external
environment for fair competition.
Regarding government efficiency, if countries want to become or stay
competitive, they have to follow four principles (Garelli, 2009). First,
government interference in business activities has to be minimised, excluding
creating competitive conditions for enterprises. Second, government has to
provide predictable macroeconomic and social conditions to minimise the
external risks. Third, government should be flexible in adjusting its economic
policies to a changing global environment. Fourth, the state has to provide a
public community which promotes fairness, equality, justice and the security of
the population.
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Comparatively little research, however, has considered the way in which home
country measures (HCMs) are used to determine the level and direction of
OFDI. According to UNCTAD's 2001 report (UNCTAD, 2001), promotional
efforts often aim at correcting market imperfections that can disadvantage
developing countries as TNCs consider prospective FDI sites. Developed
countries can help provide information and facilitate contacts that match
potential investors with FDI opportunities in host developing countries. Some
national and regional programmes provide financial or fiscal incentives as well
as investment insurance guarantees to help offset some of the risk associated
with FDI, particularly in smaller developing countries where investors
(particularly smaller ones) have less experience. HCMs may also prioritise
assistance to promote FDI with particular technology transfer benefits or
support FDI flows to the least developed countries, for example, through
preferential market access.
Most of this assistance, however, remains at the discretion of the developed
country and is commonly shaped to serve its own business interests along with
general development objectives. This national benefit factor is particularly
evident in the design of many financial and fiscal assistance programmes as
well as market access HCMs (such as product certification or rules-of-origin
regulations) that can discourage the FDI flows by diminishing market access
prospects for FDI projects with export potential. Increased stability,
predictability and transparency among these promotional efforts could serve
the interests of both the host and home countries, as well as TNCs.
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Even within the limited number of articles, most concern the impact of HCMs
of developed countries on OFDI, such as how they promote foreign direct
investment to developing countries. For example, Globerman and Shapiro
(1999), Blomstrom and Kokko (2000), Goh et al. (2001), te Velde (2007), and
te Velde and Message (2003) examine the HCMs effects of developed
economies like Canada, Sweden, Singapore, United Kingdom (UK) and the
European Union (EU). They agree that the HCMs are positively correlated to
OFDI development.
2.2.2 The HeMs of developing countries
According to the UNCTAD 2001 report, 'Home Country Measures' are
categorised by governments in developed countries, but not considering HeMs
in developing countries (UNeTAD, 2001). As regards developing countries,
the above report notes: 'the limited input ... into the design and execution of
HeMs, as well as the often uncertain commitment to the duration ofFDI
promotional assistance, may diminish the beneficial impact promotional
programmes can have on OFDI development' (UNCTAD, 2001). It then
suggests that HeMs have no obvious influence on OFDI from developing
countries. This is contradictory to findings by scholars such as Aggarwal and
Agmon (1990), Lecraw (1993), Dunning et al.(1996), Bulatov (2001), Sim and
Pandian (2002), Pradhan (2004), Sauvant (2005), and Ahmad and Kitchen
(2008), which consider the institutional framework for OFDI in emerging
economies in a number of studies, in particular Taiwan, Russia, Singapore,
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India, South Korea, and Malaysia. For example, Aggarwal and Agmon (1990)
model the business-government relations during the process of firm
globalisation and believe that national governments in developing countries
often playa critical role in determining the level and direction of OFDI.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the high level of home government support
may help MNEs overcome ownership and location disadvantages (Buckley et
al., 2007, Lecraw, 1993). The state government of South Korea has been
extensively involved in its OFDI progress (Dunning et al., 1996, Peng, 2007,
Yang, Lim et al., 2009). The overseas investment undertaken by South Korean
chaebols in strategic industries was supported by strong state interventions
such as government subsidies, tax incentives and other benefits. Sauvant (2005)
analyses the motivations of OFDI and the policy development in Brazil, Russia,
India and China (BRICs). He is impressed by the heavy government support
provided by the Chinese government, compared to Brazil's no promoting
policy, Russia's no supportive policy but capital controls, and India's initial
liberalisation. Ahmad and Kitchen (2008) argue that one of the main reasons
why Sime Darby Berhad, the Malaysian MNE, has been able to invest abroad
is its possession of significant ownership and internal advantages created by
the national government's favourable treatments.
In the history of international business theories, government interference has
been generally recognised as a negative factor in promoting the OFDI. North
defines 'institutions' as the 'rules of the game in a society' (North, 1990), and
'humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction' (1994), which
are constituted by formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal
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constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct),
and their enforcement characteristics. Henisz (2004) summarises that there are
different strands in the institutional theories within the international business,
for example, the impact of institutional context on entry and exit strategies, and
supply- and demand- side constraints for institutional changes. For example,
Wan and Hoskisson (2003) investigate six western European countries and find
that home country environment is an important factor in corporate
diversification strategies. Some scholars apply and advance the institution-
based view of strategy, and some integrate it with resource-based view when
studying strategies and entry mode by emerging economies (Baker et al., 2005,
Meyer and Peng, 2005, Peng, 2003, Peng et al., 2008, Wright et al., 2005,
Yeung, 2002). They agree that institutional development affects strategies,
directly or indirectly.
Regarding MNEs' responses to the institutional environment, Oliver (1991)
identifies five general strategic responses: acquiescence (taking no action),
compromise (reducing the need to conform to institutional pressures),
avoidance (hiding or escaping from the institutional field), defiance (ignoring,
challenging, or attacking the underlying institutions), and manipulation
(influencing or controlling institutional pressures and evaluations). In particular,
avoidance responses such as escaping from the government intervention
become more common, when the home country's economic efficiency and
fitness with the institutional environment decrease.
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2.2.3 OFDI as an escape
Based on the research on OFDI from developed countries, Witt and Lewin
(2007) argue that a higher level of societal coordination may imply a relatively
slower rate of institutional adjustment and higher rigidity and inflexibility. If
institutions are not aligned with MNEs' business requirements, economic
advantage may shrink or disappear, or even become an economic liability. FDI
is more likely used to escape increased institutional misalignments at home
country, legally or illegally, even at economic costs. The institutional escapism
view suggests that due to the poor institutional environment at home countries
and the discordant relationship between MNEs and governments, companies
from emerging economies may invest abroad to avoid these constraints (for
example, Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994, Rugman and Verbeke, 1998, Schoppa,
2006, Tallman, 1988), particularly restrictive legislation (Dunning, 1996),
regulatory uncertainty (Le and Zak, 2006, Yamakawa et al., 2008), and high
tax rates (Caves, 2007, Gordon and Hines, 2002, Vernon, 1998). This
perspective may have the potential to explain China's OFDI, especially by
private enterprises, since home countries can force companies offshore through
misaligned polices.
Studies discussed in Section 2.2 indicate that theories drawn from the analyses
of developed countries can be applied to study firm internationalisation of
emerging economies, even if the special institutional and cultural
characteristics of each country should be taken into consideration. China, as a
very classic prototype of developing countries, raises the attention of the need
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for some extension of the extant theories. For example, Child and Rodrigues
(2005) argue that the case of China has the potential to extend present theories
concerning the latecomer perspective and catch-up strategies, institutional
analysis with reference to the role of government, the relations between
entrepreneurs and institutions, and the liability of foreignness.
2.3 Research on China's OFDI
As a general theory ofFOI, internalisation and the eclectic paradigm provide
the conceptual basis to analyse international business and MNEs. The unique
characteristics of China's OFOI address a widely-discussed research question:
whether alternative theories are required to explain China's overseas
investment (Buckley et al., 2007, Child and Rodrigues, 2005). For example,
Liu et al. (2005) introduce Gaussian Mixture Models estimation methods and
suggest that the results are consistent with refined lOP analysis, while other
factors like institutions, location and network have an indirect impact on OFOI.
Li, similarly, rejects the need to modify or enhance the OLI Model as there is
no fundamental difference between early-movers from industrialised countries
and newcomers (Li, P.P., 2007).
Child and Rodrigues (2005) argue that the OLI approach is primarily based on
research on large advanced enterprises, which are presumed to enjoy
considerable domestic strengths before they globalise. The predominant
assumption in this influential perspective states that internationalisation is
motivated by a firm's ambition to take advantage of its existing ownership
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capabilities. This provides explanations for capital outflows from developed
countries: to obtain natural resources, to look for cheaper labour force than in
home country, and to overcome trade barriers restricting imports. When the
mainstream theories are adopted to analyse China's OFDI, it is reasonable to
consider China's distinct characteristics. It is well-known that China's big
SOEs are dominant players in the process of internationalisation. Before they
go global, to the utmost degree they enjoy domestic resources, such as
monopoly prices, capital support from central and local government, and
beneficial policies. The possible element which goes against the mainstream
theories is that a firm which goes global may react to the government's
encouragement, not following its primary ambition.
Furthermore, China's investment into developed countries and areas such as
Hong Kong, United States, Canada and Australia is attracted by their booming
foreign market, advanced technology and strategic resources (Cai, 1999, Deng,
2004,2007, Liu, 1992, Luo and Tung, 2007, Wong and Chan, 2003, Wu, 2005,
Wu and Chen, 2001). This is contrary to the perspective of ownership
advantages, which emphasise on profit making through selling or leasing new
products and technologies. In addition, as China lacks proprietary advantages,
China is not beneficial from structural or transactional imperfection in the
process of overseas investment. Evidently developed economies are dissimilar
to China in terms of culture, language, laws, and regulations, which contravene
L advantages. Therefore, the eclectic paradigm is not the appropriate model to
explain China's OFDI.
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2.3.1 Motivations of Chinese MNEs
Dunning and Lundan (2008) identify four types of overseas activities, namely,
natural resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset
or capability seeking, which have been widely discussed
• Resource seeking
There are three main types of resource seekers, aiming at (1) raw materials at a
lower cost; (2) cheap and well-motivated unskilled or semi-skilled labour; (3)
technological capability, management or marketing expertise and
organisational skills (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). China's OFDI in the 1980s
and early 1990s has been used to secure the supply of resources like minerals,
petroleum, timber, fishery and agricultural products (Cai, 1999, Wu and Sia,
2002), which are scarce at home country but vital for China's manufacturing
expansion and economic growth (Ye, 1992, Zhan, 1995), evidenced by, for
example, CITIC's purchase of Portland Aluminium Smelter (Australia) in 1986
(aluminium) and Shougang's 1992 acquisition of Hierro Peru (iron ore). The
energy security is the government's focus. Due to the decreasing supply from
domestic market, China's reliance on foreign resources has grown. Encouraged
by the 'going out' strategy, the national companies have invested abroad to
acquire oil and gas, metals and other natural resources, such as the acquisition
of Canada-based Petro Kazakhstan by China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) in 2005 (petroleum), and CITIC's investment in New Zealand, USA
and Canada (timber and forestry) (Buckley, Cross et al., 2008). All of these
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investors are state-owned or controlled enterprises. Their overseas businesses
have been supported, directly, in the form of financial assistance, bilateral
investment treaties and trade agreements from the host countries (Buckley,
Cross et al., 2008), and indirectly, through numerous state visits to resource-
rich countries (Buckley, Clegg et aI., 2008). Regarding China's foreign aid
investment programmes in developing countries especially in Africa, Latin
America and East and Central Asia, Luo and Tung (2007) believe that they are
undertaken to strengthen the political and diplomatic relationship between
China and various host countries. On the other hand, Pan (2006) and Evans and
Downs (2006) suggest that these infrastructure and construction programmes
are expected to assist Chinese MNEs to be granted with market access or
exploitation and extraction rights.
The second type of resource seeking is unlikely to be the case of China, as
China has abundant low-cost labour resources. As regards the third type,
Buckley et al.(2008) found little evidence for this motive, as the primary
reason for OFDI in the industrialised countries is for natural resources. Some
scholars portray FDI of this motivation into the category of strategic asset
seeking. For instance, Rui and Yip define the strategic goals of a firm as
'entering new markets, expanding capabilities by learning and acquiring new
knowledge, building bases of resources and experiences, realising a firm's
strategic transformation' (Rui and Yip, 2008). To avoid repetition, this thesis
confines 'resources' to the first type, natural resources. All technology and
expertise seeking OFDI will be discussed as a part of strategic-asset-seeking
investment.
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• Market seeking
Market-seeking investors establish foreign facilities to provide goods and
services outside home country. They aim at sustaining or strengthening
existing markets, as well as exploring or promoting new markets (Dunning and
Lundan, 2008), when the benefits of'internalisation' outweigh the transaction
costs, which is also portrayed as defensive and offensive (or aggressive,
labelled by Dunning and Lundan (2008) investment (Buckley, Cross et al.,
2008). China's low-cost, labour-intensive, low- and medium- technology-
intensive products face the imposition of protectionist measures like export
quotas and anti-dumping measures. In addition, Chinese MNEs, especially
private manufacturers, confront the intense competition in the domestic market,
which is almost saturated and have little space for business growth. OFDI is
thus primarily undertaken to support exports from the home country, collect
market information, or to circumvent trade barriers (Wall, 1999, Wu and Sia,
2002, Wu and Chen, 2001, Zhang, 2003). Most of these overseas market
seekers are private companies, involving in both, for example, the overseas
expansion of telecommunication companies such as Huawei and ZTE, and
electronics companies like Haier, Konka Electronics, Skyworth and
Changhong Electronics. The market seeking investment by Chinese private
companies can be well explained by traditional firm internationalisation
theories (Sutherland, 2010). However, previous literature has shown little
evidence of this OFDI undertaken by SOEs.
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• Efficiency seeking
The reason why firms seek efficiency outside home country is 'to rationalise
the structure of established resource-based or market-seeking investment in
such a way that the investing company can gain from the common governance
of geographically dispersed activities' (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). This
occurs when firms take advantage of the differences of factor endowments
between home and host country, such as capital, technology, information,
labour and natural resources, as well as the economies of scale and their scope.
To the utmost degree, it is unlikely that efficiency seeking is at present a major
reason for China's OFDI. Chinese MNEs' seeking for advantages in
industrialised countries is strategy-related rather than efficiency-related, while
expansion in Southeast Asia is more likely relevant to market-related. However,
it may have potential to explain the investment by Chinese MNEs in Southeast
Asia due to the rising production costs at home country (Buckley, Clegg et al.,
2008).
• Strategic assets seeking
While the question why China's OFDI flows to developed countries remains
unanswered, scholars attempt to address the question by positing the strategic-
asset seeking perspective (Cai, 1999, Deng, 2004, 2007, Liu, 1992, Luo and
Tung, 2007, Wong and Chan, 2003, Wu, 2005, Wu and Chen, 2001). The
resource-based theory suggests that competitive advantages and performance
are determined by a firm's strategic assets (Barney, 1991). What are strategic
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assets? Amit and Schoemaker (1993) define strategic assets as 'the set of
difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized resources and
capabilities that bestow the firm's competitive advantage'. These assets could
be tangible and intangible, including market information to improve domestic
export performance, knowledge of technology and manufacturing, global
brands, research and development (R&D) capability, distribution networks, and
capital markets and so forth (Alcacer and Chung, 2007, Boateng et al., 2008,
Buckley et al., 2007, Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Deng, 2004, Deng, 2009,
Taylor, 2002, Teece et al., 1997). Chinese MNEs pursue strategic assets to
promote their long-term strategic objectives, especially to strengthen their
competitiveness globally or in a particular market (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).
Lenovo's takeover of IBM's personal computer business can be regarded as a
typical example.
Chinese companies, especially SOEs, use OFDI as a 'springboard' to catch up
with their international competitors (Luo and Tung, 2007). Through
international expansion multinationals from emerging markets attempt to
compensate their competitive advantages, overcome their latecomer
disadvantages such as domestic market and institutional constraints, the lack of
innovative technologies, weak brand names, and incompetent business
management (Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Deng, 2009, Li, P.P., 2007, Luo and
Tung, 2007), retort their rivals' expansion in China, and to exploit their
competitive advantages and secure preferential treatment in other emerging
countries (Cui and Jiang, 2010, Luo and Tung, 2007). Due to the lack of firm-
specific ownership advantages, China's investment outflows to industrialised
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countries are advantage-seeking rather than asset-exploiting (Nolan, 2004,
2005, Sutherland, 2009). Some scholars, on the contrary, question whether
strategic-assets-seeking is distinguishing in China. For example, Sutherland
(2010) suggests that China's OFOI does not have any particular strategic-asset
orientation and there is no apparent need for an alternative theory.
2.3.2 Network or linkage perspective
Casson (1997) defines networks as 'a set of high-trust relationships which
either directly or indirectly link together everyone in a social group'.
Establishing networks can create competitive advantages for Chinese MNEs as
a result of disseminating and exchanging information between home and host
country, raising capital, lowering transaction costs, and acquiring further
technology, capital, and business opportunities (Chen and Chen, 1998, Hitt et
al., 2002, Johanson and Vahlne, 2003, 2006, Rauch, 2001, Saxenian, 2002,
Voss et al., 2009, Yang, 2003, Zhou, 1996). Dunning and Lundan (2008)
divide the network approach into five phases: (1) exports and foreign sourcing,
(2) investment in marketing and distribution, (3) foreign production of
intermediate goods and services, (4) deepening and widening of the value-
added network, and (5) integrated multinational network. In the case of China,
evidence of phase 1, 2 and 3 can be identified, for example, Chinese private
companies working as suppliers or service providers in the global supply chain
(Sutherland, 2010). Through global business and production network, Chinese
MNEs, as latecomers in alliances, can obtain market knowledge and have their
capabilities enhanced.
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It is generally accepted that the social and cultural networks playa crucial role
in linking overseas business with home country, for example, many Taiwanese
electronics firms are linked with their counterparts in Malaysia and Thailand
(Chen, 2003). Networks also enable firms to secure information and access
knowledge (Gulati et al., 2006, Lecraw, 1977). The Chinese TNCs may
recognise cultural proximity as a means of reducing transaction costs and
exploring new opportunities during OFDI development (Boisot and Child,
1996, Buckley et al., 2007).
Mathews (2006) studied the fast internationalisation of latecomer firms from
the Asia Pacific region, which has been achieved through organisational
innovations and strategic innovations. He made use of the linkage-Ieverage-
learning framework to examine the factors leading to the success of challenger
firms. He claims that latecomers from developing countries seek or explore
strategic assets via OFDI rather than exploit competitive advantages. Luo and
Tung (2007) share a similar viewpoint that Chinese firms' primary objective is
to leverage knowledge and resources abroad and then to catch up with their
global competitors.
While the OLI model is more internal-focused, the linkage-leverage-learning
model is more external-focused. Li (2007) integrates these two models into a
new content-process framework, with concerns to external environment,
internal firm, entrepreneur profile, and market performance. Nevertheless, Li
only employed his model to experiment three Chinese enterprises, Haier,
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Lenovo and TCL, which are hardly recognised as typical examples. It is
doubtful whether his 'holistic, dynamic and dialectical' approach provides a
better explanation for other types of Chinese MNEs.
2.3.3 Overseas subsidiaries and cross-border M&As
Concerning Chinese MNEs' overseas business activities, little research has
been done on China's entry mode, Greenfield investment (overseas
subsidiaries), joint ventures and cross-border M&As.
As a result of M&As, a firm can obtain and control resources of technology
and human capital, promote organisational learning, and facilitate skills and
competencies development (Chung and Alcacer, 2002, Vermeulen and
Barkema, 2001). Among the relatively few studies on China's M&As, there are
three main strands of research. One is to analyse the effects of M&As on a
firm's performance, for which the econometric analysis is always applied (for
example, Cai, 2007, Li, M., 2007, Li and Zhu, 2005, Liu and Zou, 2008, Yu
and Liu, 2004). Another one is to scrutinise the determinants of China's M&As
outcomes, for example, based on the absorptive capacity perspective (Deng, P.,
2010). Yet these two strands are beyond the scope of our research.
The third strand, in particular, concentrates on Chinese MNEs' overseas
acquisition of strategic assets. First termed by the study on the significant
performance of post-war Japanese companies (Hamel et al., 1989), a strategic
intent perspective concerns a firm's ambitious strategic objectives in the global
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competition, such as exploring foreign markets, acquiring new knowledge to
boost capabilities, and strengthening resources and experiences. Rui and Yip
(2008) portray the strategic intent perspective to analyse Chinese MNEs' cross-
border M&As (figure 2.1). Chinese firms use foreign acquisitions to
compensate for their competitive disadvantages, leverage their competitive
advantages, overcome institutional constraints and augment institutional
advantage, and even pursue long-term objectives, thus transforming themselves
from domestic players to global leaders. Based on evidence from Nanjing
Automobile's takeover MO Rover (UK), Rui and Yip (2008) consider
institutional constrains and incentives including the nation's weak innovative
system, local protectionism and policy to encourage firms' catch-up.
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Figure 2.1: the strategic intent perspective to explain China's M&As
Internal conditions push SIP
Explore resource to compensate
competitive disadvantages:
Lack of product technology;
No global management experience &
globally recognised brand;
Obstacles of existing patents and
standardisation
Exploit resource to leverage competitive
advantages:
Cost advantages;
Applied technology;
Niche market products;
Quick responsive service
Fast growing entrepreneurship
and management skills nurture
SIP
Growth of private ownership;
Transformation of SOEs;
Learning from inward FDI;
Growth of high tech entrepreneurs from
high-tech parks around the country
involving overseas returning
entrepreneurs
Strategic goals of the Chinese foreign
acquisitions
Instant goal: to acquire strategic needs to compensate for
their competitive disadvantages and leveraging their
unique ownership advantages
Ultimate goal: to realise firms' strategic transformation
and obtain long-term sustainable competitive advantages
External environment, institutional
constraints and incentives initiate/reinforce
SIP
Weakness of national innovation system;
Local protectionism causing low synergies in R&D at
inter-firm level;
FDI policy leading to frustration of learning form inward
FDI;
Policy to encourage firms' catch-up and go-on
Source: Rui and Yip (2008)
Despite this, Zhang and Ebbers (2010) propose a framework taking macro-
level, industry-level, firm-level and deal-specific factors into account and
conclude that China's M&As are influenced by institutional ownership,
economic relations between home and host country, industrial sensitivity and
professional information. Derived from the principal-principal model of
corporate governance (Dharwadkar et al., 2000, Su et al., 2008, Young et al.,
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2008), Chen and Young (2010) and Gu and Reed (2010) found evidence to
support the hypothesis that high levels of government ownership of an acquirer
make the M&A deals less favourably, because of the divergence of motivations
and interests between the Chinese government and minority shareholders.
Deng (2009) proposes an institutional model (figure 2.2) to study the resource-
driven motivation ofM&As, concerning country-level (the role of government
and escape response to domestic institutional constraints) and firm-level
(corporate values and norms and inward FDI as a stimulus to OFDI)
institutional elements. He agrees that the overseas businesses of Chinese MNEs
are to enhance critical competencies rather than to exploit existing assets.
Figure 2.2: an institutional model for strategic assets seeking via M&A
External
sources: the role
of government
Institutional (PI)
elements at the
national level
Escape response Acquisition
to institutional of strategic
constraints (P2) assets via
Home cross-border
country M&Ain
institutional order to
environment enhance
Internal sources: competitive
corporate values edge
Institutional and norms (P2)
elements at the
organisational
level Inward FDI as
stimulus to
overseas M&A
(P4)
Source: Deng (2009)
Another approach of outward FDI is to establish overseas subsidiaries. As
regards the decision by Chinese MNEs on entry mode to foreign countries, Cui
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and Jiang (2009) suggest that the wholly-owned-subsidiaries entry mode
(figure 2.3) is always selected if an investor is large in size, enters a
competition intensive industry, hunts for complementary assets and pursues a
global strategic objective. They, however, have not considered any of the
institutional factors. Joint ventures are preferred to penetrate cultural barriers
and to offset regulative institutional barriers in a fast-growing foreign country.
Afterwards, adapted from the strategy tripod model (Peng, 2008), Cui and
Jiang (2010) consider that the decision making of internationalisation strategy
involves three perspectives: resource-based, institution-based, and industry-
based views. They agree that China's OFDI is both assets exploiting and assets
augmenting (Dunning, 2006, Peng, 2008, Peng et al., 2008, Yang, Jiang et al.,
2009). During the internationalisation process, Chinese MNEs have to act in
accordance with the regulations issued by the Chinese government. China's
OFDI, however, is more attracted by host country's appealing policy rather
than pushed by home country.
Figure 2.3: a strategy tripod model of internationalization
Industry-based view
• Industry pull effect
• Industry push effect
Resource-based view
• Assets exploiting
• Assets seeking
Firm internationalisation
strategy
Institution-based view
• Host institutions
• Home institutions
Source: Cui and Jiang (20 I0)
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To the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study with regard to
Chinese MNEs' offshore holding companies, with the exception of the
discussion of the typical cases of Haier opening a factory in the US and
Huawei's establishment of overseas R&D centres (Deng, 2007), and
Sutherland's investigation into offshore holding subsidiaries of China's private
firms (Sutherland, 2010).
2.4 China's government intervention
2.4.1 Key stages of Chinese OFDI policy development
Based on some scholars' research on the evolution of China's OFDI (for
example, Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Voss et al., 2008, Wong and Chan, 2003,
Woo and Zhang, 2005, Wu and Chen, 2001, Yang, Jiang et al., 2009, Yang,
Lim et al., 2009, Zhang, 2003), China's OFDI progress is closely tied with the
development of China's administrative and juridical system. For instance, Luo
et al. (2010) categorise China's evolutionary changes into three phases. During
the first stage of 'fresh flowers' or 'poisonous grass' (1984-1990), China's
objective was to accumulate foreign exchange (Luo et al., 2010). At that time,
investment was limited and the application process was very strict. During the
stage of 'finding the stepping stone' (1991-2000), the Chinese government
worried about a number of problems happening after the investment, such as
the losses of state-owned assets (Luo et al., 2010), corruption and nepotism
(Wong and Chan, 2003), and capital flight and the 'leakage' offoreign
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exchange (Buckley, Cross et al., 2008). As a result, the OFDI approval process
was tightened, while the administration of foreign exchange was relaxed (Luo
et ai., 2010). During the 'Going abroad' stage (2001-present), the Chinese
government worked on a comprehensive policy system
During the early stage of China's OFDI development, scholars always shared a
negative view of the Chinese government's control and restriction ofOFDI,
similar as many other developing countries (UNCT AD, 1996). The Chinese
government involvement in encouraging and directing OFDI can be traced
back to the 1990s through its promotion of specialised international trade
corporations (Cai, 1999). Viewing China's TNCs in the early 1990s, Zhang and
VanDen Bulcke (1996) maintain that if enterprises could balance the influence
of 'the governmental bureaucratic system' and 'the development of a real
entrepreneurial logic' well, it is likely for them to be successful and
competitive, as compared to those 'which have based their international
business strategy only on the privileged position which they received from the
government'. This is a rather tentative study to consider the interplay between
the interests of government and firms.
Regardless of the different criteria to define stages, it has been generally agreed
that year 2001 marks the new era of China's OFDI (Buckley, Cross et al., 2008,
Luo et al., 2010, Voss et al., 2008). Since the Chinese government formally
initiated the 'going out' strategy, a series of regulations were issued to form a
complete political and institutional framework to supervise and monitor
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outward investment. Luo et al. (2010) also addressed that the government
transformed its role from being a regulator to a guide and supporter.
Additionally, Luo et al. (2010) categorise China's policies into two groups,
administrative and promotional and then reveal the features of China's HCMs
in different phases. However, these scholars only have listed key points of a
number of policies and regulations without a look into the details (Luo et aI.,
2010, Ren et al., 2010, Voss et al., 2008). Their shortcomings are as follows,
which will be compensated by our research. First, none of them embrace the
extensive policies and regulations, especially after 2005, or with special
concerns on Chinese MNEs' overseas activities like overseas listings, cross-
border M&As or establishing offshore holding subsidiaries. Second, the extant
studies merely connect the measures with the general trend of Chinese OFDI,
instead of excavating the relationship between the Chinese government and
MNEs or conducting case studies to analyse dominant investors.
2.4.2 Positive effects
China has entered a new era with the entry into the WTO in 2001. Many
changes occur to China's political, economic, social, and cultural sectors.
Based on comprehensive reading of China's policies and regulations related to
OFDI and relevant comments by scholars (for example, Freemand, 2008,
OECD, 2008, Voss et al., 2008), it is found that most policies and regulations
accessible now were promulgated in 2000s. Furthermore, most ofHCMs which
are effective now are issued after 2003. Therefore, this research regarded 2003
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as a turning point in the process of China's OFDI development and focuses on
the government's subsequent political and regulatory activities. After 2003, the
significance of the relationship between the government and the business
groups has been gradually noted. It is worth noting that the above-mentioned
barriers holding back China's OFDI have been relaxed to some extent. The
Chinese government has since then simplified the examination and approval
procedures, and more incentive policies have been launched. It has been agreed
by researchers that policy liberalisation has had a positive influence on
stimulating Chinese OFDI. For instance, Voss et al. (2008) suggest that the
considerable growth of the Chinese OFDI, particularly after 2002, is a
consequence of the more liberal measures and government support. These
regulations reflect the role of the state as the major shareholder in central
enterprises. The regulations are very significant, especially in the context of
emerging MNEs in China. Smaller firms, however, do not benefit from
institutional advantages as large, well-connected Chinese SOEs (Voss et al.,
2009). Other institutional advantages such as diplomatic and financial
assistances, as well as state-supported scientific and technical research are
extensively accredited (Buckley et al., 2006, Cai, 1999, Child and Rodrigues,
2005, Deng, 2004, Luo et al., 20 I0, Rui and Yip, 2008).
2.4.3 Institutional constrains
In spite of the government effort to promote firm performance to some extent,
it has also been argued the institutional constraints, such as protectionism, the
weak judiciary and legal systems, and constant changes of the policies and
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regulations. Wu (2005) has labelled an administratively decentralised China a
'vassal economy' dominated by local protectionism. Government intervention
has sheltered enterprises to mature in the home country and then to develop in
the international market (Deng, 2009, Morek et al., 2008). Moreover, Morek et
al. (2008) propose that the government officials may use OFDI as 'flagship'
projects overseas to advance their careers as bureaucrats, not taking into
account of the economic returns of these investments. This finding reflects the
call by Naughton (2008) that central enterprises are 'national champions in the
sense that they can be sent forth to battle for objectives the national
government wants to achieve'. Furthermore, Boisot and Meyer (2008)
introduce the notion of institutional arbitrage, which is in dispute with the
mainstream perspectives, which reveals MNEs from developing countries
seeking advantages abroad. They argue that Chinese firms do so to elude the
competitive disadvantages at home country and pursue advantages enjoyed by
foreign firms operating within China.
Some scholars apply the principal-agent theories (Laffont and Martimort, 2002)
to discuss corporate governance and overseas operation of the Chinese state-
owned multinational enterprises. For example, Gill and Reilly (2007) study
Chinese companies operating in Africa and found that contradictions between
the interests and aims of government principals and agents (companies and
businesspersons). When undertaking overseas mergers and acquisitions, due to
principal-agent problems, public companies may encourage and allow the
acquisitions that are not consistent with long-run profit maximisation
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). Chinese scholars, for example, Wang and
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Wang (2008), Song et al.(201 0) and Li and Shi (2004), argue that principal-
agent problems include long principal-agent chains, ineffective incentive and
constraint mechanism, internal control, and multi-roles of principals and agents.
Furthermore, these problems in overseas corporate governance may result in
the loss of overseas state-owned assets and bring constraints to OFDI
development (will be discussed in Chapter 5).
Another shortcoming of China's institutional environment is the complicated
and time-consuming examination and approval procedure. For example, Wong
and Chan (2003) found that China's domestic regulatory barriers involve
complex and prolonged approval procedures for start-up businesses, excessive
control over foreign exchange and a lack of adequate government support. The
incentive policies on overseas projects are often not easily accessible to the
general public. Many enterprises do not know the existence of these documents,
and if they do, they do not know where to get them. Another weakness is the
unexpected changes of regulatory policies. It is then difficult for the Chinese
firms to make appropriate business strategy for long-term overseas investments
(Buckley, 2004, Luo and Peng, 1999, Peng and Luo, 2000, Shenkar, 1996).
Although the Chinese government plays a continually dominant, rather than a
diminishing role in big businesses (Nolan and Yeung, 200 1b), its economic
policies in the 1980s and 1990s failed and many large enterprises have not
caught up with the world's leading business (Nolan, 2002). Different from the
views of other scholars, Wang (2002) claims that it is reasonable for the
government to be highly involved in OFDI activities, not only because the
investors are primarily SOEs, but also to ensure that the OFDI would meet the
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country's long-term development strategies. However, at that time, the
government concentrated on preventing illegal capital outflows and the
unnecessary loss of state-owned assets. The support from the Chinese
government was less than adequate.
Accordingly, it is suggested that Chinese MNEs adopt OFDI to avoid the
administrative constraints at home country, in particular local protectionism
(Nolan, 2001 b), deficient intellectual property rights (Boisot, 2004), and poor
R&D system at the national, industrial, and firm levels (Buckley, Clegg et al.,
2008). All these concerns trigger Chinese MNEs to access the advantages
outside home country. This is also well-known as the escapism view. The
discussions on China's OFDI, especially from the private sector, have
concentrated on capital flight (Cheung and Qian, 2010, Gunter, 1996, Harrold
and Lall, 1993, Lardy, 1995, Sicular, 1998, Wu and Tang, 2000) and/or round
tripping (Sutherland, 2010, Sutherland and Matthews, 2009, Xiao, 2004).
There are also a number of Chinese scholars involving in this study, who
attempt to work out the channels of capital flight and the value or ratio of
China's round-tripping (for example, Ren, 2001, Song, 1999, Yang and Gunter,
2002, Yang and Liu, 2000, Zhuang, 2000), as capital flight was not recorded in
official statistics (Wall, 1997).
Sutherland and Matthews (2009) argue that this portion of Chinese OFDI
cannot be well explained by mainstream perspectives, which is, in reverse,
always overlooked or ignored. Furthermore, no one can tell what is the next
destination of China's OFDI flows to tax havens like British Virgin Islands
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(BVI) or the Cayman Islands (Cl), and whether they go back to home country
('round-tripping') or expand to other destinations ('onward-journeying')
(Sutherland, 2010).
It is difficult to precisely quantify the extent of round-tripping. Some studies
suggest that the round-tripping flows might account for 25% of the inflows to
China in 1992 (Harrold and Lall, 1993), or much higher than 25% (Wu and
Keong, 2002), or about half of investment from Hong Kong (Xiao, 2004).
Literature concerning the motivations of 'round-tripping' investment is limited.
Xiao (2004) hypothesises two types of round tripping: rent-seeking, or
investment for escaping regulation, which is believed to facilitate private
companies to avoid institutional constraints; and value-seeking, or investment
for value added services, which is more likely to occur in the financial business.
In addition, Xiao (2004) summarises four incentives for China's round-tripping
investment: tax advantages and fiscal incentives, property rights protection,
expectations on exchange control and exchange rate, and competitiveness of
Hong Kong, China and overseas financial services. As beneficial regulations
are widely provided to encourage FDI flows into the newly industrialised
economies, especially Mainland China, round-tripping activities are widely
known in these countries and areas. Wong and Chan (2003) believe that around
20% of the total FDI flows to Mainland China are made up of round-tripping
funding. The primary reason why Chinese enterprises continue to increase their
investment into tax heavens is to gain access to preferential tax incentives
normally reserved for foreign investors. This 'round tripping' will most likely
continue until domestic investors receive similar treatment as foreigners.
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These arguments, however, may not be plausible for Chinese SOEs, which
enjoy the government's preferential treatment in obtaining bank loans and
accessing the financial markets (Morek et aI., 2008). It is well-known that
China's capital markets are dominated by banks, especially the four state-
owned commercial banks: the Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China, which
jointly account for around three-quarters of all commercial loans and over 50%
of the total banking assets at of the end of2005 (ABC, 2006, BOC, 2006,
CBRC, 2006, CCB, 2006, ICBC, 2006). Capital market imperfections are
caused by soft budget constraints, China's inefficient banking system, intra-
company cross subsidising and tunnelling, and personal capital (Buckley et al.,
2007, Morek et al., 2008, Voss et al., 2009). Due to the banks' lack of
competence in evaluating risks (Tsai, 2004) and the government's support with
preferential treatment, most of the excessive bank loans finally go to the state
sectors, although SOEs have lower returns to capital than private companies
(Dollar and Wei, 2007). For example, 73% of the short-term bank loans
between 2001 and 2004 were issued to Chinese SOEs, while the lending to
private firms remained 0.3% of the total lending credit from 2000 to 2004
(Benderson, 2008). Shirai (2002) also reveals that banks are more inclined to
grant loans to large, old, less profitable firms, and firms with a high level of
state ownership.
2.5 Conclusion
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Scholars have consistently argued whether the mainstream theories can explain
the FDI from developing countries (for example, Cantwell and Tolentino, 1990,
Lall, 1983, Wells, 1977, Wesson, 1999). Widely received theories mostly
concentrate on enterprises from developed countries, such as the USA, Europe
and Japan. They are usually world-famous firms with advanced technologies
for many years. This is different from China's state-owned or state-controlled
enterprises. The current international investment environment for developing
countries is also different from that in a few decades ago, in terms of the degree
of integration, openness, network and economic development. Furthermore, the
heavy involvement of the Chinese government to shape, guide and support
OFDI development makes China a typical example to expand international
business theory in the light of cross-sectional analysis, taking the political,
economic and social factors into consideration. Given the Chinese
government's ambitious policies to encourage OFDI, and the rapid global
expansion of Chinese companies, it seems important to have a progressive and
in-depth investigation into the relationship between the Chinese government
and business groups. It is essential to understand the objectives and activities of
both the government and MNEs.
Specifically, it should be noted that the extant literature in the field of
international business cannot fully account for the importance of China's
political supervision. One possible reason is that a significant share of the
research on Chinese OFDI is entirely in the light of extant international
business theories, which are originated and derived from the study of western
MNEs (Cai, 1999, Deng, 2004, Liu et al., 2005, Wong and Chan, 2003, Wu,
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2005, Wu and Chen, 2001). Although they take China's context into account,
not much attention has been paid to the important factor, which is the Chinese
government will never give up its control over SOEs. This is especially the
case for those strategic industries and sectors that have significantly influenced
China's economic performance and growth.
The conclusion drawn on the role of China's government and effects, however,
is always mixed, positively and negatively. Some believe that government
intervention may cause problems, such as corruption, over protection, and
using OFDI as 'flagship' projects (for example, Morek et al., 2008). In contrast,
other scholars claim that, Chinese government has made great efforts to
promote OFDI, although a lot of problems are still waiting to be solved. Luo et
al. (2010) believe that the institutional barriers and governmental promotion
should be deliberated as dual forces that co-exist and push Chinese MNEs to
internationalise. Even if most scholars agree that the Chinese government plays
an important role in the OFDI progress, very few of them, however, have
looked into the details of policies and investigate the political determinant. This
is not only for its potential to extend current theories but also for the policy
lessons it may offer to other developing countries.
This research attempts to fill in the gaps in the literature concerning the
institutional effects on OFDI. From the viewpoint of the government, based on
the study of policies and regulations, this research addresses what the
government has done and what their concerns are, and further to address the
nation's interests. Moreover, firms' business activities indicate their responses
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to the HCMs and reflect the corporate interests. This research will indicate
whether a convergence or conflict exists between the State and firms' pursues,
and to what extent the HCMs influence OFDI development.
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Chapter 3 Background: China's OFDI,
government and enterprises
Host countries, home countries and TNCs are involved in a triangular
relationship in a foreign-direct-investment transaction (UNCT AD, 2001). In
the triangular relationship in the OFDI activities, this research concentrates on
the relationship between the home country government and Chinese TNCs.
Before later considering in more detail China's HCMs and their effects, this
chapter reviews the background information relevant to the research on HCMs
effects. Section 3.1 briefly presents the development of China's OFDI and
further discusses the problem with the Chinese official statistics. This also
provides one reason for the data selected in this research. Section 3.2
introduces the governmental institutions like the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and
briefly outlines the evolution of their functions. This helps in understanding the
role of different departments in regulating OFDI measures. After that, section
3.3 reviews the progress made by Chinese TNCs in recent years.
3.1 China's outward investment and official data
If taking account of financial investment, China's total outward investment
amounted to USD 56.53 billion in 2009 (MOFCOM et al., 2010). This research
focuses on China's non-financial OFDI flows (OFDI hereinafter), which
reached USD 47.8 billion in 2009, an increase of 14.2% compared to that in
2008 (MOFCOM et al., 2010). The value of non-financial OFDI stock was
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USD 199.76 billion at the end of2009, which accounted for 81.3% of the total
stock. Figure 3.1 illustrates the value of overseas investment increased in
recent decades and China's proportion in the world's OFDI. According to
figure 3.1, there are three stages in the development of Chinese OFDI. First,
before 2003, China's OFDI fluctuated and maintained a very small percentage
of the world's total investment, which for most years was below 1%. Second,
during 2003-2007, both the value and the percentage of China's OFDI
gradually increased. Third, since 2008, the global financial credit crunch
seemed to have positive effects on China's OFDI development, which resulted
in the proportion increasing from 0.45% in 1990 to 4.34% in 2009.
Although the annual value and percentage of China's FDI outflows grew
rapidly, China's OFDI stock was still a small proportion of that of the whole
world. Thanks to the global economic depression, the year 2009 witnessed the
first time that the percentage of China's OFDI stock broke through 1% of the
global outward investment stock (UNCTAD, 2010b).
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Chapter 3 Background: China's OFDI, government and enterprises
China's OFDI has the following characteristics. First, Chinese TNCs target a
larger coverage of markets open to foreign investment. China had invested into
177 countries and regions at the end of2009, which were considerably more
than 139 countries in 2003 (MOFCOM and NBS, 2004, MOFCOM et al.,
2010). Regarding the distribution of overseas companies, Asia is the top one
continent with more than 6,800 Chinese enterprises. Specifically, 19.8% of
total overseas enterprises integrated in Hong Kong (MOFCOM et al., 2010).
These overseas enterprises concentrate on the industries of manufacturing,
wholesale and retailing and business services. Chinese enterprises prefer to set
up wholly owned affiliates and branches abroad, which account for 95.1%,
while only 4.9% are joint ventures (MOFCOM et al., 2010).
Second, the most attractive targets of OFDI flows and stock were always Hong
Kong, Cayman Islands (Cl) and British Virgin Islands (BYI) from 2003 to
2009 (table 3.1). These regions, in particular the latter two, are important
destinations (or are known as tax havens), as they have tax, accounting and
legal systems that facilitate business formation, from which further onward
investments may be made. The top three destinations of China's OFDI flows
changed in 2008 and 2009. The point worth highlighting is that in 2009, the
investment into Australia and Luxembourg both surpassed the flow into BYI.
However, it is impossible that Cl and BVI are the final destinations of OFDI.
Investment to tax havens may flow back to mainland China (round tripping) or
may proceed to other countries (onward journeying) (Sutherland, 20 10), which
needs further investigation.
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Chapter 3 Background: China's OFDI, government and enterprises
Third, as indicated by figure 3.2, overseas investment distributes into a broad
spectrum of sectors, such as business service, wholesale and retailing, mining,
transportation and storage, and manufacturing. The mining industry ranks the
first for overseas investment value in 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007. Different
from other years, in 2008, USD 6.5] billion flew to the wholesale and retailing
industry, comprising 15.6% of the annual OFDI (MOFCOM et al., 2009). In
2005 and 2009, the business service sector attracted the most investment,
which approximately accounted for more than 30% of the total value
(MOFCOM et al., 2006, 2010). The data of outflows to the banking and
finance sector only became available from 2006. For instance, in 2009, 8.73
USD billion flew to this sector, accounting for] 5% of the annual investment
(MOFCOM et al., 2010).
Figure 3.2: the value and percentage of investment flows to different industries
2009 (USD billion; %)
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Source: (MOFCOM et al., 2010)
Last but not least, most investors are large SOEs, especially in early years;
SOEs play the crucial part in investing overseas (MOFCOM, various years).
However, the percentage taken by SOEs is surpassed by limited companies,
which were only ranked in the second place in 2008. To be specific, 43% of
total overseas investors were SOEs in 2003, while this proportion continuously
declined to only 13.4% in 2009 (MOFCOM et al., 2010). The diversity of
investing companies' ownership can reduce the risk to invest abroad. This is
also in accordance with the Chinese government's 'going out' strategy that
encourages enterprises with various forms of ownership to invest abroad (Jiang,
2002). Concerning the stock value accumulated over years, however, the
picture looks different. SOEs, which take 69.2% of the stock, are still regarded
as the main power to invest abroad. Data and information of non-SOEs is quite
limited. One possible reason is that investment by private companies flows to
tax havens and then onwards to unknown destinations, which is thus unable to
be traced.
In particular, only 4.9% of investors were central enterprises in 2009
(MOFCOM et al., 2010). Affiliates founded by central enterprises account for
19% of the total number. As far as FDI outflow in 2009 was concerned, 67.6%
was achieved by central enterprises, which was less than 85.4% in 2008. The
stock ofOFDI by central enterprises in 2009 maintained a high proportion,
amounting to 80.2% of the total value (MOFCOM et al., 2010). This can be
recognised as a distinct characteristic of China's OFDI: central enterprises are
'weak' in numbers but dramatically strong in investment activities.
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On the other hand, the above analysis of China's OFDI features is based upon
official data. At the current stage, due to the lack of high quality data, most
scholars applied official statistics from the Chinese government, in particular
Chinese government sources like MOFCOM's Statistical Bulletin of China's
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (Cui and Jiang, 2009), Almanac of China's
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFCOM) (Buckley, Clegg et al.,
2008,2007, Wu and Chen, 2001), and China Statistical Yearbook (Buckley,
Clegg et al., 2008, Buckley et al., 2007, Liu et al., 2005). However, applying
official data to analyse OFDI has been questioned (Naughton, 2007, Voss et aI.,
2009), as other official Chinese statistics, for example, Rawski's argument on
the reliability of China's GDP statistics (Rawski, 2001a,b). Holz (2004) reveals
the problems in compiling accurate data during the process of China's
economic transition and development. In addition, Wong and Chan (2003)
indicate that China's official figures for OFDI released by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Cooperation (MOFTEC) between 1979 and 2001 are
significantly underestimated. They include only non-trading outbound
activities such as manufacturing and resource development. Korniyenko and
Sakatsume (2009) have a similar assumption of underestimation due to the
changing definitions and statistical methodologies. For example, China
reported that up to 2007 the OFOI stock for Mongolia was USO 315 million,
while the Mongolian FDI agency showed that the data should be USO 900
million (Korniyenko and Sakatsume, 2009). Moreover, China's OFDI statistics
is significantly different from international standards in terms of quality and
coverage; even large discrepancies exist between methodological approaches
undertaken by MOFCOM and SAFE, two main official sources ofOFDI data
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(Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Schuller and Turner, 2005, UNCT AD, 2007a).
The inflation brought by 'round-tripping' investment also results in scholars'
doubt in official data as discussed in (for example, Schuler-Zhou and Schuller,
2009, Sutherland, 2010, Sutherland and Matthews, 2009).
Due to the lack of high quality data, this research applies firm-level data
obtained from enterprises' websites, financial reports and reliable news reports.
The reason for methodology selection and data collection will be elaborated in
the next chapter.
3.2 Institutional actors
Nowadays, scholars agree that the major actors engaged in the administration
and support ofOFDI are the State Council, the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC), the People's Bank of China (PBC), the Ministry
of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE), and the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
(SA SAC). They guide which country or industry is preferential, and which
country or industry need more consideration when making OFDI decisions.
Figure 3.3 outlines the evolution of these departments. To provide a more
complete legal, regulatory and financial framework of OFDI, this section also
discusses the Ministry of Finance (MOF), an important actor to offer financial
support, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), crucial in
the supervision of overseas listings. The rest of this section introduces their
functions under the current Constitution.
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Figure 3.3: evolution of Chinese regulation departments ofOFDI
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Chapter 3 Background: China's OFDI, government and enterprises
Notes: NPC, National Planning Commission; MFTEC, Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation, the predecessor ofMOC; PBC, People's Bank of China; MOF,
Ministry of Finance; SOAA, State-owned Assets Authority; SAFE, State Administration of
Foreign Exchange; SDPC, State Development Planning Commission; MOC, Ministry of
Commerce; SDRC, State Development and Reform Commission; SASAC, State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission; DFEC, Department of Foreign Economic
Cooperation; PRO, Policy Research Department; DITEA, Department of International Trade
and Economic Affairs; FERT, Foreign Economic Relation & Trade.
Source: Luo et al.(2010)
3.2.1 State Council
The State Council, functioning as a central leadership, deals with fundamental
and general issues like diplomacy, national defence, finance, economy, culture
and education, rather than concrete policy initiatives(Luo et al., 2010). The
chief functions of the State Council include formulating and publishing of
regulations, decisions and orders, stipulating and coordinating tasks and
responsibilities of ministries and commissions, managing foreign affairs and
concluding treaties and agreements with foreign countries (www.gov.cn).
3.2.2 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
NDRC evolved from the State Development Planning Commission, which was
the successor organisation to the National Planning Commission (NPC) (Luo et
aI., 2010). According to Circular of the State Council Concerning
Organizational Structure (1E:%-~~T;fJl;f~ii.m.Er-JjfJj~rl Guowuyuan guanyu
jigou shezhi de tongzhi) in 2008, NDRC, as one of the component departments
of the State Council, should approve, authorise, and review key investment
projects for overseas resources development, and investment projects utilising
large amount of foreign exchange as mandated by the State Council, as well as
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develop strategies, planning, goals and policies to balance and optimise
outward investment' (www.ndrc.gov.cn). For instance, one of the most
important policies issued by NDRC is Interim Administrative Measures for the
Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment Projects (tlljr1Jt~.UYl§f~
ft-m1T~JlIU}¥* Jingwai touzi xiangmu hezhun zanxing guanli banJa), which
is studied in detail in Chapter 5. In addition, NDRC works closely with the
Chinese policy banks to provide financial support for relevant overseas projects
(Chapter 6). Under the control ofNDRC, the Department of Foreign
Investment and Overseas Investment is responsible for the examination of
overseas resource development and large investment projects and the planning
of using foreign exchange for OFDI (wzs.ndrc.gov.cn).
3.2.3 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
MOFCOM evolved from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC). MOFCOM's functions include drafting and
implementing policies and regulations of large non-financial OFDI projects,
negotiating bilateral and multilateral investment and trade treaties, ensuring the
alliance of China's economic and trade laws with international treaties and
agreements, and coordinating China's foreign aid policy and relevant funding
and loan schemes. As the competent authority of OFDI, the Department of
Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation (hzs.mofcom.gov.cn), under
the control of MOFCOM, is set up to formulate laws and regulations with
regard to OFDI, to formulate administrative measures and policies guiding
overseas investment, to examine and approve OFDI and establishment of
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overseas affiliates (excluding financial companies) and supervise their
operations, and to guide the work of Chinese authorities in foreign countries.
Above responsibilities are reflected by MOFCOM's examination and approval
of OFDI projects according to Measures for Overseas Investment
Administration (~jHJB5itgJt1}¥t Jingwai touzi guanli banJa). MOFCOM
also involves in information provision and technical assistance, in particular,
the publishing of Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance
Catalogue (X1jl-N ~ ~ ~iJtz:~ _I@ r~§)R Duiwai touzi guobie chanye
daoxiang mulu).
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3.2.4 People's Bank of China (PBC)
As one of the component departments of the State Council and functioning as
the Central Bank, PBC's main responsibilities are to macro-control and
coordination of the Chinese financial system, such as to issue and enforce
regulations, to formulate and implement monetary policy and to regulate inter-
bank markets (www.pbc.gov.cn). PBC's influence on China's OFDI is
exercised by its combined powers over monetary policies and foreign exchange
control. For example, RMB appreciation and reduced foreign exchange reserve
ratio are the incentives to motivate enterprises to invest abroad. However, PBe
does not provide grants or loans for enterprises to invest abroad, which are
executed by China's policy banks (directly under the State Council) and
commercial banks (under the supervision of China Banking Regulatory
Commission).
3.2.5 State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
Similar to NDRC and MOFCOM, SAFE's current tasks are confirmed after
several reorganisations, which can be dated back to the State General
Administration for Exchange Control in 1982 (Voss et al., 2008). SAFE is
principally responsible for monitoring cross-border capital flows, supervising
overseas and domestic foreign exchange accounts, and undertaking
management of foreign exchange reserves (www.safe.gov.cn). Under the direct
control of PBC, SAFE performs as the governor of China's foreign exchange
reserves. Its main responsibilities include putting forward foreign exchange
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management system reform, drafting regulations related to foreign exchange
administration, and supervising the domestic and overseas foreign exchange
accounts. Any enterprise aiming at overseas activities has to apply to SAFE or
its local branches for the OFDI foreign exchange registration certificate.
Meanwhile, SAFE works with MOFCOM to inspect and evaluate Chinese
enterprises' performances per annum. SAFE also has rights to punish the
institution which violates relevant stipulations regarding foreign exchange
administration. China's foreign exchange reform and its effects will be
investigated in Chapter 4.
3.2.6 Ministry of Finance (MOF)
The responsibilities of MOF related to OFDI are to formulate and implement
government policies on mergers and acquisitions, to manage the government's
non-tax revenues and governmental funds to support enterprises, to monitor the
corporate finance of central enterprises and profitability of state-owned assets,
to handle and supervise the appropriated funds for investment projects by the
central government (www.mof.gov.cn). One ofMOF's key contributions is to
provide special funds for foreign economic and technical cooperation. MOF's
support to OFDI will be discussed in Chapter 5.
3.2.7 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is a ministry-level unit
directly under the State Council. Its main responsibility is to regulate China's
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securities and futures markets to ensure their orderly and legitimate operation,
including drafting policies and development planning of securities and futures
markets; inspecting the issuance, listing, trading, custody and settlement of
stock, convertible bonds and corporate bonds; supervising listed companies and
their stock market behaviours; inspecting domestic enterprises' direct or
indirect overseas issuance and listing; monitoring foreign institutions to set up
securities and futures organizations in china. CSRC issues annual reports to
provide information of securities and futures on China's capital market on a
yearly basis. Chapter 4 will explore CSRC's control over the listings on the
foreign stock exchanges and its subsequent effects on OFDI.
3.2.8 State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)
In 2003 SASAC was established and directly subject to the State Council. In
terms of the structure, SASAC is the only name in the category 'special
organisation directly under the State Council' (1E~~H~*f1im:MJ
guowuyuan zhishu teshe jigou). As indicated by SASAC official website,
SASAC performs the responsibility as the investor on behalf of the state;
guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of state-owned
enterprises; supervises the preservation and increment of the value of state-
owned assets for enterprises under its supervision; appoints and removes top
executives of the enterprises under the supervision of the Central Government,
evaluates their performances, and grants them rewards or inflicts punishments;
and, directs and supervises the management work of local state-owned assets
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(www.sasac.gov.cn). SASAC primarily functions throughout the
administration, approval and support of central enterprises.
However, SASAC has been questioned whether it can fulfil the objective of
ensuring SOEs to remain competitive and maintain and further increase the
value of state-owned assets (Clarke, 2003, Naughton, 2007, Pearson, 2005).
Working at both the national level and sub-national levels, SASAC exercises
its power through appointing senior managers to SOEs and through involving
in major decision-making of its controlled firms (Naughton, 2007), in
particular before 2010. Reported by Tan (2009), at the end of2009, the
Organisation Department of the CPC Central Committee and SASAC
promulgated two measures to administer and supervise SOEs' senior
management. The Interim Provisions concerning the Administration of Central
Enterprise Leaders (!=f:1 ~1i::~@!~ Am 'ffJIf~Hf~.mfi:Zhongyang qiye lindao
renyuan guanli zanxing guiding) formulates the requirements, positions and
working periods for SOEs' board of directors, senior managers, party
committee members and other leaders. Additionally, the Measure to
Comprehensively Assess and Evaluate the Leadership Team and the Leaders
(!=f:1 ~1i::ild9i~l)I-=fflJ~~ A9H*ft~~W1fl'1J-¥t (m~T) Zhongyang qiye
lindao banzi he lindao renyuan zonghe kaohe pingjia banfa (shixing)) lists the
detailed procedure and methods to assess senior management and relevant
rewards and punishments. Although their complete official versions are not
available, these two measures noticeably indicate that the Chinese government
has rights to appoint and assess all leadership members of SOEs. These
managerial candidates may not be most suitable but rather the most rewarded
67
Chapter 3 Background: China's OFDI, government and enterprises
(Voss et al., 2008). Furthermore, an OFDI project is undoubtedly regarded as a
crucial decision that influences a SOE's value of state-owned assets, which
thus cannot avoid SASAC's supervision (Voss et al., 2008).
The conflict between SASAC's two roles is yet not clarified (Wen and Tan,
2009). As a representative body created to exercise the government's
ownership rights over selected state-owned firms (Naughton, 2008), staff of
SASAC primarily came from the State Economic and Trade Commission (now
restructured and cancelled) (Hu, 2005). They have the right to promulgate
policies and regulations, which typically is the responsibility of institutional
organisations. Except performing as the governmental supervisor, SASAC is
currently the largest investor and owner of all non-financial SOEs (Luo et al.,
2010). However, this phenomenon is not consistent with the provided criteria
'separating politics from capitals' (jjJ{Wi7j-j!lI; zhengzifenli) (Zhang, 2009a).
Voss et al. (2008) believe that OFDI by smaller SOEs and private firms may be
discouraged due to their shortage of well established relations (guanxi) with the
Central Government.
3.3 Chinese TNCs and their achievements
Having introduced the major institutional actors, the next step is to briefly
review the development of China's TNCs. In 1997, the Fifteenth Party
Congress put forward the slogan of' grasping the big and letting go the small'
(1JKA~/J\ Zhua Da Fang Xiao). It is regarded as a strategic adjustment of
SOE reform. At that time only about 1000 SOEs were considered 'large'. And
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other 'small or medium size' SOEs were promoted to privatisation. The core of
SOE reform from 200lto present is ownership reform. In November 2001, the
10th National Congress promoted to establish central and local institutions in
order to separate government administration from enterprise management and
separate ownership from management power. Policy makers and business
leaders in China have made great efforts to support the process of 'jituanhua',
the transformation of enterprises into extended groups of enterprises
(Sutherland, 2007). Members of Chinese enterprise groups are believed to
benefit from being part of a group. Most of this reform is undertaken within the
large-scale state sector. According to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), by
2005 there were 2,845 large enterprise groups, holding assets of RMB 23
trillion (NBS, 2006), including central enterprises (groups) and enterprises
(groups) approved by the central and local government.
3.3.1 Central enterprises
After the establishment of SASAC, the State Council initially announced that
SASAC performed 'the responsibility of investor' Off qT tf:j WiAAA ~ I tixing
chuziren zhize) for 196 firms, which are also labelled 'the central enterprises'.
From then on, SASAC has been China's largest investor and owner, which
manages China's state-owned assets of all Chinese non-financial SOEs.
According to 'Guiding Opinions about Adjustment and Reorganisation', till
2010, central enterprises would be highly consolidated and the number of
central enterprises would be within 80-100 after further adjustment and
restructure. As SASAC's planning, among these 80-100 central enterprises, 30-
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50 will become big business groups with their own independent intellectual
property rights and also with high international competitiveness. In other words,
these 30-50 firms will be leading investors in the near future, which can be
traced back to the idea of 'National Champions' (Nolan, 2001a). Moreover, Li
Rongrong outlined five dominant fields for central enterprises' further
development: the national security industries, the natural monopoly industries,
the industries providing important public products and service and the key
resource and pillar industries as well as some high-tech industries. Further
consolidation is proposed for central enterprises that are not able to be among
the leaders in these five fields.
By 31 December 2010 there have been lots of changes involving hundreds of
central enterprises that had undergone corporate restructuring. As a result, the
number of enterprises supervised by SASAC is updated and decreases from
196 to 122.1 There are mainly four types of changes: changing names,
introducing a new corporation, cancelling an existed company, and one
company merging into another one. Table 3.2 gives several examples of
different types of changes that have taken place in the central enterprises.
IThe updated notice can be accessed at
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/nI180/nI226/n2425/index.html.
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In particular, mergers between companies attract high attention. Summarised
by Li Rongrong, primarily there are five types of corporate restructuring
between central enterprises (Li, R., 2007). First, some scientific research
institutions merged into industrial groups, like the merger of China Building
Materials Academy (~~~1J.1>ft*'j.N~li}f1LIlft) into China National Building
Material Group Corporation (rt'lEit$[MH~LII0wJ). The combination of
research and production was supposed to increase the enterprises' capability of
technological innovation, hence the merger. And academic institutions always
become wholly owned subsidiaries of corporations.
Second, a number of industrial leaders were united together to become large-
scale enterprise groups with 'greater overall capabilities' ($X5!ii.~..g.Jt.f¥ tJ
Jiaoqiang zonghe jingzhengli). For example, China Harbour Engineering
(Group) Company (q:t ~ m~it 19: (~1II) ,h!,0 if]) and China Road &
Bridge (Group) Corporation (q:t ~ ~m= (~1II) ,h!,0 if]) united and
restructured to become China Communications Construction Company Ltd.
(q:t ~3(jJjit19:1N:17tlH~0if] CCCC). After the consolidation, CCCC
becomes the largest enterprise of harbour design and construction in China.
CCCC is also leading in road and bridge design and construction. It is also the
largest dredging company in China and third largest in the world (CCCC
website).
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Third, the merger of 'window companies' (00 rJ i~tJChuangkou gongsi)2 into
key enterprises strengthens the capability to explore overseas markets. For
instance, China Overseas Engineering Corporation (rp I:EI #fj:)'r T;fQ. }~,i~~J,
COVEC) became a wholly owned subsidiary of China Railway Engineering
Corporation (rp ~ ~R~ I;f'f1}~,0 El), which now is called China Railway
Group Ltd err 00 rp~JN15t;ff~~0ifJ). COVEC's high experience in the
international project contracting helps China Railway Group explore the
international market and carry out overseas investment.
Fourth, like the merger of China National Group Corp. of Traditional & Herbal
enterprises were combined to improve business integration and
complementarities in industrial chains.
Fifth, through restructuring some enterprises were extricated from long-term
loss. For example, China National Building Material & Light Industrial
Machinery Group Corp. (rp 00$£I~fJ1.lJI'G.~,0 ~) began to make a profit after
the merger into China National Building Material Group Corporation (~-p~ n!
2 A 'window company' refers to an economic entity directly invested, established and
registered in Hong Kong and Macao by the people's government of a province, autonomous
region, municipality directly under the Central Government or a Central Government
department of the Mainland, which is authorized to exercise the administrative management
functions over the enterprises established in Hong Kong or Macao by the said region,
department or industry.
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Despite the transformation among central enterprises, since 2004, SASAC has
gradually recognised, announced and changed the main business industry of
each central enterprise in seven batches (SASAC, 2007b). For example, China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation
(Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have same
main businesses: Oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation; Petroleum
refining; manufacture, preservation, transportation and trade of petrochemicals
and other chemical products; and, Relevant engineering technique research and
service. SASAC's '2006 Review of Planning and Development and 2007 Key
Work Ideas' (2006 i¥~m:Ml5t)lI 11O@]w.vL&2007 ~1l,9.11t,li!H~32006nian
guihua fazhan gongzuo huigu ji 2007nian zhongdian gongzuo silu) emphasised
that the verification of the main businesses is crucial for SASAC's effective
supervision over central enterprises' strategic development. It also helps to
concentrate limited resources on investment in main businesses, and then
optimise the national economy. This reflects the support from the Chinese
government to motivate overseas natural resources development.
3.3.2 Achievements
According to SASAC in recent years, central enterprises have made distinct
progress in the aspects of restructuring, reform, research and administration
(SASAC, 2008). Table 3.3 shows the achievements of central enterprises made
during the period 2003-2007. At the end of the year 2007, although the number
of central enterprises decreased from 196 to 151, the total assets of central
J Accessed at http://www.sasac.gov.cnlnI180/n3123702/n3123747/3308276.html.
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enterprises achieved RMB 14.92 trillion, around RMB 1.5 trillion growth
annually. Total sales revenue in 2007 is more than twice as much as that in
2003, while total profits increase more than three fold in these five years. Table
3.4 also exhibits the numbers of leading central enterprises listed in SASAC
and CNNMoney's statistical reports. Up to 2007, 44 and 27 central enterprises
held assets and sales over RMB 100 billion, respectively. 19 central enterprises
made more than RMB 10 billion profits. In other words, the numbers of central
enterprises in 2007 are twice, or even triple, as many as the numbers in 2003,
regarding enterprises whose assets and sales are over RMB 100 billion, and
profits in excess of RMB 10 billion.
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In the triangular relationship of FDI activities, the global economy also has
striking efforts on China's overseas plans. According to World Investment
Report (UNCT AD, 2009), the year 2008 witnessed the first time that one
Chinese TNC was listed in the world's top 100 non-financial TNCs ranked by
foreign assets, namely CITIC Group. Due to the financial crisis at the end of
2008, a number of TNCs from developed countries bankrupted, for example,
Lehman Brothers and the world's leading automakers General Motors and
Chrysler Group. The number of enterprises financially shrank and necessary
for financial support keeps increasing. This provides a potential for Chinese
enterprises, whose government has plenty of foreign exchange reserves, to
expand their business in the world economy.
Additionally, Chinese TNCs made huge progress in 2009, which is believed to
be relevant to the global economic downturn. Ranked by revenues, there were
only 8 Chinese firms nominated in the Fortune Global 500 list in 2003, which
are all central enterprises. This number gradually climbed up to 30 central
enterprises out of 43 Chinese firms in 2009 (table 3.4).
Table 3.4: numbers of Chinese enterprises listed in the Fortune Global 500
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total 8 15 19 22 25 34 43
CE 8 10 13 16 19 25 30
Note: CE refers to the central enterprises.
Source: CNNMoney, various years. 2009 data can be accessed at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/globaI500/200S/index.html.
According to the Global 500 list (Fortune, 2010), except 30 central enterprises
and 8 banking and insurance companies, Citic Group is under the control of the
central government, while Shanghai Automotive and Hebei Iron & Steel Group
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are owned by SASAC's branches in Shanghai City and Hebei Province,
respectively. Only Huawei and Jiangsu Shagang are private companies. Do
these large-scale SOEs undertake market seeking and strategic assets seeking
OFDI? Do China's home country measures facilitate their businesses? The
representational OFDI projects are discussed in the following chapters to reveal
the HCMs effects on the large-scale SOEs.
3.4 Conclusion
From above data and description, I try and better understand that despite that
the increase of China's OFDI is significant, it merely accounts for a tiny
proportion of the world's total. The chief investors leading OFDI are big SOEs,
especially central enterprises. There is no doubt that one of the key
responsibilities of Chinese government in recent years is to foster these large-
scale enterprises growing to TNCs with high competence. Although China's
OFDI has made vast progress, the problems with the official statistics, such as
underestimation of regional data and the inflation caused by round-tripping
investment cannot be ignored.
Most of existing research arises from the economic view, and no detailed study
is based on the political matters. I have identified the important institutional
agencies. Along with China's economic reform, the institutional system and
relevant departments with regard to OFDI development has experienced
distinct transformation. It evolved from a centralised administrative structure to
decentralising the power to provincial and municipal levels. However, the
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division of responsibility between departments is not always clear and has been
modified frequently, which results in problems such as overlapping duties,
conflicting interests and complicated authorisation to hinder OFDI progress
(Voss et al., 2008). Home country measures for the administration, support and
protection of OFDI promulgated by the main governmental actors will be
explored in Chapters 5 and 6.
As the owner of large SOEs and the supervisor of state-owned assets,
SASAC's purpose and main task was to decrease the number of central
enterprises from 196 to 80-100 in seven years, from 2003 to 2010. The 'high
consolidation' mode appears to promote Chinese enterprises to become
competitive giants in the international market. Even though central enterprises
have made tremendous progress in the past few years, problems of 'becoming
big' cannot be ignored. All Chinese SOEs ranking the top in the Fortune
Global 500 are in monopolised industries such as petrol, power and steel. Their
top management team members are chosen, appointed and evaluated by the
central government. Their growth may be based on the government's support
to a great extent, not on advantages in price, management, techniques or
services. Morek et al. (2008) doubt that SOEs' leaders may use OFDI projects
to advance their careers. Naughton (2008) reveals that central enterprises are
'national champions in the sense that they can be sent forth to battle for
objectives the national government wants to achieve.' It has been noted that
being used as an instrument is not beneficial to the long-term growth of central
enterprises. Chapters 7 and 8 will bring in the analysis of Chinese TNCs'
overseas activities.
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Approach
The previous chapters illustrate the need for empirical research into the HCMs
effects on China's OFDI. This chapter reviews the methods used by existing
research projects, compares their strengths and weaknesses, and reasons why
methods are chosen for my research. This chapter also describes the multi-
method approach, the interpretation of official documents and case studies, and
how the data was collected and analysed.
4.1 Methods and data used
Most prior research of China's outward FDI has been undertaken through three
approaches, descriptive analyses, econometric models and case studies, and has
relied on two sources of data: aggregate (including national-level and industry-
level) and firm-level.
4.1.1 Descriptive analyses
Descriptive analyses are broadly adopted to infer international investment
strategies from secondary data. As the major purpose of the descriptive method
is to address research questions of all types (what, why, how), this approach is
extensively adopted by researchers in exploring new areas (Babbie, 2007).
China's OFDI development has a very short history. Most research on China's
OFDI thus employed the descriptive method based on aggregate data to
identify the various characteristics of China's OFDI and to direct further
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research, for example, the role of home country government, the choice of
entry mode, investment destinations and motivations (for example, Buckley et
aI., 2006, Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Child and Rodrigues, 2005, Deng, 2004,
Wang, 2002, Wong and Chan, 2003, Wu and Chen, 2001, Yeung and Liu,
2008),. The study of China's HCMs effects on OFDI remains at a preliminary
stage. The picture of the Chinese institutional framework on OFDI is complex,
as institutional factors are dynamic and HCMs change over time (Buckley,
Cross et aI., 2008). Therefore, the method of approach undertaken by this
research is essentially descriptive.
4.1.2 Case studies
A case study research methodology is more extensively relied on when
scholars study worldwide MNEs' overseas investment (for example, Andersen,
1993, Coviello and McAuley, 1999, Zaby, 1996). Some scholars recognise
case studies as being the best approach for understanding the holistic, dynamic
and paradoxical nature of an organisation (Eisenhardt, 1989, Li, P.P., 2007,
Numagami, 1998, Yin, 2009). As discussed in section 3.1, aggregate data by
official publications can be problematic. Therefore, this research attempts to
apply firm-level data. Rather than denying or doubting all the literature based
on the aggregate data, this research applies a new approach to analyse Chinese
firms' overseas activities and their responses to HeMs. It also has potential to
compare the conclusions drew on national- and firm- level data, in order to find
whether they are in compliance.
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Due to the difficulty in accessing firm-level data on China's OFDI, most extant
case studies are based on research on a small sample, which is normally
comprised of two or three companies and/or restricted to some certain industry,
such as a study on 5 state-owned manufacturing enterprises, Shougang, SEG,
Municipal Light, Baiyunshan, Northeast Pharmaceutical by Young et al.
(1996), Haier, Huawei, Lenovo and TeL by Deng (2007), Haier, Lenovo and
TeL by Li (2007), Lenovo, Nanjing Automobile and Huawei by Rui and Yip
(2008), TeL, BOE and Lenovo by Deng (2009), Shanghai Electric Printing &
Packaging Machinery Group, Ningbo Veken Elite Group and Lenovo Group
by Wu and Ding (2009), Lenovo and TCL by Deng (2010) and a comparative
study of Haier and Matsushita (Japan) by Yang et al. (2009). These MNEs are
well known due to highly publicised investment projects and the deficiency in
location and ownership advantages. These firms, however, are carefully
selected to provide evidence for scholars to testify propositions. I doubt
whether research on these companies can induce general conclusions on the
Chinese companies' OFDI. First, most above-mentioned enterprises
investigated by other scholars in particular are private firms. Conversely, I will
look into the investment by Chinese SOEs, as I assume that the behaviours and
motivations of Chinese SOEs and private companies may differ.
Second, most of the above-mentioned enterprises are manufacturers. For
example, Haier and TeL produce domestic appliances. Lenovo manufactures
and markets personal computers. Huawei provides networking and
telecommunications equipment. However, according to the official statistics, as
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illustrated in Chapter 3, most OFDI flew to business service, mining, and
wholesale and retailing sectors.4 Findings on the solely manufacturing industry
are limited to address whether the motivations driving investment to different
sectors are similar or divergent. By applying the multiple case studies, it has
the potential to help understand the behaviours of Chinese firms in OFDI and
operating in different industries. For example, Nolan and Zhang (2002, 2003)
analysed PetroChina (created on the core businesses of CNPC) and Sinopec in
the oil and petrochemicals industry, and Aviation Industries of China (AVIC)
in the aerospace sector, as well as Nolan's studies in Sanjiu (pharmaceuticals)
(Nolan and Yeung, 2001a), Shougang (steel) (Nolan and Yeung, 2001b), and
Shenhua (mining) (Nolan and Rui, 2004, Nolan et al., 2004). In this research I
expand the study to several companies rather than one in each target industry,
intending to generalise commonalities and individualities of Chinese investors
and industries related to OFDI.
Some scholars introduce primary data to assist case studies. Cui and Jiang
(2010) adopt a multiple case study design to a sample often Chinese MNEs
with semi-structured interviews with executives. Deng (2009) interviewed
three to five senior managers of each of the three target firms with open-ended
questions. The interviews were supplemented with other data, such as
observations, company documentation and Internet data. Voss et al. (2009)
collected primary data through semi-structured interviews (May-August 2006)
with senior managers from nine Chinese enterprises (3 SOEs and 6 private
firms).
4 As this research focuses on non-financial outward investment, I exclude investment to the
banking and finance sector.
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Significantly different from prior literature, Sutherland (2010) collected the
annual reports of Chinese private companies listed on the Hong Kong stock
exchange (initial public offerings (IPOs) between Ist January 2004 and
October 2009) and the US stock exchange (listed between 2004 and 2006) to
find out activities of foreign subsidiaries and then to identify the motivation. It
is the first time employing data from the Chinese enterprises' financial reports,
as well as the first trial to bring in the Chinese offshore holding companies to
enrich research on China's OFDI. The financial reports clearly state a
company's corporate structure, OFDI projects, and the number and role of
offshore holding companies. My research is conducted in a similar way,
collecting data from financial reports of a sample of Chinese firms. Section 4.3
gives details of data collection.
4.1.3 Econometric models
As research on China's OFDI expands, the econometric models, particularly
after 2003, have been applied to analyse China's OFDI internationalisation
path, locations or determinants (for example, Buckley, Clegg et al., 2008,
Buckley et al., 2007, Liu et al., 2005), or the motivations of Cross-border
M&As by Chinese enterprises (for example, Boateng et al., 2008). Regarding
the econometric analysis, both aggregate (country-level and industry-level) and
firm-level data have been used.
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Aggregate data is mostly derived from official publications (Buckley et aI.,
2007, Cheng and Ma, 2007, Wong and Chan, 2003). Scholars that focus on
specific research objectives adopt data from other sources. For example,
Sutherland (2009) uses national-level data from the China Statistical Yearbook
(2005/2007) and business group OFDI data from the Big Business Group
Yearbook (2002-2007) to explore whether China's big business groups
undertake strategic-asset-seeking OFDI. Firm-level data used in the
econometric analysis comes from sources of a wider variety, including surveys,
questionnaires, databases, and business and news reports. Lu et al. (2010)
collected data through a survey in seven provinces and finally utilised data of
632 Chinese private firms. In the survey, they evaluate the effects of the
Chinese government along with a five-point scale. Yiu et aJ. (2007)
investigated international venturing based on a questionnaire survey
(conducted in 2003 and 2004) of a sample of 274 Chinese manufacturing firms.
Chen and Young (2010) collected information of cross-border M&As by
Chinese firms (2000-2008) through news announcements published by China
Mergers and Acquisitions Association (CMAA). Boateng et al. (2008) used a
sample of27 companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
engaged in cross-border M&As (2000-2004). Relevant information ofM&A
activity is collected from the China Daily newspapers and China Securities.
Zhang and Ebbers (2010) used information from a sample of 1324 M&A deals
(January 1992 to March 2009) accessed from the Thomason Financial Merger
& Acquisition database. Gu and Reed (2010) drew data from Thomson's SDC
Platium M&A Database and the final sample comprised 145 M&A deals by 78
firms between I January 1994 and 10 March 2008.
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It might be problematic to apply the econometric analysis for this research,
which aims to expand the understanding in China's institutional effects on
outward investment. The concept of 'institution' is arguably ambiguous
(Markusen, 2003) and the role of a home country government cannot be
captured appropriately (Buckley, Clegg et al., 2008). 'Institutions' are defined
as 'the rules of the game', which consist of informal constraints and formal
rules (North, 1991), and rules and norms, which are effective and backed with
sanctioning power (Scott, 2001). It is quite challenging to distinguish the role
ofa home country government from other determinants (Buckley, Cross et al.,
2008). It is also difficult to measure and subsequently model relevant elements,
such as customs and beliefs, religious and other norms, the legislature,
judiciary and bureaucracy, government structures and market mechanisms
(Buckley, Clegg et al., 2008, Williamson, 2000). Therefore, the broad finding
based on the econometric analysis may be contradictory to some extent to other
studies taking high levels of government involvement into account (Buckley,
Clegg et al., 2008).
Taking into account my research purpose and the strengths and weaknesses of
different methods, I apply multiple case studies and descriptive/explanatory
analyses in this thesis. The reasons are as follows. First, the interpretation of
official HCMs is essential. Second, my research aims at the theoretical
extension of international business, while an inductive case study is the best
method for building theory as recommended by Yin (2009). Third, extant
empirical research is unable to find evidence to understand the role that the
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Chinese government played in the process of OFDI. Case studies have
potential to explain my core concern, and the effects of home country measures
with in-depth and longitudinal investigation. Fourth, to understand Chinese
MNEs' responses to relevant policies and regulations, empirical models are
problematic to provide reasonable explanations due to the lack of firm-level
data. It is more suitable to apply descriptive/explanatory analyses of carefully
selected materials, including news reports, documents and business reports.
Fifth, as shown in section 3.1, China's overseas investment distributes into a
variety of countries and industries, while Chinese investors come from a wide-
range of industries. I choose multiple case studies as no two or three companies
can represent the holistic nature of China's OFDI.
4.2 Official documents
What China's HCMs are is the first question to be answered in analysing
China's HCMs effects on OFDI. To the best of my knowledge, only three
research projects introduced official documents when studying the policy
regime of China's OFDI. Ren et al. (2010) listed policies and their key points,
without clarifying their evolutionary changes, for example, how SAFE
liberalised the quota on purchasing foreign exchange. Voss et al. (2008) had a
discussion on the historic documents' step-by-step progress, but was rather
brief. In spite of interpreting HCMs, Luo et al. (2010) divided the Chinese
measures into two groups, promotional and monitoring. They illustrated a
picture of China's legal, political and economic framework on OFDI. This,
however, is far from complete. For example, for monitoring policies, Luo et al.
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(2010) mentioned' Interim Measures for Joint Annual Inspection of Overseas
Investment', but failed to provide any details of provisions or an analysis on
the result of annual inspection. The comparisons between regulations are very
broad rather than in-depth. Moreover, none of these works have been supported
by evidence from enterprises' responding activities, for example, whether the
Chinese enterprises comply with relevant policies or whether they attempt to
avoid the restrictions.
I select current policies and measures in China that affect Chinese companies'
overseas businesses. Based upon the description of the roles of the Chinese
official departments and relationship between the government and enterprises
in Chapter 3, I understand that the main actors are the State Council
(www.gov.cn), PBC (www.pbc.gov.cn), NDRC (www.ndrc.gov.cn),
MOFCOM (www.mof.gov.cn), SAFE (www.safe.gov.cn), SASAC
(www.sasac.gov.cn), MOF (www.mof.gov.cn), and CSRC (www.csrc.gov.cn).
I collected primary documents related to monitoring and supporting China's
OFDI from their official websites. The original language of these regulations is
Chinese. I translated them into English and added Chinese text and Pinyin to
the titles of measures and key expressions for better understanding.
Based on policies and regulations studied by Luo et al. (20 10) and Voss et
al. (2008), I eliminated measures that have been abolished or replaced and have
added newly updated ones, and thus concentrated on 26 key OFDI regulations,
most of which have been promulgated 2003-2009. Chapter 5 and chapter 6
discuss the Chinese government's role as a supervisor and a promoter,
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respectively. Regulations listed in table 4.1 are analysed in Chapter 5. Chapter
6 investigates measures listed in tables 4.2 and 4.3. The thesis also considers
relevant historic OFDI policies and presents evolutionary changes of the
government's attitude towards overseas expansion.
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4.3 Case studies
• Multiple case studies
Chapter 7 shows my particular interest in the institutional effects on China's
OFDI by the largest enterprises. Research on Chinese MNEs is underdeveloped.
Case studies done by the prior literature are limited to several typical examples.
Regarding the data collection, no scholar has ever selected a sample of more
than ten companies, except Sutherland (2010). Their conclusions, either on
SOEs or private companies, cannot be extensively applied to all Chinese firms.
Furthermore, overseas activities undertaken by the Chinese MNEs merely take
cross-border M&As into consideration, regardless of offshore holding
subsidiaries. To ascertain the motivations of China's SOEs establishing
offshore holding companies and undertaking cross-border M&As, studying
China's investment to tax havens and subsequent destinations (flowing back to
China or carrying on to other countries) is a challenge. My objective cases,
therefore, should represent the main investors of Chinese outward FDI.
Following this objective, I used the appendix of '2009 Statistical Bulletin of
China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment' (MOFCOM et al., 2010) as our
sampling frame, which contains a list of top ranking Chinese firms by total
foreign assets in 2009 (table 4.4). These top 50 business groups can be
regarded as the most internationalised in the global market. Before the
promotion of • go global' and the relaxation of the Chinese government's
administrative control, many business groups established offshore subsidiaries.
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There is no official report to describe what overseas subsidiaries have done.
Neither have I known whether in the OFOI development onward journey OFOI
is significant. Contributions made by overseas subsidiaries to their parent
groups have never been analysed. Any overseas activities undertaken by
offshore subsidiaries in tax havens were under high-secrecy protection, which
could also avoid the State's inspection and approval. Therefore, I investigated
listed companies' annual reports to know where OFDI flows onwards.
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Approach
I proceed as follows: with the sample of 50 business groups, I firstly explore
their official websites and corporate reports to gather general information, such
as their ultimate controllers, their main businesses, corporate structures, and
lists of subsidiaries, including both unlisted and listed subsidiaries. For those
unlisted subsidiaries, I explore their websites, if they have one, to find whether
they have overseas subsidiaries or assets.
Secondly, concerning companies listed on the domestic stock exchanges
(Shanghai and Shenzhen), I use their annual reports to collect information,
such as shareholders, overseas subsidiaries and assets, and the current year's
outward investment. With regard to companies listed on the overseas stock
exchanges (Hong Kong, the US, Singapore, or Australia), after checking the
places of incorporations, I use these annual reports to acquire the details of
these listed companies' subsidiaries. The annual reports list the particulars of
the principal subsidiaries in the notes to the consolidated financial statements.
All annual reports I used are dated from 2003 to 2009. If a firm was listed
within this time period, I only use annual reports from the IPO to 2009. I also
record the number of listed companies' overseas subsidiaries, their places of
incorporation/registration and operation and principal activities to see whether
there is onward journey OFDI and to examine their motivations and the role of
overseas subsidiaries playing in the internationalisation.
I adopted the method of a multiple longitudinal case study, as well as to
respond to the call to extend the prior case studies (for example, Li, 2003, Li,
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P.P., 2007). These cases should reflect the government intervention on decision
making of China's investing MNEs. As there is no official summary of M&A
transactions, I primarily collected data to compile a list of China's M&A deals
(2003-2009). I count on the time of the final contract assignment; if the deal
has not been closed, I consider the time of the bid announcement. The list of
China's M&A activities is achieved by a search for historic data (2003-2009)
and observations on ongoing projects (from October 2009 to July 2010). This
thesis focuses on non-financial OFDI, so I exclude investment flows to the
banking, insurance and security sectors.
Supplementary to the data gathered from a firm's website and listed
companies' annual reports, I also referred to official news sites. For central
enterprises, SASAC's website has a section called 'overseas expansion by
central enterprises 'releasing the progress of all overseas projects undertaken
by central enterprises. The data of other business groups was collected from the
publications by the China Mergers & Acquisitions Association (CMAA)
(online), which provide comprehensive information about cross-border M&As,
including industry categories, name of the bidding and target companies, and
rationale behind the deal. CMAA 6 is a non-profit, non-governmental
organisation administered by the All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce (ACFIC), summarising the M&A deals in the global market (Chen
and Young, 2010). The news reports of these transactions originate in Chinese.
If information from the above-mentioned websites was not enough for research,
I used key words (Chinese and English translation), such as the names of
S Available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/nI180/nI226/n24)0/n3)4289/index.html.
6 Available at http://www.ma-china.com/chinese/news/index.asp.
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acquiring and acquired companies, to search for more information from both
Chinese and English websites. I trust information gathered from leading
reporters, such as China Daily (www.chinadaily.com.cn). the largest English-
language newspaper in China, Reuters, Financial Times and Yahoo Finance.
• Examples for in-depth analysis
The multiple case studies undertaken by Chapter 7 analyse China's HCMs
effects on a variety of industries, including natural resources and
manufacturing. To provide an in-depth insight of the relationship between the
Chinese government and TNCs as well as the motivation ofOFDI, Chapter 8
investigates and compares two cases: Chinalco's investment in Rio Tinto and
Geely's acquisition of Volvo.
There are four reasons that I choose ChinaIco and Geely for the comparison.
First, these two cases appeared after 2008, when the global financial crisis had
brought significant changes to the world economy. Both Chinalco and Geely
regard this as an opportunity to strengthen their competitive advantages and
potential to catch up with the world's leading giants. This also represents the
attitude of most Chinese TNCs towards the global economic downturn. Second,
these two cases are quite typically meaningful for the internationalisation of
Chinese TNCs. Until then, Chinalco's attempt for Rio Tinto's shares was the
largest overseas investment decided by a Chinese TNC. Geely's purchase of
Volvo is the largest M&A deal in China's automotive industry. Third, based on
previous analysis, China's HCMs effects on SOEs and private companies are
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different. Regarding the two cases, Chinalco is one of the central enterprises.
Geely is a private company. The comparison may reveal the discrepancy of the
government's incentives and disincentives in OFDI made by Chinese TNCs of
different ownerships. The two corporations' motivations to conduct overseas
investment may also differ. Fourth, these two M&A deals are undertaken by
Chinese corporations from two industries, automotive and natural resources
development. Through the comparison, the government's attitude and strategy
may be different towards industries.
Generally field work and interviews are conducted for the in-depth case studies.
This research targeted officials of the Chinese government departments and
senior management in Chinese business groups as interviewees. However, the
response rates to emails were low and it was difficult for them to find an
appropriate time to be interviewed. As a result, this research applies secondary
materials like companies' financial statements, websites, and news reports.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter first presents the detailed review of data and methods used by
prior research. Due to the difficulty to collect firm-level data, aggregate data
from China's official sources has been widely adopted, (Buckley, Clegg et al.,
2008,2007, Cui and Jiang, 2009, Liu et al., 2005, Wu and Chen, 2001), in
particular econometric models, although the data quality has been questioned
simultaneously (Buckley et al., 2007, Rawski, 200lb, Voss et al., 2009, Wong
and Chan, 2003).
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Apart from the descriptive analysis, the tentative approach to study a new event,
econometric models and case studies are two widely employed approaches.
Neither of them is perfect and both have limitations. However, variables in
terms of HCMs effects like government structures and customs and beliefs are
complex and difficult to identify or measure (Buckley, Clegg et al., 2008,
Williamson, 2000). On the other hand, the multiple case studies are consistent
with investigating the interplay between the enterprises and social structures.
The review of the literature conducted in Chapter 2 illustrates the
underdevelopment of China's HCMs effects on OFDI. To date, comparatively
little detailed research has been undertaken on them. Current literature (Luo et
aI., 2010, Ren et al., 2010, Voss et al., 2008) only listed a number of home
country measures and their key points. Scholars did not look at evolutionary
changes of these measures, whether they are effective now, or apply these
measures with OFDI activities of Chinese enterprises. Therefore, the
descriptive/explanatory analysis of official documents is most appropriate to
investigate the Chinese government's behaviour. I translate, summarise and
analyse 26 published documents obtained from the Chinese government's
official web sites, which are effective and most updated at present.
Supplemented by historic measures, these documents constitute an important
evolutionary record of the Chinese policies. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss
administrative and supportive HCMs and address the government's role as a
supervisor and a promoter.
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In addition, there is a lack of empirical research on the Chinese enterprises'
overseas activities. Chapter 7 employs firm-level data of a sample of the top 50
business groups ranked by their foreign assets. Based on the websites and
annual financial reports of the 50 largest business groups, I compile two
distinct but combinable data sets, overseas subsidiaries and cross-border
M&As. The multiple case studies thus allow investigation on OFDI from two
perspectives. The firms' overseas subsidiaries, in particular, have nearly been
taken into account by extant literature, except Sutherland's research on private
companies (Sutherland, 2010). For the better understanding ofHCMs effects
and the motivation of Chinese TNCs undertaking OFDI, Chapter 8 applies the
in-depth analysis of two examples: the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal and the Geely-
Volvo acquisition.
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Chapter 5 The Chinese government: as a
supervisor of OFDI
The previous chapter indicates how official documents and case data were
collected and analysed to investigate the research objective. This chapter
reports and discusses findings from research. Section 3.2 has indicated the key
institutional actors, in particular NDRC and MOFCOM, and their functions as
a supervisor. In this chapter, 14 OFDI-related key policies and regulations
collected from official websites are investigated. Based on the findings,
answers are provided to questions raised in Chapter I: what monitoring
measures are, whether they are restricted or liberalised, what the evolutionary
changes are, and to what extent they influence overseas expansion.
Section 5.1 studies China's step-by-step reform on the examination and
approval of OFDI, including the two most important regulations by NDRC and
MOFCOM, SAFE's administration on foreign exchange, and measures on
overseas M&As and establishing subordinate enterprises. Section 5.2 explores
the Chinese government's supervision after investment, the result of which yet
remains under question. Section 5.3 deliberates the state's extraterritorial
controls, in particular, concerns on overseas state-owned assets and listing on
stock exchanges outside China, both of which have been tightened in recent
years to deal with the loss of state-owned assets and capital flight.
103
Chapter 5 The Chinese government: as a supervisor of OFDI
5.1 Examination and approval reform
5.1.1 The most important: two national-level measures
China's policies on overseas investment have been built up since Deng
Xiaoping's 'reform and opening up' policy. The State Council enacted 15
economic reform measures in 1979, one of which approved the establishment
of foreign companies. In fact, owing to the lack of overseas experience and
limited foreign exchange reserves, OFDI was only a tentative activity. From
1983, MOFTEC was assigned to supervise China's OFDI. At that time, there
was no standard procedure for examination and approval. A Chinese firm had
first to apply to local or provincial governments and the application was then
submitted to MOFTEC, which also needed advice from the embassies to make
the final decisions. In 1984, the first regulation on Chinese OFDI was issued.
From then on, the main executors of the Chinese government regarding OFDI,
NDRC and MOFCOM, promulgated a series of policies and regulations.
NDRC's updated policy to encourage OFDI is the Interim Administrative
Measures for the Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment Projects
(:l:jt~H9j~J9i §t~flfUfT~JllJ-¥!7Jingwai touzi xiangmu hezhun zanxing
guanli banJa) ('Examination and Approval Measures' hereinafter). This
measure replaces the policy implemented since August 1991. It shows what
information the project application report has to provide. The measures clearly
explain the content of application reports, procedures and requirements of
7 Accessed at http://www.ndrc.gov.cnlzctb/zctbVzctbI2004/t2005101044801.htm
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examination and approval, and the responsible departments. The most
important clauses of this regulation can be summarised as followed: first, the
projects of resource development with investment over USD 200 million and
the projects using large amounts of foreign exchange with investment over
USD 50 million will be audited by NDRC and then be reported to the State
Council for examination and approval. Second, the projects of resource
development with investment over USD 30 million and the projects using large
amounts of foreign exchange with investments over USD 10 million will be
subject to the examination and approval ofNDRC. Third, regarding the
projects of resource development with investment ofUSD 30 million or less
and the projects using large amount of foreign exchange with investment of
USD 10 million or less, the central enterprises are able to independently make
their own decisions. Local SOEs, however, still need approval by provincial or
municipal departments in charge of development and reform. After the final
approval is given, pertinent documents are sent to NDRC for record keeping.
To make this reporting concise, 'Circular concerning the Reporting Certificate
of Overseas Investment Projects' (=*-T±i;rHi~Jm §~~iiE~B<Jll§~1l8
Guanyu jingwai touzi xiangmu beian zhengming de tongzhi) was subsequently
issued. It requires the central enterprises to fill in a form to describe the details
of a project, such as the domestic and foreign investors, target country, the
scale of investment, and where the money comes from (self-owned or loans).
'Examination and Approval Measures' were significantly different from
previous regulations on examination and approval in the following aspects.
8 Accessed at http://www.fdi.gov.cnlpub/FDIIzcfg/gtlP020070606382229847095.pdf
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First, it was the first time that the Chinese government granted permission to
all types of companies to invest abroad. Previously, the question of who could
undertake OFDI was never clearly answered. People assumed that all policies
and regulations were set up for SOEs, which left private companies under
vague and unsteady supervision. Second, the measures reduce the steps for
examining and approving project applications other than project proposals and
feasibility reports. Third, in the past the government had to examine and
approve any investment over USD 1 million. Now the limitation for
examination and approval has been increased numerously. Fourth, through the
project application reports, the government mainly wants to confirm investors,
investment orientation and whether the investments comply with relevant
regulations. Before the measures, the government had to examine product
portfolio and financial documents.
MOFCOM's 'Measures for Overseas Investment Administration' (:I:i"Hi~~
JI3f}:r!9 Jingwai touzi guanli banJa) replaces and abolishes the previous
MOFCOM documents. Any enterprise embarking on OFDI under the
following circumstances reports to MOFCOM: investing in countries with no
diplomatic relations with China; investing in particular countries or regions; the
Chinese party investing more than USD 100 million; investment involving
multi-national (regional) interests; and, the establishment of offshore special
purpose companies. As shown by table 3.1 (see Chapter 3), investments
to/from these offshore companies are very significant. Any local enterprise
initiating investment under the following circumstances reports to provincial or
9 Accessed at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticlelb/cf200903/20090306103210.html?3333633464=383633112
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municipal departments in charge of commerce: the Chinese party's investment
between USD 10 million and 100 million; investing in power energy and
mineral resources; and projects which raise capital within China. Regarding
other OFDI, the companies log into the website of 'the Administration System
of Overseas Investment' (±tjrti~1tJlIL~~JElo Jingwai touzi guanli xitong),
fill in and print the application form, then report to MOFCOM or provincial
departments. The government will award 'the Certificate for the Enterprise's
Overseas Investment' (1l::~:ijtjrti~iiE-=j=5 Qiye jingwai touzi zhengshu)
within three working days if the application form complies with the relevant
standards.
'Measures for Overseas Investment Administration' delegates MOFCOM's
approval authority to relevant local official departments. Based on the number
of applications approved in 2008, around 85% of projects will be submitted to
provincial governments (Xinhuanet, 2009). In addition to being authorised
more power and sharing the central government's responsibilities, provincial
government can work closely with local SOEs. The simplified procedure is
also beneficial for local SOEs to respond more quickly to potential investment
projects. For OFDI projects requiring examination and approval, MOFCOM
scrutinises whether they have negative effects on bilateral political and
economic relationships, national security, or initiate vicious competition.
Enterprises themselves take responsibility for finance and technology concerns.
10 http://jwtz.hzs.mofcom.gov.cnlfecp/fem/corp/fem.jsp
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Table 5.1 applies NDRC's 'Examination and Approval Measures' and
MOFCOM's 'Measures for Overseas Investment Administration' to 52 M&A
deals. 11 36 of 52 deals conducted by the central enterprises and 13 of 20 by
other SOEs need the approval of MOFCOM, NDRC and the State Council. For
central enterprises, only three of 52 deals (investment under USD 30 million)
can be determined independently. Despite this, any OFDI by the central
enterprises need SASAC's approval. For local SOEs, only three of20 projects
can be exempted from the national-level examination, while intervention by the
provincial or municipal government cannot be avoided.
Table 5.1: cross-border M&As deals and their approving departments (USD
million)
Value Departments Numbers
CE Other SOEs CE SOEs
R>$200m MOFCOM, MOFCOM, 29 6
NDRC and SC NDRC and SC
$1OOm<R<$200m MOFCOMand MOFCOMand 4 3
NDRC NDRC
$30m<R <$1OOm NDRC NDRC and local 1 0
MOFCOM
R<$30m None Local MOFCOM 3 3
and local NDRC
L>$100m MOFCOM, MOFCOM, 7 7
NDRC and SC NDRCandSC
$SOm<L<$100m NDRC and SC NDRC, SC and 0 0
local MOFCOM
$10m<L<$SOm NDRC NDRC and local 2 0
MOFCOM
L<$10m None Local NDRC 0 0
Notes: SC refers to the State Council. CE refers to the central enterprises. Local MOFCOM
and local NDRC refer to provincial or municipal departments in charge of commerce and
development and reform. R refers to overseas resource development. L refers to investment
using large amount of foreign exchange.
II These M&A deals were mentioned in Chapter 4. The detailed data will be shown and
discussed in Chapter 7.
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To investigate the whole procedure of examination and approval and political
decision making, overseas M&A projects are taken as essential for the approval
of MOFCOM, NDRC and the State Council as an example. Based on the
relevant policies issued by NDRC, MOFCOM and SAFE (will be discussed in
the next section), the approximate time needed for the approval process is
summarised (as shown in figure 5.1). Even under the most successful
circumstances, the central enterprises and other SOEs need at least 55 to 60
days. This excludes the unspecified time required for SAFE's issuing of a
foreign exchange registration certificate and SASAC's approval for the central
enterprises.
Figure 5.1: the time needed for the approval process
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Approved
Note: All 'days' refer to working days. This figure is summarised from NDRC's Examination
and Approval Measures and MOFCOM's Measures for Overseas Investment Administration.
Apart from the timing problem, the situation is more complicated in practice
than shown by figure 5.1. No documentation clarifies whether a firm first
applies to NDRC or MOFCOM or both at the same time. For investment in
industries or projects encouraged by the government, for example, petrol and
gas and advanced technology, the state will speed up the approval, not confined
to as long as 55-60 days. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the central government
treats SOEs' and private investment as equals. Furthermore, as SMEs are more
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profoundly prone to invest in small-scale projects facing intense competition,
timing, simplified procedures and a stable institutional environment are crucial.
Institutional impediments, including unexpected changes of regulatory policies,
widespread corruption, and weak enforcement of regulations, are recognised as
competitive disadvantages in the home country to private companies rather
than SOEs.
Regarding large-scale investment by SMEs, Tengzhong case is taken as an
example. Sichuan Tengzhong, a privately owned engineering company,
dropped its acquisition of OM's Hummer brand in February 2010. The
announced reason was that Tengzhong failed to obtain government approval
within the time limit determined by Tengzhong and OM, even through
Tengzhong believed it would benefit from the investment. According to
NDRC's 'Examination and Approval Measures', Tengzhong's $160 million
investment, the original plan, exceeded the threshold $100 million, which
needed NDRC's approval and subsequent report to the State Council. However,
Tengzhong announced its purchase without NDRC's approval letter, which
violated the regulation. Tengzhong then decided to buy the Hummer brand
only, shares and technology excluded. However, MOFCOM repeated that they
had yet to receive any formal application from Tengzhong. In fact, Tengzhong
did not have the qualifications to manufacture automobiles. The investment
also conflicted with the government's promotion of energy saving cars.
Tengzhong failed to provide clear information of the M&A deal. The failure of
the Tengzhong transaction indicates the HCMs' negative effects on private
firms.
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5.1.2 Foreign exchange administration reform
As shown by table 5.2, the approval procedures were gradually relaxed in three
aspects: the guarantee for remitting profits, the examination of capital sources,
and the foreign exchange quota. In the beginning, the Chinese government
emphasised companies remitting their overseas profits. The guarantee for
remitting profits commenced in 1989 and was abolished in 2002. After that,
SAFE started to return the paid guarantee. The source of funds was strictly
confined to self-owned foreign exchange in the early 1990s. All commercial
loans need National Planning Commission (NPC) approval. From 2006,
domestic investors were permitted to use self-owned foreign exchange, foreign
exchange purchased with RMB and/or domestic foreign exchange loans. The
idea of 'pilot areas' was introduced in 2002 for the reform of foreign exchange
administration. Any overseas projects requiring more than USD 1million
foreign exchange from the Chinese party had to be approved by SAFE. Since
2003, the inspection rights of SAFE have been gradually decentralised to local
foreign exchange bureaus. In pilot regions, the inspection limit of foreign
exchange bureaus expanded from less than USD 3 million in 2003 to USD 10
million in 2005. The quota on purchasing foreign exchange available for all
investors was increased from USD 3.3 billion in 2003 to USD 5 billion in 2005
and finally cancelled in 2006. From 2007 no matter how much foreign exhange
was to be invested, the provincial foreign exchange departments are entitled to
review all OFDI projects, with exceptions for certain projects like overseas
natural resource development.
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As the rapid development of China's OFDI, it is attractive to introduce more
relaxed administrative regulations for foreign exchange. Based on previous
scattered normative documents, SAFE promulgated a new measure, Provisions
on the Foreign Exchange Administration of Overseas Direct Investment by
jingwai zhijie touzi waihui guanli guiding) ('Forex administration of OFDI'
hereinafter) and this regulation has been effective since 1 August 2009. Nine
previously issued regulations from 1990-2007, including those listed above, are
all annulled or abolished.
'Forex administration ofOFDI' provides a detailed explanation on the foreign
exchange registry, the inward and outward capital remittance, the export of
pre-investment costs, and foreign exchange settlement. SAFE's updated system
regarding OFDI standardises the foreign exchange administration by domestic
financial institutions. This also clarifies that the domestic financial institutions
can provide loans and guarantees to enterprises investing abroad. Based upon
this measure, SAFE will also establish a statistical information system to
monitor cross-border capital flows.
With regard to foreign exchange fund sources, Chinese TNCs can use their
own foreign exchange funds, domestic foreign exchange loans, RMB to
purchase foreign exchange or in-kind, intangible assets and other sources of
foreign exchange assets approved by SAFE to conduct overseas investment.
12 Accessed at
http://www.safe.gov.cnimodel safe/laws/law detail.jsp?ID=80404000000000000.29&id=4
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Compared with previous regulations, the capital sources have been further
expanded. After approval by the relevant competent authorities, domestic
investors register at a local foreign exchange bureau with the documents, such
as the foreign exchange registration application form for OFDI, explanatory
materials of the foreign exchange source, the approval documents or
certificates by competent authorities. After examining these documents, SAFE
issues a foreign exchange registration certificate. Domestic investors use the
certificate at designated foreign exchange banks for foreign exchange income
and expenditure operations. This process requires fewer documents and less
time compared with the past investigation of foreign exchange funds sources.
Particularly, SAFE allows the export of pre-investment costs, which was
ignored in previous measures. Pre-investment costs like deposits for purchasing
overseas stakes or assets, should not access 15% of the total value ofOFDI
applied to competent authorities. This spending can be compensated by the
special funds provided by MOF, according to 'Measures Governing Special
Funds for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation' (will be discussed in
section 6.1.1 ).
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5.1.3 Measures on cross-border mergers and acquisitions
Pertaining to overseas mergers and acquisitions, MOFCOM implemented
'Regulations on Reporting before the Overseas Merger and Acquisition of
Enterprises' (:Jt~~j~*wr~rm1WWHfi 1!fiilIJJtI3 Qiye Jingwai Binggou
Shixiang Qianqi Baogao Zhidu), which began to function on 1 May 2005.
Mergers and acquisitions mentioned in this reporting system refers to the
investment behaviour that a domestic enterprise and its overseas holding obtain
the assets or operations of an overseas enterprise through the purchase of the
overseas enterprise's stocks or assets. After making a decision on M&A,
central enterprises report to MOFCOM, while other enterprises report to
provincial business administration departments. All enterprises submit the
M&A preparatory reporting form, in which they list the investor, the subsidiary
that conducts M&A, and the target company. They also have to give the
estimated amount of investment and the transaction approach and explain how
they raised the money. Time and risk management should also be included.
Additionally, in 2009, the updated Circular Concerning Issues relevant to
Improving the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (::X:T~ff:ljtj~
guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi) shows the government's concerns regarding
overseas acquisitions and biddings. This new regulation requires that the
Chinese enterprises send application reports to NDRC before signing a binding
contract, making a binding offer or applying to the host country government.
13 Accessed at http://www.mofcom.gov.cnlaartic1elb/g/200S0S/200S0S00087223.html.
14 Accessed at http://www.gov.cnlgzdtl2009-06/19/contentI34S236.htm
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5.1.4 Measures on establishing overseas subsidiaries
For establishing overseas enterprises, MOFCOM's 'Measures for Overseas
Investment Administration' replaces most of previous regulations (table 5.3) on
the establishment of overseas subordinate companies, with the exception of
two measures. The Circular on encouraging enterprises to undertake overseas
processing and assembling businesses with supplied materials (*T tfJJJh Jf:~
dailiao jiagong zhuangpei yewu yijian de tongzhi) issued by the State Council
in 1999 specifies the support for enterprises in five aspects: financial incentives,
simplifying procedures of foreign exchange administration, export tax refund,
financial services and policy insurance. Notice on relevant issues regarding the
adjustment of the examination and approval of overseas investment (*T~~
youguan shixiang de tongzhi) issued by MOFCOM in 2008 enlarges the scope
of countries where local enterprises may set up branches examined and
approved by local authorities. It is noteworthy that the 2009 new measure
strengthens the supervision of the special purpose ventures (SPVs). Any SPY
set up by Chinese citizens or enterprises has to be approved by MOFCOM.
Spy and 'round-tripping' investment will be discussed in section 5.3.2.
15 Accessed at http://www.gov.cnlfwxxlbw/swb/content449812.htm
16 Accessed at http://vn.mofcom.gov.cnlaarticle/ddfg/tzzhchl200903/20090306073222.html
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5.2 Post-investment monitoring
China's control over overseas enterprises has a very short history. Due to long-
term problems suffered from OFDI, such as capital flight, huge losses and
corruption, the Chinese government has started to pay more attention to post-
investment administration. Until recently, MOFCOM and SAFE worked
together to practise two measures, Interim Measures for Joint Annual
Inspection of Overseas Investment (±.ljrN~IJ*ftift@:fg1T1}¥t;;22 Jingwai
Touzi Lianhe Nianjian Zanxing Ban/a) and Measures for Evaluating
Comprehensive Results of Overseas Investment (Trial) (~jrN~~ft;Ji~if
1fl'1}¥t(iJ\~Ti3 Jingwai Touzi Zonghe Jixiao Pingjia Ban/a Shixingi, which
were jointly used as the foundation of the annual inspection and evaluation of
OFDI during the period 2003-2008. According to these two measures, all
overseas enterprises are categorised into three groups: service and trade,
manufactures or resource development. MOFCOM and provincial business
administrative departments assess enterprises in terms of five indices: the
benefit of asset management, the quality of asset, the ability of debt payment,
the development capability, and social contribution. Enterprises should fill in
annual inspection reports for the examination of relevant departments. The
annual inspection result of level I, II or III will be decided. The certificate of
annual inspection will be sent to domestic parent companies (HJ: -0 if] mu
gongs;) and must be reserved for future requirement.
22 Accessed at
http://www.safe.gov.en/modelsafe/lawS/lawdetail.jsp?id=6&ID=S0404000000000000.1S
23 Accessed at h!tJ?:llsg.mofcom.gov.cnlaarticle/cataloglzggy/200404/20040400207005.html
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From 2009, MOFCOM and SAFE's 'Notice on relevant issues of Joint Annual
Inspection of Overseas Investment' (*T-±tjr1i~~-friff&I 1iif*lDWB"J
ji1H~Q24Guanyu jingwai touzi lianhe nianjian gongzuo youguan shixiang de
tongzhi) simplified the content and process of inspection. The new marking
standard concerns the current situation of overseas business organisations,
whether enterprises comply with home and host country regulations, and the
evaluation on foreign exchange administration. Only enterprises that are
awarded the result of level I are able to apply for special funds support (will be
discussed in Chapter 6) and enjoy relevant beneficial policies, such as foreign
exchange, customs, tax payment and exit-entry. Enterprises nominated level II
have no access to any support policies. If an enterprise gets level III in a series
of two years, it is forbidden to conduct overseas activities in the third year.
Firms that do not submit reports will be recorded as 'uninspected' in SAFE's
information system, and not allowed to apply for MOFCOM's special funds.
MOFCOM and SAFE's 2009 measure updates award and punishment criteria.
This modification was made after Beijing comprehensively considered the
problems illustrated in annual inspections in the past few years. As far as I can
ascertain, the Chinese government has never published the outcomes of annual
inspection. The only accessible example is Hunan Province's 2009 annual
inspection. The results for Hunan for other years or of other provinces are not
available. In other words, it is likely that the central government and sub-
national departments have reports but only for internal publication and
24 Accessed at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cniaarticle/zctblbI200912/20091206 7053 70.html.
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reference. This may be due to the short-term implementation of the above
measures. There may not be strong requirement to disclose the results.
Hunan Province's 2009 annual inspection can be taken as an example (Hunan,
2010). By the end of 31 December 2009,300 Hunan companies had overseas
subsidiaries, 210 of which needed the annual inspection. Among 126 (60% of
210) submitting the annual inspection reports, 117 (93% of 126), seven and
two were labelled level I, II and III, respectively. Most uninspected firms were
SMEs, which had no financial or managerial system abroad. Although the
annual inspection has been working since 2003, the documents submitted are
not yet complete or standard. Due to the lack of effective post-investment
management, it is difficult for parent companies to know changes of
shareholding structure and financial conditions promptly. The penalty in fact
has little effect on domestic parent companies, especially those without further
support by MOFCOM or SAFE. In addition, the Hunan government also found
problems with its provincial enterprises during OFDI. The investments
undertaken by Hunan companies, especially SMEs, showed the lack of risk
prevention and effective management.
5.3 Extraterritorial controls
5.3.1 Overseas state-owned assets
Detailed Rules for Interim Measures for the Registry and Administration of
Property Rights of Overseas State-owned assets (t_t~HE:fH3i;n:;n:~~ic.1tJl
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fD1T1}l*~nTh~JjW25 Jingwai guoyou zichan chanquan dengji guanli zanxing
banfa shishi xize) ('Property rights of OSA' hereinafter) were promulgated and
executed by the State-owned Assets Administration Bureau (now SASAC) on
11 September 1996. These regulations provide the first definition of overseas
state-owned assets, the principles to administer the registration of property
rights, the procedure and documentations for enterprises' registration, issues
concerning changes of property rights, the procedure and documentations for
annual inspection and how to deal with relevant documents. The regulations
provide facilities for the punishment and penalising of firms that do not respect
these regulations.
Interim Measures for the Administration of Overseas State-owned Assets (!Ji
;rr~:ff)qfFtfJItg1T1}l!26 Jingwai guoyou zichan guanli zanxing banfa)
('Administration of OSA' hereinafter) were promulgated and executed by the
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SAFE, and China Customs
on 27 September 1999. For centrally owned enterprises, they highlight the
important capital operations that have to be inspected by the Ministry of
Finance or relevant government department. They also list activities that have
to be recorded by the State Council. The basic administration of overseas state-
owned assets is concerned with the definition, registration, statistics and
evaluation of property rights. In addition, regulations provide the evaluation of
efficiency and performance and relevant legal responsibilities of enterprises.
25 Accessed at
http://www moc.gov cnlzizhanlsijulcaiwusi/zhengceguiding/guizhangzhidul200709/t20070920 398021.hlml
26 Accessed at hnp:llwww.jincao.comlfalI7/IawI7.03.htm
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Both of these regulations are widely used for the administration of overseas
state-owned assets and are important documents. They pinpoint the rights and
responsibilities of the government and enterprises and strengthen the
government's supervision and administration. However, both of them were
issued a decade ago and are rather dated and therefore have certain weaknesses
in administering current overseas investments. According to these regulations,
SASAC, SAFE and MOFCOM all have the right to inspect or administer
overseas state-owned assets. Due to this imperfect regulation and difficulties in
implementation, the government can administer overseas assets but only
through the financial supervision of parent companies within China.
Nonetheless, up to 2006, there were 161 central enterprises in China with
16,373 subsidiaries (Naughton, 2008). Due to the complexity of internal
structure of central enterprises, the government is insufficient in command of
those subsidiaries. Furthermore, because of the lack of efficient and effective
supervision, the loss of overseas state-owned assets is getting worse. According
to Wang, only one third of overseas central enterprises were profitable, and the
other two thirds merely balanced or even in deficit (Wang, 2004). This brings
into question how easy it is for SASAC to monitor the performance of its
groups.
In the process of internationalisation, the loss of state-owned assets attracted
the government's attention. It became increasingly important to shape new
regulations for the administration of overseas assets. Two cases are influential:
Beijing Shougang Corporation's acquisition (now China Shougang Group) of
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Hierro Peru (1992), and the derivatives trading of China Aviation Oil
(Singapore) Corporation (2003).
The Shougang case. In 1992, Beijing Shougang Corporation spent USD 118
million on a 98.4% share in a state-owned iron ore mining company in Peru
and subsequently established Shougang Hierro Peru, which nowadays is the
largest iron ore supplier on the east coast of the Pacific Ocean (Shougang
Hierro Peru website). However, Shougang's investment in Peru occurred
during the initial period of Chinese enterprises going global. Although a few
scholars mentioned this case (for example, Nolan and Yeung, 2001a,b, Young
et al., 1996, Zhan, 1995), there seems to be little study of the motivations or
implications. According to a number of Chinese news reporters and scholars,
Shougang failed to run its Peru company successfully due to its lack of
knowledge of Peru's relevant laws and regulations (Liu, C., 2005, Shen, 2010).
Despite this, Shougang signed an agreement with the Peru labour union, stating
that Peru's employees could enjoy free medical treatment, education and
accommodation. All these clauses are far beyond legal requirements in Peru,
China and many other countries in the world, and were therefore highly
favourable. Shougang accordingly incurred many extra costs due to this
agreement. In addition, Shougang struggled with the Peruvian employees'
strikes, which focused on raising wages and improving health benefits (for
instance, Che, 1996, Deng, Y., 2010, Gou, 2005). Before Shougang, Chinese
enterprises had little experience of dealing with labour relations in host
countries, which were very different from those in China. To summarise, I
argue that most SOEs developed under the government's protection with soft
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financial and institutional constraints. It is also true that many of these
enterprises lacked experience in international markets, as well as knowledge of
where to locate accurately in the global market. Poor decision making is one of
the most important reasons leading to the loss of state-owned assets.
China.liViation. Oil (€A.O) case. Generally, domestic parent companies
supervised their overseas subsidiaries through financial and personnel control.
In fact, due to the small size of many overseas firms, the managerial group is
simplified. For instance, in one company the executive manager could also be
the financial officer. In 2003, as an overseas holding subsidiary of China
National Aviation Fuel Group Corporation, CAO (Singapore) Corporation
began a hedging business dealing in oil products (Chen et 01.,2005). The
executive of the Singapore Corporation, Jiulin Chen, privately expanded the
business to futures trading of oil derivatives, which is prohibited under Chinese
law. This insider trading caused the loss of around USD 554 million and
subsequently led to the collapse of the company (Chen et al., 2005). After that,
the Chinese government agreed that the reshuffle of CAO (Singapore) be
conducted in line with Singapore's laws and business rules, not the normal
reform of Chinese SOEs. This won support from all parties in Singapore such
as creditors, small shareholders, strategic investors and other related parties.
Since March 2006, the new board of directors held the first meeting and CAO
(Singapore) recovered (He, 2006).
Since the CAO case happened after the establishment of SASAC, the
government's insufficient supervision of overseas affiliates became a hot topic.
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As mentioned above, one of responsibilities of SASAC is to supervise the
preservation and increment of the value of state-owned assets. Scholars have
questioned whether SASAC can fulfil these objectives (Clarke, 2003,
Naughton, 2007, Pearson, 2005). Nevertheless, it is more problematic
managing overseas subsidiaries than domestic ones. First, people in charge of
overseas subsidiaries always have overwhelming power with weak supervision.
For example, due to the lack of internal control monitoring, Jiulin Chen of
CAO (Singapore) was the only person who had real power to make decisions
on how to use the corporation's money, apart from the chief directors (Jin et aI.,
2005). Jiulin Chen's exclusive position and use of risky investment to
exaggerate his achievement also supports the argument made by Voss et
aI.(2008) and Morek et aI. (2008). Therefore, the peculation for futures trading
by Jiulin Chen could not be impeded in its early stages. Second, existing laws
and regulations are not complete for the administration of overseas national
assets. Third, until 2008 the State Council had decided to establish the
department of overseas auditing under the National Audit Office of China.
Before that, no department was responsible for the supervision of revenues,
debts, profits or losses of enterprises outside China.
It was concluded from these three cases that the loss of state-owned assets was
due to the lack of experience in the international market (the Shougang case),
and the lack of means of supervision (China Aviation Oil case). For these
reasons, if the government aims to reinforce the effectiveness of overseas
assets administration, relevant regulations have to be updated, especially in
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terms of restructuring central enterprises, the selection and appointment of
executives, and how to put these regulations into practice.
The State Council issued 'Opinions about Further Deepening the Reform of the
Economic System' (*-T~1{J28f1**~Bj(~(J{J~_9i!.n Guanyu shenhua jingji
tizhi gaige de yijian) in Apri12005, which was recognised as the work
guidelines for different government departments in the following years until an
updated one was issued in 2008. According to the 'Opinions', NDRC and
MOFCOM took the leading role to establish the guidelines for improving
'going-out' strategy. Furthermore, SASAC and Ministry of Finance had to lead
the revision of laws, regulations and criteria related to supervision and
administration of overseas state-owned assets.
In Apri12007, based on 'Property rights of OSA' and 'Administration of OSA',
Ministry of Finance, SASAC, MOFCOM and SAFE worked together for the
troubleshooting of overseas property rights registration. The registration
involved four aspects: whether the application and changes of overseas assets
rights comply with relevant regulations; whether the procedure of changing
overseas assets is completed; the situation of safety, value preservation and
appreciation of overseas assets; and whether legal rights are trespassed.
Relevant results were regarded as an important reference for future policy.
Through the registration of property rights, the government was able to
comprehensively understand the current situation of overseas assets.
27 Accessed at http://www.gov.cnlzwgkl2005-08/12/content21634.htm
129
Chapter 5 The Chinese government: as a supervisor of OFDI
Accordingly, the government will be able to update relevant regulations and
adopt pertinent measures to avoid the loss of state-owned assets.
As planned, the State Council would have promulgated the measures for the
administration of state-owned property rights of overseas enterprises and for
the auditing, supervision and administration of overseas state-owned assets in
2007. However, due to conflicts between national and international laws, after
several years of drafting, relevant updated regulations have not yet been
promulgated. A number of problems are now discussed, such as how to balance
between national and international auditing criteria, the payment of exchange,
and information disclosure.
5.3.2 Overseas listing and round-tripping investment
The Hong Kong, United States and Singapore stock exchanges are the top three
popular destinations for Chinese enterprises. According to the World
Federation of Exchanges statistics (www.world-exchanges.org), the United
States has the largest size of market capitalisation and attracts the most capital.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), however, has the highest demand for
IPOs. Regarding profitability, a firm should have $2 million pre-tax income
annually in the last three years and $2.5 million in the most recent year (NYSE,
2009). The requirements of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) and
Singapore Exchange (SOX) are lower than the NYSE but still higher than
China's capital markets (HKSE, 2010, SOX, 2010). It is significantly difficult
for normal SMEs to access overseas capital markets. Accordingly, most
130
Chapter 5 The Chinese government: as a supervisor ofOFDI
Chinese enterprises or enterprises with Chinese assets that have are imprinted
'state-owned' or 'state-related'. Relevant regulations are listed in table 5.4
regarding the evolution of Chinese enterprises' going out to overseas stock
exchanges.
Table 5.4: regulations related to overseas listing
Regulations Year Enunciator
Circular Concerning Further Strengthening the Administration of 1997 The State
Share Issuance and Overseas Listing Council
~~m-~~~~~*~ffft.~~m• • ~~~~
Guanyujinyibujiaqiang zai jingwai faxing gupiao he shangshi
guanli de tongzhi
('No. 21')
Circular on Relevant Issues Concerning Enterprises Applying for 1999 CSRC
Overseas Listing
~~~ft$~~*km~~~~~~~N
Guanyu qiye shenqing jingwai shangshi youguan wenti de tongzhi
('No. 83')
Notice on Issues Concerning the Overseas Stock-Issuance and 2000 CSRC
Listing by Foreign Enterprises Involving Domestic Rights and
Interests
~~~&~~a§~~*0~~~*~ffM.~~m~~~
~~i8i~30
Guanyu shejijingnei quanyi dejingwai gongsi zai jingwai faxtng
gupiao he shangshi youguan went; de tongzhi
('No Objection Letter')
Notice on Issues Concerning Improving the Foreign Exchange January SAFE
Administration of Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign Capitals 2005
:X;~jM!f9r~jf~;rr¥[.!I~:X;IIlJIm ~i8i~31
Guanyu wanshan waizi binggou waihui guanli youguan went; de
tongzhi
('No. 11')
Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Registration of Overseas April SAFE
Investments by Domestic Individual Residents and Foreign 2005
Exchange Registration of Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign
Capitals
:x;~*~m~~A~*N • • ~&*.jf~*~ft~~:X;~
~~i8i~032
Guanyujingnei jumin gerenjingwai touzi dengjiji waizi binggou
waihui dengji youguan went; de tongzhi
('No. 29')
Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange October SAFE
Administration of Financing and Round-tripping Investment by 2005
28 Accessed at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n575727/n575772/871143.html.
29 Accessed at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n805070/n829260/n829292/l991820.html.
30 Accessed at
http://www.csrc.gov.cnln575458/n870654/n6018320/n9498435/nll0739801nll0742181nll074611/11091150.html.
31 Accessed at http://www.law-lib.comllaw/law view.asp?id=88422.
32 Accessed at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/g/200505/20050500l02082.html.
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Domestic Residents via Overseas Special Purpose Companies
~~m~g~mMm*~.§~~~Mm&~~Nm*~.
f.l1f ~ fiiJ »2Ef.Jm~[]33
Guanyujingneijumin tongguojingwai teshu mudi gongsi rongzi
jifancheng touzi waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi
('No. 75')
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 2006 MOFCOM,
by Foreign Investors SASAC,
~~*OONm~*~m~~~~.~~ SAT*,
Guanyu waiguo touzizhe binggoujingnei qiye de guiding SAIC*,
('No. 10') CSRC and
SAFE
..Note: SAT= the State Administration of Taxation, SAIC = the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce
In the 1980s, along with China's economic development and deepening
understanding of the capital market, Chinese enterprises began actively to use
capital markets to raise funds. However, the A-share market in China was far
from mature, and was mainly organised in line with increasing cash flows for
SOEs. Other companies, especially private companies and SMEs, had to look
for other approaches to raise capital. At the end of the 1980s, Yuexiu Group
and GDH Group indirectly listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In 1993,
Tsingtao Brewery listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and became
China's first H share. Up to the end of2008, 111 Chinese enterprises have
listed on the main board of overseas stock markets (CSRC, 2009). Figure 5.2
indicates the fluctuation of IPO numbers during this period, the result of
CSRC's changing policies.
33 Accessed at
http://www.safe.gov.cn/model safe/laws/law detail.isp?id=4&1D=80403000000000000.1.
34 Accessed at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/cv/lanmuc/200804/20080405490455.html.
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Figure 5.2: the numbers and raised capitals of Chinese enterprises' overseas
IPOs 1993-2008
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During this period, compared with listing on the A-share market, the procedure
of overseas listing was simpler. The number of enterprises thriving in overseas
stock markets kept increasing and reached a peak in 1997. Between 1993 and
1995, major overseas listed companies were from traditional industries and
manufacturing, such as Shanghai Petrochemical, Maanshan Iron and Steel,
Harbin Power Equipment. Around 1997, a number of typical high-quality
companies listed abroad in succession, such as Eastern Airlines, Huaneng
Power and Shenzhen Expressway, which operated in the power and
infrastructure industries.
Before 1997, the government's administration and inspection of overseas
listings were comparatively liberal. Any Chinese enterprise to be listed abroad
had to inquire whether they needed CSRC's approval. However, no specific
laws explained how to deal with the domestic assets of red-chip companies. In
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March 1997, GITIC Group issued the prospectus on the HKSE without
notifying CSRC in advance. It then was ordered to suspend its capital raising.
Although GITIC finally listed on the HKSE after mediation by the Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission, this incident alerted the Chinese
government. To strengthen the supervision of Chinese- funded enterprises in
Hong Kong, the State Council promulgated Article No. 21, which was also
well-known as 'red chip guidelines'. Subsequently, the Securities Law became
effective in 1999. This required that any domestic firm that was inclined to list
on overseas stock markets needed the approval of provincial governments or
the relevant departments of the State Council and had to report to CSRC for
inspection, whether they listed directly or indirectly.
The year 1999 witnessed the launch ofHKSE's Growth Enterprise Market
(GEM). With the rise of dot.com shares, a large number of private high-tech
enterprises listed abroad, like Sina and Sohu, apart from the large monopolies
in the petroleum and telecommunication industries.
In July 1999, CSRC's Article No. 83 required that all domestic enterprises
listed outside China must meet the following conditions: net assets no less than
RMB 400 million; raising capital no less than USD 50 million; and, after-tax
profits of the past year no less than RMB 60 million. The increase in the
threshold blocked many enterprises from direct overseas listings, especially
private firms with limited sizes but thirst for capitals. As a result, more and
more companies landed overseas stock markets through the red-chip approach,
using overseas listed companies to acquire domestic assets.
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At that time, CSRC had no clear approval process for indirect overseas listing.
There happened Yuxing Case (Wang, 2001). 12 out of 16 founding
shareholders of Beijing Yuxing transferred their shares to the other four
shareholders, who registered two companies in BYI. These two companies then
established ajoint venture Yuxing Technology, which would be listed on the
HKSE, registered in Bermuda to evade China's legal obligations. In December
1999 Yuxing Technology completed its international placement without
CSRC's approval. Instructed by CSRC, Yuxing waited one month and was
finally approved by CSRC to list on the Hong Kong GEM in January 2000.
The Yuxing case revealed the deficiency of existing laws and regulations. As a
remedy, CSRS issued Article No. 72, which was also recognised as a 'No
Objection Letter'. According to this article, regardless of the place of
registration, as long as it involved business or assets in China, a company
applying for overseas listing had to find a lawyer to declare the details of assets,
formation and evolution and to comment on its legal validity. CSRC would
accept the lawyer's legal opinion. After some certain procedures, if there were
no further objection, CSRC would reply to the lawyer with a 'no objection
letter' .
The introduction of the 'No objection letter' almost closed overseas listings.
This functioned well against the loss of domestic assets, particularly state-
owned ones. However, it usually took four months or more to obtain the 'no
objection letter'. The complicated and time-consuming approval process made
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it difficult for Chinese enterprises to judge the best time for listing.
Accordingly, most Chinese enterprises had to postpone or even give up the
overseas listing plan. After the 'No objection letter' became effective in 2001,
Chinese enterprises only raised capital RMB 20.2 billion, which was only 1/18
of that in 2000 (CSRC, 2009). During this period, most Chinese enterprises
achieving overseas listings through the red-chip approach were SOEs, such as
CNOOC's IPOs on NYSE and HKSE (CNN, 2001), and Bank of China's
listing on HKSE (Dong and Huang, 2007).
After two years of implementation, the State Council cancelled 406
administrative examination and approval projects", including Article No. 72.
The 'No objection letter' was finally annulled in March 2003. This was,
undoubtedly, good news for domestic private enterprises, as plenty of time was
saved for overseas listing. Consequently, the overseas listing of Chinese
enterprises reached a new peak. In 2003 and 2004, respectively, 18 and another
18 Chinese enterprises undertook overseas IPOs and raised USD 6.49 billion
and 7.83 billion (figure 5.2).
However, the approach of establishing an overseas holding company to acquire
domestic equity or assets rapidly became popular and troublesome. The
concern about loss of state-owned assets and capital flight made the Chinese
government start a new round of strengthening supervision. In 2005, SAFE
successively promulgated three circulars: Article No. 11 in January, Article No.
29 in April and Article No. 75 in October, respectively. Article No. 11 declared
3S Accessed at http://www.chinatax.gov.cnln480462/n480513/n480979/n554229/1015017.html.
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that domestic residents should obtain the approval from foreign exchange
administration departments, if they wanted to transfer domestic assets or equity
for overseas shares and other equity. Article No. 29 emphasised that any
resident should finish foreign exchange registration, if they injected domestic
assets or equity into foreign firms and held overseas shares directly or
indirectly. Although SAFE's two circulars aimed to combat capital flight and
the loss of state-owned assets, their regulations unavoidably restricted legal
acquisition by foreign companies. The new declaration and registration
procedure obstructed the red-chip approach. Chinese enterprises had to
postpone or suspend their overseas listing plans once more. Therefore, Article
No. 75 was issued to alleviate the suppression brought by the previous two
regulations. It clearly recognised the offshore company established for the red-
chip listing as a special purpose venture (SPV). In addition, it stated that a
domestic resident could set up an SPY and use this SPY as a springboard to
undertake capital activities. Correspondingly, the red-chip listing boomed again
after a brief period of stagnation.
However, Chinese enterprises had to face internal and external changes.
Internally, MOFCOM and another five departments jointly promulgated
Article No. 10, which re-defined and regulated the red-chip listing. Before the
establishment of an SPV, Chinese companies had to apply for approval from
MOFCOM. The listing and trading of an SPY should be approved by the
securities regulatory authorities. An approved Spy had to complete its listing
within one year, or the corporate structure of the domestic company must be
restored. Overall, Article No. 10 clarified the multilevel supervision of
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MOFCOM, CSRC and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce,
which was believed effectively to prevent 'round-tripping' OFDI. On the other
hand, the operations of 'round-tripping' investment and red-chip listing are
extremely similar. The restraint of 'round-tripping' investment will inevitably
be affected by the red chips adversely. Overseas listings also become more
risky due to the strengthened examination, approval and registration procedures
and the compulsory one-year operating time. Up to now, no one has broken
through the block of Article No. 10 to list on overseas stock markets. The
companies that succeeded their overseas listings after 2006 had all completed
their equity swaps before the issue of Article No. 10.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the research questions of the contemporary home
country measures and their evolutionary changes on the basis of analysing
China's examination and approval reform, post-investment monitoring, and
extraterritorial controls. The Chinese government traditionally controlled
outbound businesses through rigid restrictions on the supervision before
investment, as well as limitations on the amount of foreign exchange used for
OFDI. By contrast, nowadays, the state uses the examination and approval
approach to control pre-investment intentions and the annual inspection and
assets registry to monitor post-investment results. The control over the
approval of overseas projects has been significantly relaxed. The principal
criteria for approval is whether OFDI projects are in compliance with the
state's long-term planning, that is, the requirements of sustainable development
and development of strategic resources required for national development.
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Contrary to the state's pre-investment examination and approval, the post-
investment monitoring seems out of control to some extent. The penalty on
non-participation in relevant inspections is relatively weak. This may result in
SOEs' capital flight and the loss of state-owned assets.
The issues of extraterritorial controls have caught the government's attention
due to the concerns regarding the loss of state-owned assets addressed in the
Shougang and China Aviation Oil cases. The institutional constraints on SOEs
can be found on GITIC and Yuxing's listings on the Hong Kong stock
exchange, but are not significant. The purpose of OFDI examination and
inspection is not to hinder OFDI, but more for the government to understand
SOEs' business operations and the feasibility of their OFDI projects. Therefore,
it is not significant that HCMs effects drive SOEs to escape from the home
country. The escapism perspective is not suitable for addressing Chinese
SOEs' internationalisation.
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Chapter 6 The Chinese government: as a
promoter of OFDI
Morek et al. (2008) believe that to investigate China's OFDI, research should
consider institutional, political, and social factors. This is along with the cross-
disciplinary nature of international business theory. The macro-level analysis
also provides an essential background to micro-level study. Therefore, before
later studying the motivations and strategies of Chinese TNCs, the previous
chapter presents the HCMs effects on OFDI in the light of the Chinese
government performing as a supervisor. In addition to this, it is vital to
understand China's stimulatory measures, as classified by Luo et al. (2010).
Apart from the argument on China's institutional hindrances, scholars have
accredited diplomatic and financial assistances, state-supported scientific and
technical research (Buckley et al., 2006, Cai, 1999, Child and Rodrigues, 2005,
Deng, 2004, Luo et al., 2010, Rui and Yip, 2008), unfortunately, without
detailed interpretation of measures or discussion on their interrelationship.
Section 3.2 has described the key actors, particularly MOF and PBC, and their
functions as a promoter. This chapter investigates 12 measures that support
Chinese TNCs going global in terms of finance and information services.
Section 6.1 discusses the financial support, including special funds, sovereign
wealth funds, preferential loans provided by policy banks and state-owned
commercial banks, and the risk prevention mechanism. Section 6.2 concerns
policies to encourage TNCs in specific industries, for example. overseas
exploration of natural resources. Enterprises from industries obtaining extra
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support will be elaborated on in case studies (chapter 7). After that, section 6.3
explores the Chinese government's information provision and technical
assistance. Their effects on OFDI development are indirect, functioning as a
step in the simplified examination and approval procedure (online services),
the supplement to the financial support (guidance catalogues and reports), and
the reference to regulate new measures (the statistical system).
6.1 Financial incentives
6.1.1 Financial subsidies
In the year 2005, MOF and MOFCOM circulated Measures Governing Special
Funds for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation (X>t5'ri2mtt*-€H1=~
19H)!t~~Jl1}¥*36 Duiwai jingji jishu hezuo zhuanxiang zijin guanli banJa)
('Special Funds Measures' hereinafter). 'Special Funds Measures' has been
used as the guideline for the application and reporting for special funds in the
following years. From then on, through an annual notice, MOF and MOFCOM
determined the key scopes exactly supported in the previous year, as well as
concerning the details of application and reporting.
Regarding the 'Special Funds Measures', the government provides the special
funds to support the foreign economic and technical cooperation business,
which includes: overseas investment, overseas agricultural, forestry and fishery
cooperation, foreign engineering contracting, foreign labour services, the
36 Accessed at
http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/f/200512/20051201256329.htm1? 180378298=366855896
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establishment of overseas R&D platforms on high and new technologies, and
foreign designing consultation.
The special funds are used by the means of direct compensation and interest
subsidy. In general, direct compensation applies to costs incurred before a
domestic enterprise registers any overseas enterprise, such as consultation of
laws, technology and business, translation of documents, and payment for
relevant materials. Direct compensation shall not exceed 50% of the actual pre-
investment expenses spent by the applicant enterprises (MOF and MOFCOM,
2005). One project can only enjoy the support of direct compensation once. An
interest subsidy is appropriate for the medium and long-term loans from
domestic banks for overseas investment, cooperation and an engineering
contract. The maximum rate of the interest subsidy shall not exceed the
People's Bank of China base rate in effect. The annual rate of an interest
subsidy for loans in foreign currencies shall be lower than 3% (MOF and
MOFCOM, 2005). Furthermore, the support of an interest subsidiary provided
for each project is limited to five years. In addition, different projects have
different bottom lines for the contract sum. For example, an overseas
investment project shall not be lower than USD 1 million (or equivalent
currencies) in principle.
Notice for 2005 gives a detailed explanation for overseas investment and other
foreign business activities. Other regulations are in compliance with the
'Special Funds Measures'. Since 2006, however, Notice for 2006, Notice for
2007 and Notice for 2008 have some differences from 'Special Funds
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Measures'. Notice for 2006 and Notice for 2007 start to consider and act in
accordance with the Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment
Guidance Catalogue(s). A number of forms for an enterprise's application and
materials for reference are also introduced. Additionally, Notice for 2006
(MOF and MOFCOM, 2006) and Notice for 2007 (MOF and MOFCOM, 2007)
give details of the content of the special funds support. A 20% subsidy is
granted for the transport cost of raw materials to China. This applies only to a
Chinese enterprise engaged in the exploitation of raw materials, such as oil,
natural gas, iron, copper, aluminium and other metals, and also forestry and
fishery resources. Moreover, the support of build-ope rate-transfer projects is
mentioned in Notice for 2007. In 2006 the total amount of special funds given
to each enterprise was limited to RMB 20 million (MOF and MOFCOM, 2006).
For 2007 the maximum subsidies for each enterprise was increased to RMB 30
million (MOF and MOFCOM, 2007). Notice for 2008 has little difference from
Notice for 2007, but specifies that in overseas agricultural cooperation projects
and overseas R&D centres, the Chinese party should invest more than
$500,000, and that is not less than RMB 1.5 million (MOF and MOFCOM,
2008).
6.1.2 SovereignWealth Funds
At the end of2009, the balance of China's foreign exchange reserves had
totalled USD 2,399 billion, ranking first in the world since 2006 (SAFE, 2010).
How to use this huge amount of foreign exchange to promote China's OFDI
gradually became a hot topic.
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Established in 2007, China Investment Corporation (CIC) is a solely state-
owned enterprise engaged in foreign exchange capital investment. Nowadays,
it has become one of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds. Chinese
Ministry of Finance issued the special treasury bonds to raise RMB 1.55
trillion, which was used in tum to purchase USD200 billion as China's national
foreign exchange reserves (CIC, 2008). This huge amount of money was used
as CIC's registered capital. CIC follows the criteria 'separation of enterprises
from the government' (zhengqi fenkai) and is profit-oriented.
CIC aims at the maintenance and increment of China's foreign exchange
reserves, the liquidity contraction in the financial system, and the hedge of
macroeconomic fluctuations (CIC, 2008). In terms of the governance, CIC
performs accountable to the State Council. Due to its peer administrative
position to ministries and commissions in China, no ministry or commission
has rights to supervise CIC's performance.
During the initial period of operation, most of CIC's investment flew to
overseas banks or financial agencies, for example, USD 3 billion to acquire
9.99% of Blackstone's shares in 2007 (Blackstone, 2007). Until31 December
2009, CIC had invested USD 811 million in foreign developed and emerging
economies (CIC, 2010), especially several investments in overseas resource
exploration (table 6.1). I assume that excluding investment to banks and
financing corporations, CIC's outward investment is primarily to secure the
144
Chapter 6 The Chinese government: as a promoter of OFDI
nation's energy and to maximise long-term investment returns of these surplus
state funds.
Table 6.1: CIC's overseas investment (financial investment excluded)
Target Value Industry Time
Teck Resources (Canada) $1.5 billion Mining and 07/2009
resources
development
JSC KazMunaiGas $940 Oil and gas 07/2009
(Kazakhstan) million
PT. Bumi (Indonesia) $1.9 billion Coal mining 09/2009
Nobel Oil Group (Russia) $270 Oil and gas 09/2009
million
Noble Group (Singapore) $858 Resources 09/2009
million
SouthGobi Energy (Canada) $500 Coal mining 1112009
million
AES (USA) $1.58 billion Power generation 11/2009
GCL-Poly (HK) $717 billion Renewable energy 11/2009
Source: CIC 2009 annual report
Furthermore, it can smooth the impact of the short- and medium-term
fluctuations of oil and other commodity prices, and further promote domestic
economic stability (Portman, 2008). However, due to the limited knowledge on
the CIC's operation, scholars have argued about the intentions of China's
sovereign wealth funds. A number of experts in international finance cautioned
that the Chinese government-backed investment could potentially disrupt
global financial markets and harm the U.S. economy (for example, Cox, 2007,
Francis, 2007, Surowiecki, 2007). Other experts were less apprehensive and
pointed out that both China and the US could benefit from the investment (for
example, Berger and Berkofsky, 2008, Davidson, 2007, Martin, 2008).
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6.1.3 Banking support
First registered in 2003, Central Huijin Investment Ltd. ('Central Huijin'
hereinafter) was once the largest investment corporation in China. After the
establishment ofCIC, Central Huijin became CIC's wholly owned subsidiary.
Regarding the corporate governance, Central Huijin's Board of Directors and
Supervisory Board members are appointed by MOF, PBC and SAFE.
After China's step-by-step banking reform began with the entry into the WTO,
currently, China's banking system includes three state policy banks and four
state-owned commercial banks'", Three policy banks were established by the
Chinese government in 1994 and are policy-driven rather than profit-oriented,
namely, China Development Bank38 (CDB), the Import-Export Bank of
China39 (China Eximbank), and Agricultural Development Bank of China"
(ADBC). The policy banks are under the direct leadership of the State Council,
solely owned by the Chinese government and are supervised by PBC.
Following special financing principles, their main responsibilities are to
implement the national industrial projects and regional development plans. The
policy banks are also mainly supportive in the overseas projects of Chinese
enterprises (figure 6.1). On behalf of the State Council to act as the investor,
Central Huijin holds the shares of China's one policy bank and four
commercial banks (table 6.2) and several other financial companies.
37 Accessed at http://www.cbrc.goy.cn/bankbbs/bankbbslBbsPageAction.do ?operate=geUrp I.
38 CDB website http://www.cdb.com.cn/web/
39 China Eximbank website http://www.eximbank.goY.cn/
40 ADBC website http://www.adbc.com.cn/index/index.asp
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Figure 6.1: China's financial framework related to OFDI
SOEs, especially central
enterprises
State-owned commercial banks
Table 6.2: key shareholders and their shares of policy banks and state-owned
banks
Bank Shareholders Shares
COB MOF 51.3%Central Huijin 48.70%
China Eximbank The State Council 100%
ADBC The State Council 100%
Central Huijin 35.42%
ICBC41 MOF 35.33%
HKSCC Nominees 16.31%
ABC Central Huijin 50.00%MOF 50.00%
BOC42 Central Huijin 67.53%
HKSCC Nominees 24.69%
Central Huijin 57.09%
CCB43 HKSCC Nominees 19.12%
Bank of America 10.95%
Note: China EXImbank and ADBC are not stock corporations.
Source: Central Huijin website http://www.huijin-inv.cnlinvestmentsJinvestments2008.html;
Sina Finance websites, data at the end of 3) I) 2/2009.
41 Accessed at
httD://money.finance.sina.com.cn/coro/go.php/vCI StockHolder/stockid/6Q1398/djsplaVlype/30 phtml
42 Accessed at
http://monev.finance.sina.com.cnlcoro/go.php/vCI StockHolder/stockid/6Q I988/displaytynel30.phtml
43 Accessed at
http://monev.finance.sina. com.cnlcoro/go. php/vCI StockHolder/stock id/60 I939/displaytype/3 0.phtm I
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The differences between the policy banks and the commercial banks are as
follows (Peng and Gu, 20 II). First, the policy banks are wholly owned by the
Chinese government and are in compliance with all requirements by the
Ministry of Finance in China. Joint-stock commercial banks conduct business
on their own decisions and independent accounting. Second, the capital of the
commercial banks chiefly comes from the civil deposits. In contrast, the policy
banks do not accept civil deposits. Their capital comes from the issuance of
financial bonds, the government's financial allocation and PBC's interest-free
loans. Third, the commercial banks have to maximise their profits for business
purposes, with a wide range of businesses. The policy banks are specialised to
provide policy financial support for the development of some sectors or
industries, not for profits. They all have a close relationship with corresponding
industrial departments.
In general, the policy banks provide low-interest, long-term loans for specific
targets. Their loans cover the areas that the commercial banks are disinclined to
enter in the initial developing stages. For example, CDB serves 'bottleneck'
industries like power and transportation, and areas requiring priority support,
such as developing the western region and revitalising the old industrial base of
Northeast China (COB, 2005). China Eximbank is committed to expanding
exports of electro-mechanical products and high-tech products, as well as
supporting overseas contracting projects and OFDI projects (Eximbank, 2009).
ADBC is mainly responsible for the rural financial services. They mostly target
in agriculture and rural development and provide loans for the purchases and
reserves of food, cotton and oil (ADBC, 2005). Deduced from their specific
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responsibilities, COB and China Eximbank are key supporters in the OFOI
development.
• China Development Bank (CDB)
Being decided by the main responsibilities, COB, undoubtedly, has been highly
involved in the OFOI activities. After 14 years of operations, up to the end of
2008, COB has provided USO 40.4 billion for overseas projects (COB annual
report, 2008), an average annual USO 2.9 billion. Most of COB's loans have
flowed to public infrastructure (28.80%), road construction (20.27%) and
electric power (15.70%). Only a small part facilitated the development of
natural resources like petrochemicals and coal.
NORC and COB jointly issued Notice concerning relevant issues on providing
more financing support to key overseas investment projects (*TJtt-tV1JO~j
X1±lj~N~.m2J:m §lM!~xt.fff*IQ]N!ia<Jjfft9;044 Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang
dui jingwai touzi zhongdian xiangmu rongzi zhichi youguan wenti de tongzhi)
in 2005. Since then, they have had annual plans to provide financing support
for the key overseas investment projects. In particular, they comprise natural
resource-seeking projects that compensate China's insufficient resources;
productive and infrastructural projects that stimulate the export of domestic
technologies, products, equipment and labour services; R&D projects in
advanced international technology, management experience and professional
44 Accessed at http://www.fdi.gov.cnlpub/FDl/zcfglyh/t20060619 49400.jsp
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talents; and M&A projects to improve the international competitiveness and to
explore the international market.
In COB's annual scales of equity loans (IN:;;fs:Jjt;j,x Guben daikuan), a certain
amount of special equity loans for overseas investments is arranged for
Chinese enterprises to increase capital funds, improve their financing
capabilities, exert their predominance and actively participate in overseas
projects. Additionally, COB affords medium- and long-tem non-equity loans
for key investment projects, provides services in industry analysis and risk
evaluation and other financial services.
• The Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank)
China Eximbank is wholly owned by the Chinese government and is under the
direct leadership of the State Council. Its main responsibility is to 'implement
state policies in industry, foreign trade and economy, finance and diplomacy;
to promote, through the provision of policy financing, the import and export of
Chinese mechanical and electronic products and high- and new-tech products,
and encourage Chinese companies with comparative advantages to undertake
offshore construction contracts and overseas investment projects; to strengthen
China's relations with foreign countries and enhance the international
economic and trade cooperation.' (China Eximbank website 2009)
I deduce several points from China Eximbank annual reports (various years).
First, from the financial statements, China Eximbank's total assets and
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revenues increased more than six-fold in seven years, from RMB 119.5 (2003)
to 792.14 (2009) billion. Nevertheless, the gross profit margin yet maintained
at an extremely low level, even no more than 1% (calculated from original data
gathered from annual reports). As a state-owned policy bank, I understand that
China Eximbank cannot be recognised as a common enterprise. Its main
purpose is not to maximise profits, but to follow state policies and to provide
policy financing for relevant projects.
Second, based on China Eximbank's loans disbursement (table 6.3), the total
disbursement has increased dramatically as well, from RMB 62.72 to 368.4
billion. Using the data of interest income and the total loans, I calculate the
average interest rate, which increased from 5.17% in 2003 to 6.44% in 2009.
Third, the export seller credit" plays a critical role in all China Eximbank's
businesses, although the ratio of export seller credit to the total disbursement
declined from 94% in 2003 to 47% in 2009. Loans disbursed by China
Eximbank to overseas investment projects reached RMB 54.0 ($8.2) billion in
2009, the percentage of which in the total disbursement grew from 8.6% in
2003 to 14.7% in 2009. This also reflects the contribution China Eximbank
made to support the government's 'going out' strategy and enterprises'
overseas activities.
45 The Export Seller's Credit refers to loans provided to an exporter to finance its export of
manufactured or purchased mechanical and electronic products, complete sets of equipment.
and high- and new-tech products as well as the provision of labour services
(http://english.eximbank.gov.cnlbusinessarticle/activities/exportl200905/9395 l.html).
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Since 2003, according to Notice on providing credit support policy for key
overseas investment projects encouraged by the State (~TxtOO*nmJJfl'.Jil
j~N55:flt,siJW El~-=f1§17t3tt.fl&~fl'.Jji!H~046 Guanyu dui guojia guli de
jingwai touzi zhongdian xiangmujiyu xindai zhichi zhengce de tongzhi),
NDRC and China Eximbank have jointly established a credit support
mechanism for overseas investments. Among the annual export credit plans (ttl
D 1i§17titjGlj Chukou xindai jihua) (NDRC and Eximbank, 2004), China
Eximbank arranged a certain amount of special loans to back the key overseas
investment projects encouraged by the State. The special loans are under a
preferential interest rate on export credit loans. The key projects are the same
as the ones supported by CDB's special equity loans. China Eximbank also
provides other conveniences, such as extending the loan term for long-term
investments and approving loans directly to overseas subsidiaries if the projects
have the potential for low-risk and stable returns.
If an enterprise, especially an SOE, wants to borrow from China Eximbank, the
target OFDI project shall be approved and authorised by relevant departments
in China and/or the host country. For example, the borrower has to pay at least
USD 1 million, which is no less than 30% of the total amount of the target
project value (Eximbank, 2008). This means that for any project requiring over
USD 3.3 million, it is easy for an enterprise to borrow 70% from the bank.
46 Accessed at http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cn/jwtzlcyznlt2005071435625.htm
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• State-owned commercial banks
Illustrated by table 6.2, China's four main commercial banks, Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank
of China (BoC), and China Construction Bank (CCB), are controlled by the
State through Central Huijin and/or MOF. In spite of shareholders, ICBC, ABC,
BOC and CCB are under the supervision of China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC). CBRC's main responsibilities include formulating
supervisory rules and regulations governing the banking institutions;
conducting examination and surveillance of the banking institutions; publishing
statistics and reports of the overall banking industry; and functioning as the
supervisory board of the major state-owned banking institutions (CBRC, 2010).
On 6 December 2008, CBRC promulgated Guidelines on the Risk
Management ofM&A Loans of Commercial Banks (lfij~ftHTtf:Wr1]t~)Xl.~
"ifJJ.miJI47 Shangye yinhang binggou daikuan fengxian guanli zhiyin). To
engage in M&A lending business, a bank must have a loan loss special reserve
ratio of no less than 100%, a capital adequacy ratio of 10% or above, and a
general reserve balance of no less than 1% of the loan balance over the same
period. According to Bankscope'" 2008 data, most of China's listed banks are
qualified, including state-owned banks (ICBC, BOC and CCB), state-
controlled banks (CITIC bank and Bank of Communications) and banks
47 Accessed at
http://www.cbrc.goy.cnlchinese/home/jsp/doc View .jsp?docID=20081209D8EO 13330FDF 1498
FFE8080300CB6500.
48 Bankscope is an important resource for banking information. It can be accessed at
https:/lbankscope2.bydep.com/Yersion-20 10122IHome.serv?product=scope2006.
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controlled by the local government (Bank of Beijing and Bank of Shanghai).
Despite these, a bank also has to comply with nebulous criteria as a sound risk
management and effective internal control mechanism and a professional term
for credit due diligence and risk assessment. These requirements are not
stringent for state-owned banks.
The Guidelines also require commercial banks to analyse and evaluate strategic
risk, legal and compliance risk, integration risk, operation risk and financial
risk. For risk control purposes, the total M&A loans should not exceed 50% of
the lending bank's net core capital. M&A loans issued to a single borrower
should be no more than 5% of the net core capital. The amount of the loan for
one M&A deal should be within 50% of the total amount of the investment.
The term of any M&A loan should be no longer than five years.
Before the implementation ofCBRC's Guidelines, General Principles on
Lending C:1lt*j,::imJJ!~49 Daikuan tongze), issued by People's Bank of China in
1996, forbade borrowers to use loans in equity investments, with the exception
of particular cases stipulated by the State. This regulation left limited space for
domestic investors to obtain M&A loans. Only for a very small number of
enterprises, especially large-scale SOEs, might they be released after special
approval.
After the promulgation of the Guidelines, the permission of the issuance of
M&A loans by commercial banks is regarded as a crucial measure to support
49 Accessed at http://www.pbc.gov.cnlrhwg/19961202f.htm.
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various M&A activities, including cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In
December 2008, Shanghai United Assets and Equity Exchange'", ICBC's
Shanghai branch and Bank of Shanghai launched an RMB 10 billion credit line
for M&A activities. In January 2009 Beijing Equity Exchange" and ICBC's
Beijing Branch signed an agreement with Beijing Capital Co., Ltd., which
became the first company in China to obtain loans for M&A transactions.
Shortly after that, according to a Caijing news report (Zhang, 2009), COB
provided its first M&A loan, RMB 1.6 billion in total, to Citic Group and Citic
Guoan Group.
The Guidelines aim to expand the capital sources that can be used for M&As,
which is thus expected to have a positive impact on domestic corporate
consolidation and overseas investment beyond China. However, during the
initial period of implementation of the M&A loans by commercial banks, I
expect that the commercial banks will be as cautious as possible. Therefore,
priority will probably be extended to enterprises and projects in line with
national and industrial policies and strategies. Based on the security and
profitability considerations, the commercial banks will also be inclined to
extend loans to large SOEs rather than SMEs.
COB, China Eximbank and state-owned commercial banks have established
the strategic cooperation relationships with some central enterprises and have
provided billions of loans to finance the state's key industries and projects.
so Shanghai United Assets and Equity Exchange (J::#iJlrlftF~3(~JiJT), approved by
Shanghai Municipal Government, is a comprehensive platform for assets and equity
transaction.
S) China Beijing Equity Exchange Group (~tJi(f=~3C~JiJT) provides the comprehensive
information package needed to succeed in today's Chinese financial market.
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Considering the natural resources development, CDB inked a cooperation
agreement with CNPC, which promised that in the next five years, CDB would
offer CNPC USD 30 billion to support CNPC's overseas assets acquisitions
(CNPC, 2009). Furthermore, CDB signed several agreements of loan-for-oil
deals with Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, as well as India. For example, two
Russian companies (Rosneft Oil Company and Russian pipeline company
Transneft) will provide 300,000 barrels a day for 20 years to pay down a $25
billion loan from CDB (Winning et al., 2009). Venezuela's Petroleos de
Venezuela agreed to take a $4 billion loan from CDB and supply 200,000
barrels of oil a day (Liu and Martinez, 2009). CDB provided Brazil's state-
controlled oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, with $10 billion of loans in
return for 100,000 barrels of oil a day (Dantas and Blount, 2009). Through
these loan-for-oil deals, China would ensure a stable oil supply from these
countries.
Regarding the metal industry, Chinalco obtained a USD 2 billion loan from
China Eximbank to develop copper ore in Peru (Xu, 2008) and a USD 21
billion syndicated loan from CDB, China Eximbank, ABC and BOC when
acquiring Rio Tinto's shares (ChinaDaily, 2009b). China Wuhan Iron and Steel
Corporation (WISCO) received an extended credit line ofRMB 80 billion
(2009) from CDB, which would be used in WISCO's overseas expansion and
mid- to long-term development (Song, 2009). COB also signed cooperate
agreements of development financing with Ansteel (2005) (SASAC, 2005a),
Sinosteel (2005 and 2009) (SASAC, 2005c, 2009b), and Baosteel (USD 10
billion, 2010) (SASAC, 2010) for resources development and corporate
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consolidation. China Eximbank provided WISCO USD 90 billion in foreign
exchange financing from 2010 to 2015 (Song, 2010). Additionally, Sinosteel
had strategic cooperation agreements with ABC (2005) (SASAC, 2005b), BOC
(2006) (SASAC, 2006), and China Everbright Bank52 (RMB 10 billion, 2008)
(Sinosteel, 2008). Similarly, Ansteel was supported by ICBC (RMB 20 billion,
2007) (SASAC, 2007a), ABC (RMB 15 billion, 2008) (Ansteel, 2009), CCB
(RMB 20 billion, 2008) (Ansteel, 2009), and BOC (RMB 20 billion, 2009)
(SASAC, 2009a).
However, a key criterion of the financial support, the preferential loan interest
rate, has never been explained clearly in the above-discussed HCMs. There are
two possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, the Chinese government is
able to apply different interest rates based on the target project and the amount
of investment. Second, the nebulous interest rate would hinder the comparison
of the government's treatment to SOEs and private companies. Furthermore,
the information of signed strategic cooperation agreements was collected from
news reports and enterprises' websites. None of them provided any subsequent
information regarding the utilisation of capitals and financing services.
In addition, CDB undertook a granted USD 1 billion as the initial funding of
China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund), which was established in 2007
and aimed at investing in Africa. Now CAD Fund has reached USD 5 billion.
CAD Fund works as private equity (PE) funds, only supervising corporate
business rather than getting involved in daily operations. Meanwhile, in
S2 China Everbright Bank is approved and controlled by the State Council of China.
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addition to the corporate governance of a general fund company, CAD Fund
has a unique guidance committee, comprising ministerial-level representatives
from MOFCOM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOF, PBC, CBRC, CSRC,
SAFE and COB. The office of this committee is located in MOFCOM's
Department of Western Asian and African Affairs. Any project related to vital
industries and economic policies has to consult with the committee first. This
government-backed PE fund aims at encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest
in Africa and explore new markets under the 'going out' policy. It has
sponsored or built cooperative relationships with a number of SOEs, for
instance, Jinchuan's acquisition ofWesizwe (South Africa), Zijin's copper
exploitation in Congo, Jidong' s cement plant setup in South Africa, FAW' s
establishing of a large-scale manufacturing base, WISCO's exploring of
mineral resources like metals and coal, and coal investigation and investment
by China National Administration of Coal Geology.f
6.1.4 Risk prevention mechanism
China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) is China's sole
policy-oriented insurance company offering export credit insurance. It was
established in 2001 with the capital from the Export Credit Insurance Risk
Fund as arranged by the State's fiscal budget. Sinosure is mandated to support
the Chinese enterprises through providing the export credit insurance against
non-payment risks and the guarantee service for overseas investment.
S3 China National Administration of Coal Geology is an institute under the direct leadership of
the Central Government, specialising in coal resources exploration and geology industry
management.
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In 2005 NDRC and Sinosure promulgated Circular concerning relevant issues
on setting up a risk prevention mechanism for key overseas investment projects
jingwai touzi zhongdian xiangmufengxian baozhangjizhi youguan wenti de
tongzhi). The risk prevention mechanism serves overseas projects as follows:
overseas resources development to compensate for China's insufficiency;
overseas production and infrastructure to drive the export of domestic
technology, products and equipment; overseas R&D projects to utilise
advanced technology, management experience and expertise; and overseas
M&As to improve the international competitiveness of enterprises and to speed
up exploring the global market.
Furthermore, CDB and Sinosure issued Circular concerning relevant issues on
further strengthening the financial insurance support for key overseas
~filJ~Ef<Jji'H~Q55 Guanyujinyibujiada dui jingwai zhongdian xiangmujinrong
baoxian zhichi lidu youguan went; de tongzhi) in 2006. CDB and Sinosure
particularly emphasise the support for the central enterprises under SASAC's
supervision and local large business groups and their offshore subsidiaries with
capital, technology, management and brand strengths. The overseas projects
highlighted in the above circulars will be funded by CDB in priority and
guaranteed by Sinosure with preferential insurance.
S4 Accessed at http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cnljwtzlcyzn/t2005071435755.htm.
ss Accessed at http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cnljwtzlcyznlt2006022861389.htm.
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Before the enunciation of the above two measures, China, as other developing
countries, had done little in formulating measures regarding investment
insurance. A number of Chinese scholars appealed the importance of
establishing a guarantee mechanism to shelter outward investment (for
example, Hu, 2004, Huang and Xiong, 2004, Liu, J., 2005, Zhu, 2004).
Sinosure's two measures not only broaden financing channels and spread
investment risks, but also promote China's security market with international
practice. Generally speaking, the insurance covers political risks, such as
nationalisation, expropriation, restrictions on foreign exchange and restrictions
when investing abroad. OFDI insurance has a common precondition, that is,
investment projects must be consistent with the economic interests of the home
country. For example, an overseas project is helpful to increase employment
opportunities for the home country, or to increase the home country's economic
interests. Unlike private insurance, investment insurance is implemented by the
state institutions. It is also often closely related to the intergovernmental
agreement, with the nature of the national security or government guarantee.
The purpose of investment insurance is not only to compensate ex post facto,
but more importantly to take preventive measures to avoid incidents.
6.2 Industrial promotion policies
To encourage enterprises to develop OFDI in resources, the Chinese
government has introduced a number of policy measures in terms of finance,
industrial guidance and credit loans. 'Special funds for exploring overseas
mineral resources' (IE"Hrrz:~~)X\.~!1Jit~:rm~~) was established by
161
Chapter 6 The Chinese government: as a promoter of OFDI
MOFCOM and Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) in 2003. Provisional
measures'? concerning how to manage the special funds were promulgated by
the Ministry of Finance in 2005. Furthermore, OFDI in resources development
is also listed as one of the key projects sponsored by special funds for foreign
economic and technical cooperation (discussed in section 6.1.1). To assist
overseas resources development, MOFCOM and MLR establish 'Online
Recording System of Developing Overseas Mineral Resources '". When
business activities are still in the preparation stage, enterprises have to report to
MOFCOM and MLR. Through this online system, enterprises are able to fill in,
submit and search for the recording forms. In the appendix, it also provides a
detailed manual to explain how to use this online system. The 'Recording
mineral resources' is highly regarded as the important platform for the
communication between the government and enterprises.
At the first national energy conference= in February 2009, Guobao Zhang, the
head of the Energy Bureau ofNDRC, emphasised China's cooperation with
foreign countries and international energy organisations. According to the Oil
and Gas Development Planning 2009-2011, the Energy Bureau will offer
discount loans and preferential loans to support overseas oil and gas projects.
The proportion of the government's capital injection will also be increased. In
addition, the Energy Bureau has plans to sign bilateral agreements with
relevant countries regarding the protection of investments, avoidance of double
taxation and legal assistance. Moreover, the Energy Bureau will make efforts
~~*r~.~~~• •~.*. .fibtt
Accessed at http://fdi.gov .cnlpub/FDIIzcfglcwgl/P020060619694876096517 .pdf.
57 Accessed at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/
58 Accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2009-02/05/contentl0766913.htm.
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to set up special funds with the utilisation of China's foreign exchange reserves
for overseas energy exploration and petroleum reserve.
In January and February 2009, one after another, the State Council published
the Adjustment and Revitalisation Plans of the top ten industries, namely, iron
and steel, automobile, textile, equipment manufacture, shipbuilding, electronics
and information, light, petrochemical, nonferrous metal and logistics. Among
them, five industries are endowed with missions to progress global projects
(table 6.4). Derived from the motivations of Chinese SOEs investing overseas,
the Chinese government has concerns on resources development, market
seeking, technology seeking and overseas network building. Concerning the
entry mode to a foreign market, for natural resources development the Chinese
government encourages both individual and joint venture operation. For
information technology the State is more inclined to support the establishment
of overseas subsidiaries and the build-up of a global network. For
manufacturing CBMA is more likely to receive discount loans.
However, key industries being promoted and supported by the State are all
under the control of China's largest SOEs. In other words, private companies
are excluded from these opaque but rigid thresholds. The difficulty in financing,
however, is that it obstructs Chinese private enterprises investing abroad.
Because of limited national export credit and high interest rates of loans,
Chinese SMEs have problems with repayment and cash flow. The Chinese
government has to consider extending the repayment period or reducing
interest rates as well.
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6.3 Information service
Before 2002, the Chinese government's information provision and technical
assistance for overseas investment was deficient. Since 2003, MOFCOM has
worked with other departments on the OFDI-related information publication. It
has also devoted itself to establish online service platforms.
6.3.1 Guidance
In the 16th National Congress (2002) and the Third Plenary Session of the 16th
CPC Central Committee (2003), Chinese leaders emphasised several points
related to OFDI, including encouraging and supporting enterprises with
comparative advantages to invest abroad, and perfecting the service system of
overseas investment. To carry out and implement the central guidance,
Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogues (x-t ~~
1i~ IE§]IJf=~.Iff ~ §~S9 Duiwai touzi guobie chanye daoxiang mulu)
('Catalogues' hereinafter) were drawn to strengthen the coordination and
guidance of OFDI. Catalogues I, II and III cover 28, 67 and 25 countries
correspondingly, including industries of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry,
fishery, mining, manufacturing, service and others. Enterprises, which comply
with requirements of the Catalogues and which have approved certificates of
59 Catalogue I can be accessed at htto:llwww.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/62617I.htm
Catalogue II can be accessed at www.sndrc.gov.cn/uploadfileslf2008-09-
OIl200809011859089945.doc
Catalogue III can be accessed at
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtzJ2007tongzhi/t20070227 118707.htm
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overseas investment, have priority to enjoy preferential policies regarding
funding, foreign exchange, tax payment, customs, and exit-entry.
The Catalogues first select countries, and then define relevant investment fields,
based on the consideration on comparative advantages of Chinese enterprises,
economic structure and environment of target countries. Countries are mainly
selected from peripheral countries with a good relationship, high
complementarity to China's economy, primary trading partners, strategic
partners'", and members of important regional economic organisations in the
world. The choice of industries takes into account areas that target countries try
to attract investment for, and is referred to China's National Economical
Industry Classification (GB/T4754-2002).
Table 6.5 gives an example ofIndia selected from Catalogue I (2004). Firstly,
India has a close relationship with China. In 2005, China and India agreed to
establish a 'strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity'
between them. According to the statement, China-India relations have entered a
new stage of comprehensive development. Secondly, according to the India
Investment Centre website, India's 1991 Power Policy seeks to attract
significant foreign investment in the power sector. Concerning the
infrastructure sector, FDI up to 100% is automatically permitted in projects for
construction and maintenance of roads, highways, vehicular bridges, toll roads,
vehicular tunnels, ports and harbours. SASAC's website demonstrates that in
past years, most projects involved Chinese central enterprises and their
60 China has established strategic partnership with many countries, for example, with
Mongolian and South Korea in 2003, with Chile and Uzbekistan in 2004, and with Peru and
Indonesia in 2005.
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participation in the construction of Indian power stations and roads (SASAC,
2009). This also shows that China's investment in India complies with the
Catalogues.
Table 6.5: an example selected from Catalogue I 2004
Country India
Agriculture, forestry,
animal husbandry and
fishery
Crop planting
Mining Coal and iron
Manufacturing
Service
Manufacture of instruments and office equipment;
Manufacture of high/low voltage switchgears, generators
and other electric machinery;
Mechanic manufacture of refrigerating equipment and air
conditioning;
Manufacture of televisions and other electric equipment;
manufacture of plastic products;
Pharmaceutical production
Trade
Software development
Building
Transportation
Travelling
Infrastructure
Other Electricity production and supply
Source: Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue (I), 2004
From 2006 to 2009, the Investment Promotion Agency (lPA) of MOFCOM
published 24 reports concerning the investment in different countries and
regions. All these reports are within the category of Country/Region Report of
China's Outward Investment Promotion (Series) (q:t 00 ~ ~~ 1:2:Wi~:i! lE §iIJ/:J:t!!
!R~~H~ 'j5-61 Zhongguo duiwai touzi chujin guobie/diqu xilie baogao) and
focus on the target country's macroeconomic environment, industrial structure,
laws, policies and incentives, the establishment of foreign enterprises,
production costs, and investment services. Furthermore, in 2009, MOFCOM's
61 Accessed at http://tzswj.mofcom.gov.cn/staticlredianzhuizong/redianzhuizong.html/l ?3635885496=383633112
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two departments, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic
Cooperation (CAITEC) and IPA, worked jointly with the Economic &
Commercial Counsellor's Office of China's embassies in various countries to
compile Outward Investment Cooperation Countries (Regions) Directory (X"it:9r
19: I8i iHt 00§jIJ (±i!!!K) m i¥J62 Duiwai touzi hezuo guobie diqu zhinan). In
2010 MOFCOM will release three more reports and supplement relevant
information to the issued reports. These reports assist the Chinese enterprises to
understand the politics, economy, society and culture, laws and customs of 162
countries and regions.
6.3.2 Online services
The website of 'Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation''" was put
into operation by MOFCOM in 2004. It supports the Chinese enterprises with
the information of China's laws and regulations, policy explanations and the
enterprise directory. Additionally, MOFCOM provides administrative services
through the online systems, including OFDI Statistics System, OFDI Approval
System, Developing Overseas Mineral Resources Recording System and OFDI
Operation Obstacles Reporting System. The online performance evaluation is
under construction.
According to Notice on establishing the information bank of OFDI proposals
62 Accessed at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cnlgbzn/gobiezhinan.shtml
63 rplE~~H~8t-fr{'J::1!i~IXXl~ Accessed at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cnJ.
64 Accessed at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cnlaarticle/zcfb/b/200403/20040300 191018.html.
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touzi yixiang xinxiku de tongzhi), MOFCOM established an information bank
ofOFDI proposals in 2003. It was designed to provide the capital supply and
demand information for domestic and foreign enterprises. However, the
applicants to join this information bank have to comply with the following
requirements: the registered capital of over RMB 10 million; making profit in
three consecutive years; and aiming at the OFDI project of over USD 1million.
The government's bias obstructs many SMEs from useful information.
Furthermore, if an enterprise wants to release its proposal on MOFCOM's
website, it has to fill in a form and submit it to the relevant department.
Relevant information will be publicised online only twice a year, in June and
December. This time-consuming procedure will predicatively delay the
investment opportunities. It is hardly believed that the enterprises will take this
so-called information bank seriously. As a result, the information bank does
not function as well as it sounds. According to the website of the Department
of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation.f little information can be
found of domestic intentions. Most of the overseas requests for China's
investment were publicised in 2004 and 2005. Only a few have been updated in
recent years.
Reporting System of Overseas Investment Operation Obstacles (00 ~IJN f5t g}_ fr
~~Hi~tll1§-fMlt66Guobie Touzi Jingying Zhangai Baogao) ('Reporting
obstacles' hereinafter) was issued by MOFCOM on 11 November 2004. The
main purpose of this 'Reporting obstacles' is to protect Chinese investors' legal
rights and to create a good environment for promoting overseas investment.
6S Accessed at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/static/j/j.htmi/i.
66 Accessed at http://gbtz.hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/
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According to this 'Reporting obstacles', Chinese economic and commercial
agencies, chambers of commerce and enterprises abroad shall submit annual
and irregular reports. Chinese enterprises shall provide the following
information in their reports: the overall situation of their overseas investment
and operation, obstacles and risks of target countries, barriers of investment
and service trade, and suggestions to deal with these problems. Enterprises
shall submit written materials in compliance with the sample report annexed.
Online submission can be completed at the programme' Reporting Overseas
Investment Operation Obstacles' on the website of China's Foreign Economic
Cooperation (http://fec.mofcom.gov .cnD.
These reports shall reflect various obstacles, barriers and related problems
encountered in their investment and operation in the host countries and regions.
Furthermore, these reports will be used as the bases of the annual 'Foreign
Market Access Report' (lEjJlJll ~H9J5!J.ftl11l1§-Guobie maoyi touzi huanjing
baogao) issued by MOFCOM. Relevant domestic departments will consult
these reports to understand various problems of investing in the target countries,
and then to safeguard the legal rights and interests of Chinese enterprises
through multilateral or bilateral mechanisms.
'Foreign Market Access Report', released since 2003, has been regarded as a
useful reference for enterprises to have updated information of overseas
investment environments. It is also important for enterprises to report the
overall situation of their outward investment, especially problems they have
encountered. Foreign Market Access Report 2009 (' Access Report 2009'
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hereinafter) introduces the trade and investment environment of 16 countries
and areas: Argentina, Egypt, Australia, Brazil, Russia, Philippines, The
Republic of Korea, Canada, the United States, Mexico, South Africa, the
European Union, Japan, Turkey, India, and Indonesia. 'Access Report 2009'
describes the general situation of trade and investment in these 16 countries
and areas, their administrative systems and relevant changes in 2008, their
trade barriers and negotiations with Chinese government. The Indian cabinet
further relaxed FDI policies in a number of sectors. In the civil aviation sector,
100% foreign ownership is permitted in aircraft maintenance, flight training
and helicopter services. In the petroleum and natural gas sector, the Indian
government cancelled the requirement that a foreign investor has to transfer
26% of its equity to its Indian partner or the public within five years. In the
mining sector, after the approval of Indian government, 100% foreign
ownership is permitted in titanium mining and sorting operations. It all looks
good for Chinese enterprises that want to invest in relevant industries in India.
6.3.3 Statistics
The Statistical System of Overseas Direct Investment (X1~~l~JjH:2:~~itllIIJ
Jjt67 Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Tongji Zhidu) (,Statistical system' hereinafter)
became effective in 2009, and was issued by MOFCOM and NBS. The
'Statistical System' replaces the earlier version, which was promulgated in
2004 and 2006. The 'Statistical System' is suitable for all enterprises that
invest overseas. The main purpose of the 'Statistical System' is to grasp overall
67 Accessed at
http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zctblb/20070)/20070)042)3569.html?4236645562=383633 ) 12
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information of enterprises' overseas investment. Based on collected data, the
government publishes • Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct
Investment' every year. The government would be able to analyse the trend of
OFDI and to efficiently administer overseas activities. The government would
make relevant guidance policies for outward investment.
In the first section, it specifies general instructions, including the main content
of the reports, submission and filing of materials, publication and adjustment of
statistical data and the training of statistics personnel. In spite of this, it also
specifies that some behaviour may receive administrative punishments,
according to Rules for the Implementation of the Statistics Law of the People's
Republic of China. This includes false declaration, concealment, forgery or
falsification of statistic materials, refusing to declare or continuous late report
materials.
In the second section, it lists tables and forms required by statistic reports,
which have to be fulfilled by enterprises on time. Then it gives explanations for
the basic concepts and index, and details of statistical standards and calculation
methods in the following two sections. The forms imply what the government
concerns and what the crucial information is related to OFDI. They are
interested in basic information of domestic and overseas enterprises,
investment and profit distribution between domestic and overseas enterprises,
import and export through overseas enterprises, and reinvestment by domestic
enterprises through tax havens.
172
Chapter 7 Evidence from business groups: China's largest companies by foreign assets
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 summarise the core information provided by the 'Statistical
System' and relevant forms. MOFCOM is responsible for the statistics of
OFDI and administers the statistic work of central enterprises and all provincial
business administration departments. Domestic investing parties should
organise and compile all information of their overseas subsidiaries and
activities. Considering 16,373 subsidiaries under 161 central enterprises
(Naughton, 2008), however, it is intricate for domestic parties to finish this
work.
Table 6.6: regulation for OFDI statistics
Form Name Issued Reporter Reporting date and
No. I!eriod method
FOUl Agreement signed on Quarterly Domestic Online transmission,
overseas investment enterprises within 10 days after
the end of each
uarter
FDU2 Statistics on overseas Quarterly Ditto Ditto
investment
FDINI Brief information of Annual Ditto Online transmission,
domestic enterprises before 20th June in
the ~ear later
FDIN2 Brief information of Annual Ditto Ditto
overseas enterprises
FDIN3 Investment and profit Annual Ditto Ditto
distribution between
domestic and overseas
enterprises
FOlN4 Import and export Annual Ditto Ditto
through overseas report
enterprises
FOlN5 Re-investment by Annual Ditto Ditto
domestic enterprises
through tax havens
FOlIOl Brief information and Annual Overseas Arrange the time and
operation activities of enterprises method within the
overseas enterprises deadline required for
domestic enterprises
Source: MOFCOMet. aI, 2009 Statistical Systemof Overseas Direct Investment
Notes: Central enterprises should send all the above forms (except FDIlOl) to MOFCOM.
Other SOEs should send forms to provincial business administration departments. The form
FDI101 should be sent to domestic mother enterprises by their overseas subsidiaries.
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Table 6.7: information required by each form
Form
No.
Key information requiredName
FOUl Agreement signed on
overseas investment
The date of the agreement;
The investment mode; and
Investment by Chinese party, itemising
capital, real and other investment
FOU2 Statistics on overseas
investment
The investment mode; and
Investment by Chinese party, specifying
capital, real and other investment
FDINI Brief information of
domestic enterprises
The amount of total assets, debts,
shareholders' interests, revenues and
profits; and
The number of employees in total and
abroad
FOIN2 Brief information of
overseas enterprises
The amount of total assets, debts,
shareholders' interests, revenues, profits
and taxation paid to the host country
FOIN3 Investment and profit
distribution between
domestic and overseas
enterprises
OFDI in current period: net amount, total
amount (itemising added capital stock and
profit reinvestment), and reverse
investment;
OFOI accumulated: net amount, total
amount (itemising capital stock and profit
reinvestment), and reverse investment;
Distribution of profit made by domestic
enterprises in current period: net amount,
total amount (itemising profits), and
distribution of profit made by overseas
enterprises; and
Profits returned to domestic enterprises
FOIN4 Import and export through
overseas enterprises
The total value of import and export
through overseas enterprises; and,
Imported resource products, itemising
petroleum, natural gas, timber, copper, iron
and aluminium
FOINS Reinvestment by domestic
enterprises through tax
havens
The location (HK, Cl, BVI, and/or
Bermuda);
The amount of reinvestment in current
period and accumulated amount; and,
The industry reinvested
FOIIOI Brief information and
operation activities of
overseas enterprises
Basic information;
Investment between domestic enterprises;
Profit distribution with domestic
enterprises; and
Import and export
Source: Ibid.
Relevant official reports, however, are far from enough for overseas investment.
They merely concentrate on key countries and industries, and are not able to
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provide detailed information. The central government is likely to take into
consideration problems reflected in Foreign Market Access Reports and OFDI
statistic reports when examining OFDI projects in the following year or years.
These reports are used for analysis rather than providing information for
investors. Information collected by Country/Region Reports and OFDI
Directories may be comprehensive, but not concurrent. Due to the increasingly
close relationship between China and the host country government, the central
government, as well as provincial and municipal government departments, has
the fastest and most efficient information of potential projects outside China.
Chinese SOEs, in particular, the central enterprises would have first and
foremost priority to take advantage of relevant information.
It is also insufficient if it only knows that Chinese government provides
financial support or not. The firm certainly should have overall information of
the local investment environment, such as how many competitors, which entry
mode to select, labour and infrastructure costs. Some scholars argue that
China's service system for overseas investment has to be strengthened in
supplying detailed information and training specialised personnel, and
encouraging the development of commercial and non-commercial
organisations (for example, Wei and Zhu, 2010, Zhang and Zhou, 2007, Zhao
and Chen, 2010).
However, it shall be the firms' responsibility, not the State's, to search relevant
first-hand information like target country environment and target sector. Based
on my research, first, the government has already established a platform for
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companies' communications. The service system is also relatively complete.
Second, it is impossible for the government to provide updated and detailed
information of all countries and sectors. It always takes time for institutional
departments to compile reports or catalogues. It is crucial to train specialised
personnel to collect and deal with information. There is also a large potential
market for information in need.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter focuses on what supportive measures are and their concerns, as
well as the range of application. First of all, this chapter investigates the
Chinese government's role as a promoter. The financial support and
information services from Chinese government have dramatically improved. In
addition to special funds offered by MOF and MOFCOM as well as sovereign
wealth funds, NDRC and CDB provide capital support for projects that
supplement domestic resources and stimulate the export of technology,
products, equipment and labour. NDRC and China Eximbank also have jointly
established credit support mechanism for overseas investment projects. China's
state-owned commercial banks closely work with SOEs' overseas projects as
well, for example, extending M&A Loans. The analysis concerning Beijing's
financial policy by other scholars like Luo et al. (2010) and Voss et al. (2008),
which are close to this research, is quite broad. MOF's special funds, CIC's use
of sovereign wealth funds, long-term low-interest loans provided by policy
banks and state-owned commercial banks are not yet discussed.
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On the other hand, some problems of the Chinese regulations promoting OFDI
have been discovered in this chapter. The State lays emphasis on five industries
through industrial promotion policies. SOEs are the leading actors in the fields
of petroleum and refining, metallurgy, electronics and information and
manufacture. Most of the promotional measures first and foremost service
SOEs, sometimes even exclusively, although this is hardly written in
documents. This prevents private companies from enjoying financial support as
fairly as SOEs.
Information support and consultation will also assist investors in gaining access
to the investment environment of host countries. Therefore, the state provides
information on a variety of countries through embassies, banks and specialised
consulting companies. The Catalogues list the attractive target countries and
encouraged industries. The Directories and CountrylRegion Reports describe
general information of potential host countries. 'Foreign Market Access
Report' also helps enterprises update their knowledge of overseas investment
environments, as well as China's OFDI statistical reports.
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Chapter 7 Evidence from business groups:
China's largest companies by foreign assets
Functioning as an administrator and a sponsor, the Chinese government has
promulgated a series of policies and regulations, 26 of which are currently
effective and are enunciated by the key policymakers. To enrich the extant
literature with more detail and to construct a more complete institutional
framework, Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate China's institutional context ofTNCs'
overseas expansion. Generally speaking, the attitude of the Chinese
governrnent is to encourage OFDI development to the utmost extent, along
with reasonable and essential controls.
This chapter responds to calls for empirical research at the micro level (Cui and
Jiang, 2010, Li, P.P., 2007, Yin, 2009) and the need for a better understanding
ofHCMs and their effects on Chinese TNCs (Child and Rodrigues, 2005, Luo
et al., 2010). In this chapter, I investigate the data of China's largest companies
by examining their foreign assets and overseas subsidiaries. Section 7.1
provides the overview of the sample. Sections 7.2 to 7.4 investigate the
relationship between the groups and their subsidiaries. In particular these
sections consider the corporate governance of business groups and examine
and discuss the motivations of business groups' OFDI. Section 7.5 seeks the
rationale of round-tripping investment. Section 7.6 is the conclusion.
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7.1 Corporate structure
7.1.1 The mother companies
As stated in Chapter 4, I apply the data of the top 50 business groups ranked by
their foreign assets in 2009 (MOFCOM et al., 2010). Among these business
groups, I find little information ofCSSD Venture Capital (rank 45), due to no
website or listed holding subsidiaries. For the 49 companies with available data,
based on the overviews from their official websites, regarding their ownership,
32 of them are SASAC-owned central enterprises; 5 are state-owned or
controlled enterprises (CITIC68, SAIC69, Shougang, CIMC7o, and Legend"); 9
are owned or controlled by the provincial and municipal government (Shum
Yip, Yunnan Copper, Hunan Valin, Yanzhou Coal, Changsha Zoomlion, GDH,
Guangzhou Yuexiu, Shenzhen Investment, and Jinchuan), and 3 are private
companies (ZTE, Huawei and Jiangsu Shagang).
Considering the places of incorporations, 5 are registered in Hong Kong,
namely, China Resources, China Merchants, Shum Yip, GDH, and Guangzhou
Yuexiu, based on the introductory information from their official websites.
Others are incorporated in mainland China.
68 CITIC refers to China International Trust and Investment Corporation, a state-owned
investment company.
69 SAle refers to Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation.
70 CIMC refers to China International Marine Containers (Group) Ltd., which is principally
engaged in the manufacture and sale of transportation equipment.
71 Legend is the holding company of the famous Lenovo Group. The State-owned Assets
Management Company of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a Chinese government agency,
holds 35% shares of Legend, which makes it the largest shareholder of Legend.
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7.1.2 Listed companies
In our sample, except for Huawei, Shagang and Jinchuan, 46 Chinese TNCs
have 127 listed companies. 51 out of 127 are listed on the Chinese stock
exchanges, while the rest are listed outside mainland China. 9 companies are
listed in more than one stock exchange, for example, CNPC's holding
company Petrochina is listed on the China, Hong Kong (HK) and New York
stock exchanges. For these companies, I only refer to their financial reports
from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) to avoid repetition.
In China-listed companies, I find evidence of overseas activities in 9
companies' reports. With regard to companies listed abroad, 68 HK-listed
subsidiaries distribute in China (18), Bermuda (18), the Cayman Islands (Cl) (7)
and HK (25). The main businesses of most offshore companies are recorded as
investment holdings, which are used to control more subsidiaries. Some
financial holdings also focus on bond securities investment, providing services
of nominee, financial, leasing, administration, management and warehousing.
Excluding those with investment holdings, 61 listed companies have 894
offshore holding subsidiaries, including direct and indirect holdings, dispersed
in 45 countries and regions. Tax havens, like Hong Kong and Panama, are the
top destinations. Despite this, the central enterprises set up subsidiaries in
advanced economies like the US and Europe. Although half(l,353 out of
2,792) of subsidiaries are outside mainland China, only 30% (859 out of 2,792)
participate in OFDI businesses.
180
Chapter 7 Evidence from business groups: China's largest companies by foreign assets
Due to the complicated corporate structure of business groups, I have found
conflicts between the information of parent groups and listed companies. Take
CNPC72 for example. CNPC's website demonstrates that its HKSE-listed
company Petrochina has a China-based non-listed subsidiary, namely,
Petrochina International Co. Ltd. (Chinaoil). Chinaoil is responsible for the
construction and management of international trade, overseas warehousing and
global networks. It has 11 subsidiaries in China and 12 abroad, which distribute
in the US, Kazakhstan, Japan, the UK, Russia, Indonesia, Hong Kong and
Singapore. Nevertheless, Petrochina's annual report only shows a list of 5
subsidiaries, which do not mention Chinaoil. One reason for this situation is
that the report will be lengthy, particularly when the parent group has dozens of
subsidiaries. As it is noted in CNPC (Hong Kong)'s report, 'To give details of
all the other subsidiaries would ... result in particulars of excessive length.'
(CNPC(HK), 2010) Another possible reason is that unrecorded companies are
indirectly held by investment holding companies in their multi-level ownership.
Accordingly, I have to take the information collected from the websites of
parent groups into account, which does not appear in the financial reports of
listed companies.
The detailed information of listed companies and main businesses and the role
of their offshore holding companies are demonstrated in Appendix 1. I compile
the names of groups and the listed companies. With regard to the listed
companies, Appendix 1 shows their places of incorporation/listing, their main
businesses, how many subsidiaries principally operated in China but were
72 CNPC refers to China National Petroleum Corporation, the holding company of its well-
known listed subsidiary Petrochina.
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registered as foreign-owned enterprises, and the roles, locations and numbers
of their overseas subsidiaries. Appendix 2 demonstrates Chinese TNCs' cross-
border M&As from 2003-2009, with regard to ultimately acquiring companies,
target companies, the value of investment, and the stake obtained. This
responds to questions of whether their overseas businesses comply with their
domestic main businesses. This also considers whether establishing offshore
holding companies is conducted on the purpose of 'round-tripping' investment,
what the proportion is, and whether it is significant. Furthermore, this indicates
the groups' strategic choices of target countries and sectors and the motivations
of undertaking OFDI, and whether they are politically driven or business
inclined.
In brief, I agree that, as latecomers to the global competition, Chinese TNCs
use OFDI to address their competitive disadvantages, catch up with their
competitors (Buckley, Cross et al., 2008, Child and Rodrigues, 2005, Deng,
2004,2007, Luo and Tung, 2007), and augment their assets (Sutherland and
Matthews 2009). OFDI has reinforced Chinese TNCs with advanced
technology, diverse products and professional personnel (Child and Rodrigues,
2005, Cui and Jiang, 2010, Rui and Yip, 2008).
There is evidence for 'round-tripping' investment, but it is not significant.
These 'most internationalised' business groups, ranked by their overseas assets,
operate in various industries abroad. Most of their overseas businesses are
regarded as a support to the mother companies or a service to foreign
customers. Morek, Yeung and Zhao argue that the government, however, may
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use these SOEs to promote 'flagship' overseas projects, rather than investments
with high economic returns (Morek et al., 2008). Naughton (2008) also
criticises that it is not beneficial for the long-term growth of central enterprises,
because they receive resources and high level government attention. However,
this research disagrees with their belief that OFDI undertaken by Chinese
TNCs comes from the convergence of the nation and enterprises' interests. I
hypothesise Chinese TNCs' responses to HCMs are 'conditional compliance',
which cannot be well explained by Oliver's categories of firms' strategic
responses (Oliver, 1991). The OFDI of these business groups is driven by the
balance between political and institutional factors and business interests.
Neither of them functions solely. This will be elaborated on in sections 7.2 to
7.5.
7.2 Natural resources seeking
7.2.1 Petrochemical industry
China's foreign oil dependence ratio has continuously increased from 6% in
1993 to 52% in 2009 (NBS, 2010). Domestic oil production was replaced by
these imports in order to meet more than half of China's oil consumption. The
growing reliance on imported oil and gas has forced China to enhance its
energy security. Their 'going out' strategy encourages national oil enterprises
to purchase quality oil and gas assets abroad, build transnational pipelines and
sign long-term provision contracts to secure their supply.
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CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC are China's three major crude oil explorers and
producers. The CNPC Group has 12 overseas branches in Iran, Iraq,
Kazakhstan, South America and Asia to operate local oil and gas exploration
and exploitation. Petrochina International Co. Ltd. (Chinaoil), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of PetroChina Co. Ltd., is responsible for international trade, the
establishment and management of overseas storage, and the construction of the
global marketing network. For example, in 2009, through Chinaoil's Singapore
subsidiary, Petrochina purchased 45.5% of the publicly listed Singapore
Petroleum from the Keppel Corporation for $1.02 billion (Petrochina, 20 I0).
Similarly, Sinopec's wholly-owned subsidiary Sinopec International
Exploration and Production Corporation (SIPC) specialises in overseas oil, and
gas exploration and investment. In recent years, other Chinese central
enterprises have also embarked on acquisitions of overseas sources. For
instance, Sinochem paid $879 million for Emerald Energy, which was
recognised as 'another step in our strategy of building a global energy
company' (Kavanagh, 2009). Thanks to these M&A deals, Chinese petroleum
refining enterprises have broken through to the oil fields in South America, the
Middle East and Africa.
In spite of the expansion in the upstream sector, CNOOC's subsidiary China
Oilfield Services Ltd. (COSL) acquired Awilco Offshore ASA for $2.5 billion
(COSL, 2009). Awilco was a Norwegian company, providing offshore drilling
services in Australia, Norway, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and the Mediterranean
region. In addition to growth opportunities in new markets, COSL would
obtain Awilco's project contracts and drilling equipment, in particular, the
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advanced technology in relation to its offshore drilling and management
expenence.
7.2.2 Iron and steel industry
China's crude steel imports amounted to 628 million tons, accounting for 69%
of national steel consumption (NBS, 2010). Due to China's escalating
dependence on foreign iron ore, Chinese steel-producing companies seek
overseas opportunities in terms of long-term contracts, overseas iron
development by participating in joint ventures, and the equity acquisition of
foreign companies. For example, Sinosteel completed its purchase of Midwest
(Anand, 2008). Shougang acquired 12.03% shares of Mount Gibson Iron
Limited (Australia) (Jia, 2010). Baosteel acquired a 15% stake of Aquila
Resources Limited, accessing Aquila's iron, coal and manganese in Australia
and South Africa (Riseborough, 2009). The Valin Group acquired a 17.34%
share of Fortescue Metals Group Ltd. (FMG) by AUO 1,270 ($929) million
(Tan, J., 2009). According to this transaction, FMG would multiply its iron ore
supply to the Valin Group and its subsidiaries. These two parties would also
cooperate on the new technology of developing low-class iron ore. Finally,
Jiangsu Shagang acquired 90% of Australian Bulk Minerals (ABM), the
holding company of Savage River iron ore (Gong, 2007).
Although the Chinese steel MNEs would obtain millions of tons of iron ore
from such M&A deals, it is far from enough compared to their annual imports.
The long-term strategy of the Chinese steel enterprises is to enhance the control
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of resources via overseas M&As, diversify importing channels of raw materials,
import crude steel at a lower price, as well as break the iron ore control by the
world's mining giants, Vale, Rio Tinto, and BHP Billiton.
Offshore subsidiaries of a parent group may function differently from one
another. Under the leadership of the parent group Shougang Corporation, the
mainland-based subsidiaries of Shougang Concord International Enterprises Co.
Ltd. (HK) and Shougang Concord Century Holdings Ltd. (HK) are mainly
involved in manufacturing, while offshore holding companies undertake
shipping and trading of metals and steel products.
Regarding the Baosteel Group, as the main platform of the parent group's
OFDI activities, the Baosteel Australia Mining Company focuses on the
development and production of steel ore. Baosteel Hong Kong Trading
Company conducts businesses such as the trade, processing raw materials and
ocean shipping. These subsidiaries work together to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the parent group's overseas investment. The main purpose of
the establishment of the sales subsidiaries appears to be related to trading,
warehousing and shipping, after-sales service, as well as looking for further
sales outlets.
SinoSteel has 23 overseas firms and branches in HK, Australia, South Africa,
Germany, India, Brazil, Gabon, Indonesia, Cambodia, Turkey and Vietnam.
Different from other firms, the HK-based Sinosteel International Holding
Company Ltd. has nine subsidiaries in China, BVI and Macau, participating in
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the parent group's core businesses, overseas resources development and
international trade.
7.2.3 Nonferrous metal industry
By the end of2009, Jinchuan had no listed subsidiaries. Most of its overseas
assets are mineral resources. For example, after the deal with Tyler Resources
for $213.4 million, Jinchuan would acquire Bahuerachi, which is the largest
unexplored copper and zinc ore source in Mexico (Cang, 2008). Jinchuan
obtained Munali nickel ore in Zambia in a similar way. It also paid $15.7
million for 11% of Fox Resources, a nickel and copper supplier of Jinchuan
(Foxresources, 2008). In 2009, Jinchuan expanded its business to titanium and
zirconium ore through purchasing 70% ofTiomin Kenya Ltd. (Chinadaily,
2009a).
China National Gold Group Hong Kong Ltd. was established in 2008 as the
parent group's platform to achieve overseas strategies. Afterwards, through this
'window company', the Chinagold Group acquired 42% controlling interest in
Jinshan Gold Mines Inc. for $218 million, which was mainly engaged in
exploring gold in China, and was previously held by Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. (Sina,
2011).
In 2004, CNMC, the parent group, established ORD River Resources Limited
in Australia, jointly with its two subsidiaries, China Nonferrous Metals Int'l
Mining Co. Ltd. (CNMIM) and China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Foreign
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Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. (NFC). CNMIM targets mineral
resources including copper, lead, zinc, gold, nickel and cobalt, while NFC is
ORD's partner in the Laos bauxite project. In 2009, after it completed buying
around $16 million worth of shares, CNMC became the largest shareholder of
Chaarat Gold Holdings and Terramin Australia (Li, 2009). Terramin, an
Australian zinc and lead miner, currently operates in Australia and Algeria.
Chaarat Gold is a UK-listed gold exploration and development company,
operating in the Kyrgyz Republic. CNMC also purchased an 80% stake of
Zambia's Luanshya Copper Mine (Li, 2009). In addition, NFC also contracted
international engineering projects in Kazakhstan, Iran, Italy, Zambia, Vietnam,
and India.
7.2.4 Coal, power and electricity
Yanzhou Coal Mining established Yancoal Australia Ltd. in 2004 and
introduced the Longwall Top Caving Coal Mining Technology. Afterwards,
Yancoal Australia purchased Southland Coal Mine with $230 million and
formed a wholly-owned subsidiary called Austar Coal Mine Pty Ltd. to hold
assets. This was the first time that China's coal enterprise acquired an overseas
coalmine. Through the acquisition of Austar, Yanzhou Coal Mining
accumulated experience of overseas acquisition and operation. The stock price
of Australian coal companies crashed, due to the recession, the slump in coal
prices, and the devaluation of the Australian dollar. In 2009, Yanzhou Coal
Mining, through Austar, spent AUD 3.33 ($2.78) billion on a 100% share of
Felix Resources Ltd. (Scott and Duce, 2009). The amount of investment
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accounted for 59% of the total assets ofYanzhou Coal Mining. The Bank of
China's Sydney branch, the China Development Bank's HK branch, and the
China Construction Bank's HK branch jointly provided a $3 billion loan to
support this transaction (Xing and Zhang, 2009). After acquiring Felix,
Yanzhou Coal Mining's coal reserves grew by 23.8%. Coal produced by
Felix's Ashton and Yarrabee is of strong profitability. Felix would also bring a
large number of customers from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore,
Yanzhou Coal Mining would benefit from Felix's cooperation with Austar in
terms of exploration, transportation, distribution, and sales.
Compared to natural resources like oil, gas and metals, power projects are in
the downstream industry, and have relatively small effects on the energy
security in the host country. It is easier for the Chinese power companies to
obtain approval from the local government. These Chinese power companies
have been seeking a breakthrough in the Asian market. The State Grid holds a
40% share in the joint venture, the National Grid Corporation of the Phlippines,
which was the first time that a Chinese enterprise won the right to operate the
national power grid in a foreign country. Also from the power generation
sector, Huaneng acquired 50% shares ofOzGen (Australia) (Wan, 2009) and
100% shares ofTuas Power (Singapore) (Lim, 2008), respectively. The
transaction with Tuas also facilitated Huaneng to learn how to operate a web-
based bidding and scheduling system, and how to use fuel and foreign
exchange futures hedging for risk management. In addition, Huaneng
purchased a 25.5% stake of the Australian Monto coal mine to guarantee the
long-term supply to its China-based power plants (SASAC, 2005d). In spite of
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cross-border M&As, Huaneng also developed the Ruili River Cascade I
Hydropower Plant in Burma, China's largest international hydropower project,
which was completed in the mode of build-ope rate-transfer. As such, 85% of
the electricity would be sent to China from abroad to join the nation's 'West-
to-East Electricity Transmission Project'.
7.3 Market seeking
The most common activities of the foreign subsidiaries are sales and trading.
For example, Sinopec's two HK-based subsidiaries are all involved in the
trading of crude oil, petroleum and petrochemical products. Sinochem has two
subsidiaries (1 in HK and 1 in Macau) of fertiliser trading. China Minmetals's
one subsidiary in Cl is established to purchase and supply alumina, while two
in HK trade in non-ferrous metals.
Evidence is also found in reference to Chinese telecommunication operators.
After having gained rich experience in telecommunication and other
information transmission services in the domestic market, China Mobile's key
concern on overseas strategies was to increase profit and expand into new
markets. Hong Kong was its first target to expand outside China. China Mobile
paid $436 million for Peoples Telephone Company (HK) in 2005, which had
been previously held by another Chinese central enterprise, the China
Resources Group (Liu, Y., 2005). Released by SASAC, the China Resources
Group should focus on three main fields, namely, production and distribution
of daily necessities, real estate and relevant industry, and infrastructure and
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public utilities. Peoples is one of the major mobile communications service
providers in Hong Kong, which was not included in the parent group's main
businesses. This transaction complied with SASAC's requirements, such as
'separating auxiliary from main businesses' c±~ill7t~ zhufufenli) and
'specialised operation' (~~jdtt2'§'zhuanyehuajingying).
After several failed attempts to enter Uzbekistan and Pakistan, China Mobile
purchased Paktel in 2007, which was renamed China Mobile Pakistan (CMPak)
(Gan, 2007). China Mobile had successful experience in attracting China's
low-income customers, which would be advantageous during the expansion
into emerging markets such as Asia, Africa and Latin America. Furthermore,
China has a long-term friendly relationship with Pakistan. A number of
Pakistan reconstruction projects are conducted by China so the two
governments would be likely to assist in solving any problems that occurred
after the transaction. In comparison to China Mobile targeting emerging
markets, China's other two telecommunication operators offer different
telecommunications services in developed countries, like China Unicorn in HK,
the US, the UK, and Japan and China Telecom in the US, HK and Macau.
They seek opportunities to cooperate with leading global operators.
7.4 Strategic assets seeking
7.4.1 Equipment manufacture
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Before the 'going out' policy, the development of China's equipment
manufacture industry depended on low-cost materials and labour. Since 2003,
especially after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Chinese manufacturers have
deliberated on how to expand their overseas markets, as well as possess brands,
distribution channels and advanced technology, in order to offset the impact
brought by increasing costs of labour and resources. Among the 50 largest
business groups, Changsha Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science & Technology
Development Co. Ltd. and China International Marine Containers (Group) Ltd.
(CIMC) are two examples.
Changsha Zoomlion is mainly engaged in manufacturing equipment for
construction, energy engineering, transportation and other infrastructure
projects. Hunan Province SASAC branch is the largest shareholder of
Changsha Zoomlion, holding 24.99% shares. In 2008, Zoomlion paid 162.6
million Euros ($253 million) for a 60% stake in an Italian construction
machinery maker, Compagnia Italiana Forme Acciaio SpA (CIFA) (Zhang, Q.,
2008). Goldman Sachs, Mandarin Capital and Hony Capital would jointly hold
the remaining 40% (Zhang, Q., 2008). Thanks to the China Eximbank Hunan
branch's financing guarantee, Zoomlion borrowed $200 million from the Hong
Kong branch of Barclays Bank to fund the transaction (Zhang, B., 2008). The
remaining $50 million would come from Zoomlion's internal funds.
Furthermore, three sponsors of Mandarin Capital are the China Development
Bank, the China Exim Bank, and Intesa San Paolo, the second largest Italian
bank. Mandarin Capital played an important role in the coordination between
the Chinese and the Italian government and enterprises. Hony Capital, a
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Chinese private equity firm under the control of Legend Holding, shared the
experience it obtained from Lenovo's acquisition and integration of IBM
(Zhang, 8., 2008).
With regard to motivations, firstly, CIFA was the only company able to supply
all types of concrete equipment, which made it a leading manufacturer of
concrete equipment in Europe. It had seven factories in Italy and two sales
centres in the US and Mexico. CIFA's products covered West Europe, Russia
and Bulgaria, which was complementary to Zoomlion's existing market.
Furthermore, CIFA was strong in R&D, distribution, brand, and particularly in
design and technology. In contrast, Zoomlion is good at manufacturing, but
weak at management and technology development. This transaction would help
both parties to enter a new market, as well as enable Zoomlion to draw support
from CIFA's advantages such as advanced technology and expertise.
CIMC is a state-controlled public listed company, dedicated to manufacturing
and supplying containers, trailers, tank equipment and airport equipment. Its
two biggest shareholders are China Merchants International (CIMC)
Investment Co. Ltd. (24.82%) and COSCO Container Industries Ltd (21.8%),
which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of China Merchants Holdings
International Co. Ltd. and COSCO Pacific Ltd, respectively.
In 2003, CIMC purchased the semi-trailer manufacturer HPA-MONON with
only $4.22 million and established a product line in the US after restructure
(Yue, 2006). In 2007, CIMC's subsidiary CIMC Tank Equipment Investment
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Holdings of Hong Kong spent $63.3 million on SO%shares of ajoint venture
Newco, which ultimately acquired 100% stake of Burg Industries B.V. (the
Netherlands) for €1OSmillion (Lv, 2006). As the Netherlands is Newco's place
of incorporation, while Germany is the place where Burg Industries undertook
its main business, the CIMC-Burg transaction did not constitute a connected
transaction. Therefore, the merger did not need any consideration by the
shareholders or the EU's approval. This arrangement has effectively simplified
the approval procedures and avoided risks of laws and regulations on the way
to internationalisation. Soon after that, CIMC acquired 42.1S% shares of Enric
Energy Equipment Holdings Limited (HK) for $144 million (Sohu, 2007). In
2008, CIMC acquired a 60% stake in TGE Gas Investment SA for €20 million
(around $2S.S million) (Ma, 200S). By the end of2009, 16 out of38 offshore
holding companies were operating in Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark, the US and Germany, manufacturing and distributing transportation
vehicles (CIMC, 2010).
CIMC's purchases focus on its energy, chemical equipment and food
equipment businesses. Burg Industries was one of the world's largest makers of
standard-size tank containers carrying liquid cargo. Enric Energy Equipment
was a leading supplier of specialised storage and transportation equipment and
integrated business services in China's gas apparatus industry. TGE,
headquartered in Germany, is engaged in providing engineering, procurement
and construction supervision services for the storage and processing of
petrochemical gases. These deals enable CIMC to take advantage of advanced
technology and expertise, as well as avoid competition within the same
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industry. Furthermore, thanks to Burg and Enric's existing competitive
advantages in local and global markets, CIMC has explored more mainstream
products to enrich its product line, expand its production capacity, and further
build up its global tank equipment business.
7.4.2 Telecommunication manufacture
ZTE and Huawei are two providers of communications equipment and
networking solutions. ZTE is listed on the Shenzhen and HK stock exchanges.
According to its 2009 financial report, ZTE had two principal overseas
subsidiaries, respectively, in HK and India, operating information technology,
and telecommunications and related equipment manufacturing. Additionally,
ZTE has established a global network in over 140 countries to service the
world's operators. As an unlisted private manufacturer, however, it is difficult
to obtain reliable information from Huawei, which has no listed subsidiary or
corporate reports. The only information I can find on the website states that
Huawei has established more than 100 branches in 22 areas and 17 R&D
centres in the US, India, Sweden, Russia and China. It is general description of
overseas operations or assets, which is far from clear or comprehensive.
7.5 Round-tripping investment
Taking the available information of parent groups and subsidiaries into account,
I find evidence for 'round-tripping' investment. All listed companies have 341
wholly foreign owned subsidiaries in total in mainland China.
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Based on the evidence from the annual financial reports of the top 50 business
groups (various years), 'round-tripping' investment can be traced as being
undertaken through the following two approaches. First, a business group is
registered in Hong Kong, whose main businesses are mostly or completely
undertaken in mainland China. Shum Yip is owned by the Shenzhen city
government and under the direct supervision of Shenzhen SASAC. Shum Yip
has 13 principal subsidiaries, undertaking businesses in three main areas: real
estate (5 subsidiaries), infrastructure (4 subsidiaries) and logistics and
transportation (4 subsidiaries). Shenzhen Investment Ltd. is a HKSE listed
company of Shum Yip, which has 100% of the controlling shares of 16
principal subsidiaries. These 16 subsidiaries are all incorporated and operating
in PRC, 3 of which are registered as foreign owned companies.
Second, a business group is incorporated in mainland China and has overseas
subsidiaries, most of which are registered in Hong Kong, BVI, Cl or other tax
havens. These overseas subsidiaries run businesses primarily in mainland
China. Almost all of the business groups analysed have this type of 'round-
tripping' OFDI, more or less. Shenzhen Investment, owned by SASAC of the
Shenzhen municipal government, has the whole or controlling shares of 79
companies. The main responsibilities of Shenzhen Investment are property and
assets management and capital operation, covering broad business areas like
securities and insurance, packing, transportation and exhibitions. Shenzhen
International Holdings Limited, a Bermuda-registered, HKSE-listed subsidiary,
mainly performs in logistics through restructure and M&As. It has no overseas
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subsidiaries. All of its subsidiaries are based in China, 5 of which are registered
as foreign-owned enterprises.
Therefore, for the above two Chinese TNCs, Shum Yip and Shenzhen
Investment, 'going global' is just talk, not reality. That means that they are
supported by the government. No matter where their subsidiaries are, no
commercial business is undertaken abroad. They merely take advantage of
overseas stock exchanges to raise capital and then invest in China.
I also find similar evidence from central enterprises. One typical example is
China Mobile Ltd. Except for one subsidiary providing mobile
telecommunications and related services in HK, China Mobile has 39
subsidiaries operating in different provinces of China, 38 of which are
registered as foreign owned companies. Each of these 38 companies is under
control of an offshore investment holding company. For example, China
Mobile Group Jiangsu Co. Ltd. (PRC) is held by Jiangsu Mobile (BVI) Limited.
In addition, for those HKSE-listed companies that do have offshore holding
subsidiaries ('onward journey investment'), the offshore companies are not
playing the roles that are as important as their Chinese cohorts. For example,
China Resources Land, incorporated in Cl and listed in HK, has 56 Chinese
subsidiaries undertaking property management within PRC, which is also the
vital business of China Resources Land. In contrast, China Resources Land has
only one subsidiary in HK for decoration service. Similar issues can be found
on China Mobile, China Merchants Holdings, Aluminum Corporation of China,
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China Overseas Land & Investment, Sinofert Holdings, CITIC Pacific, and
Shougang Concord Grand. There is no doubt that these round-tripping
behaviours make the business groups look big and internationalised.
Before the launch of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law,73 by the State
Administration of Taxation in 2008, foreign owned companies in China could
enjoy a beneficial tax rate. The new Enterprise Income Tax law imposes a
unified tax rate of25% on both domestic and foreign enterprises. For old laws,
both domestic enterprises and foreign companies were subject to a statutory
rate of 33 percent. However, foreign enterprises operating some special
businesses enjoyed 15 or 24 percent as their effective tax rates. Only domestic
enterprises with a low annual income had access to preferential tax rates (table
7.1).
73 Accessed at http://www.gov.cnltlfg/2007-03/19/content554243.htm.
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Table 7.1: Comparison of the new and old tax laws
NewEIT* law
Tax law for domestic Tax law for foreign
enterprises enterprises
All 25 %; 20% for non- 33 % 33 %
enterprises residential enterprises
20% for small meagre- 25% if annual taxable 24% for enterprises inprofit enterprises income is between special economic zone(Annual taxable RMB 30,000 and and economic andincome less than RMB 100,000 technological300,000) development zone
Preferential 15% for enterprises
treatments
18% if annual taxable
with encouraged
15% for important income is less than projectshigh-tech enterprises RMB 30,000 10%, or 0, for
enterprises with
advanced technologies
Note: EIT= Enterprise Income Tax
Source: Enterprise Income Tax, 2007; Implementation Rules of the Enterprise Income Tax,
2007; Provisions of some policy issues regarding enterprise income tax, 1994; Income Tax
Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, 1991.
The enterprise income tax of foreign owned companies engaged in the
manufacturing sector was exemptible for the first two years and was a half rate
reduction for the subsequent three years, calculated from the profit-making
year. Take CIMC's subsidiaries for an example. CIMC has 122 subsidiaries, 84
within China and 38 abroad. 37 out of 84 are foreign owned companies under
control of overseas investment holding enterprises. In 2007, 16 subsidiaries
benefited from this preferential policy, paying 0, 7.5% or 12% tax rate, which
was far less than the 33% standard tax rate. This provides an important
incentive for the business groups that have undertaken round-tripping
investment. This policy also reflected the government's emphasis on the
manufacturing sector during the initial stage of open up and outward
investment.
The new Enterprise Income Tax law may have negative effects on China's
'round-tripping' investment. After the launch of the new Enterprise Income
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Tax law, according to the State Council's Notification on Carrying out the
Transitional Preferential Policies concerning Enterprise Income Tax (:~T·~fit!!:
::il::~JifT1~f5Hi11tttf!i5!:Jftl¥Jimj;D74 Guanyu shishi qiye suodeshui guodu
youhui zhengce de tongzhi), foreign owned companies established after 16
March 2007 are not able to enjoy preferential tax rates. Furthermore, the new
Enterprise Income Tax law only provides a preferential tax rate for high-tech
enterprises, which indicates the Chinese government's focus on R&D and
technology development.
7.6 Discussion
Since the 'reform and open up' policy in 1978, international leading
corporations have embarked on large investment in China. Due to the
government's previous over protection of national business, state-owned
enterprises, in particular have faced rigorous competition from global giants.
Compared to non SOEs, SOEs have expanded more widely both in geography
and in industries in the global market, whether they are central enterprises or
controlled by the other departments of the state. SOEs, particularly the central
enterprises, take part in businesses in Asia, America, Europe, Australia and
Africa. They are also the leading companies in petroleum refining, power and
energy, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, telecommunications, transportation
and construction of China.
74 Accessed at http://www.gov.cnlzwgkl2007-12/29/content847112.htm.
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As the 'backbone' of the Chinese economy and the most important source of
revenue for the central government, SOEs cannot use OFDI as an escape from
domestic competition, which is one of the motivations of private companies'
OFDI. However, Chinese officials expect more competitiveness of SOEs in
both domestic and international markets. 'Round-tripping' investment by
Chinese SOEs is designed to make the most of advantages including product
diversity, advanced technology and expertise, which are obtained through
overseas investment, in order to compete with foreign companies in the
domestic market. Offshore holding companies, hence, play an important role in
onward journey OFDI.
According to the disclosed information, I find that none of the OFDI
examination results by Chinese approving institutions has been 'not approved'
or 'failed'. For OFDI undertaken by SOEs, the negative effects of the central
government's administration are not significant. Although I find the Chinese
government give massive financial support in cross-border M&A deals,
information like the amount of loans or the interest rate is not disclosed.
Chinese TNCs may weaken the government's function as an'invisible hand' on
purpose, due to the host country's concerns on national security. In other words,
the implementation of China's positive measures may result in disincentives.
For example, in CNOOC's $18.5 billion bid for Unocol, the state attempted to
lend CNOOC $13 billion, including $6 billion from ICBe. The politically-
inspired obstruction set by the US government blocked CNOOC's takeover.
This 'failed' M&A deal reflects the host country government's worry about
security threats brought by China's growing energy appetite.
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I should also note that the Chinese government does not stand behind every
overseas activity. The government left Chinese TNCs on their own to make
decisions. The government also shows its support beyond business factors like
dealing with the bilateral relationship with the host country and organising
trade delegations to visit some target countries.
My results also show that, despite being registered as large outward investors,
many of China's state-owned groups actually engage in significant amounts of
'round-tripping' OFDI, for example, Shum Yip and Shenzhen Investment, as
discussed in section 7.5. What this means is that they move capital offshore,
which is often registered as outward foreign direct investment, before returning
it onshore. Often this is done with the incorporation of further capital raised on
the Hong Kong stock exchange, as well as through the developed financial
markets that are present in Hong Kong. In reality, therefore, these SOEs are not
necessarily' going global'. Their officially registered outward investments,
going primarily to Hong Kong, actually return to the mainland. And, in fact,
when they do look to make real outward direct investments, these are actually
carried out through Hong Kong-based subsidiaries. This OFDI, of course, is
not registered in official Chinese statistics. As such, it is very difficult to
ascertain the full extent of Chinese outward investment. Further, the official
rankings of business groups according to OFDI are most likely to be quite
misleading.
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Our analysis leads us to some interesting conclusions. China's HCMs may be
targeted at domestic business groups. But in reality many of these groups are
not 'going global' or may be active outward investors through their offshore
subsidiaries. These subsidiaries lay outside the jurisdiction of Chinese
authorities and, as such, it may be difficult for Chinese HCMs to specifically
target these groups. This raises the question of whether Chinese HCMs are
simply window dressing, with little real bite or effectiveness. Once Chinese
companies have established offshore subsidiaries, theoretically they are free of
the potential restraints a complicated bureaucracy may demand of its domestic
corporations. Moreover, once offshore, the access to further capital markets
may dramatically increase domestic as well as international expansion.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the enterprises' motivations and their responses to
government measures. The Chinese government has made significant efforts to
encourage Chinese corporations, especially its biggest business groups to go
abroad. Most academic research, however, has not discussed the role that the
Chinese government plays in helping its groups to undertake OFDI in much
detail. This research investigates China's so-called • home country measures'. It
is based on detailed research into China's 50 largest business groups (by
foreign assets), as their overseas activities must be significant. In particular, I
use annual reports (of the groups' listed subsidiaries) and other sources to
investigate China's home country measures. Our results show that Chinese
SOEs invest abroad to fulfil the ambitions of the Chinese state at various levels.
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Motivations of Chinese TNCs' outward investment are diverse. Overseas
subsidiaries play different roles in conglomerates. 19 TNCs are involved in
natural resources development like oil, gas and metals, and power projects. The
chief purpose of OFDI is to diversify resource supply channels and further
improve the nation's energy security. Their subsidiaries also process trading
with suppliers and customers. Chinese TNCs, providing various sorts of
services, like telecommunications and shipping, develop business opportunities
in international markets. Enterprises in the manufacturing sector, lack of
strategic assets like technology, R&D capability, distribution networks, and
capital markets, seek reinforcement for their competitive disadvantages.
However, I should note that most Chinese enterprises' overseas businesses are
located in Hong Kong, excluding tax havens-based investment holding
companies. Most subsidiaries are set up in advanced countries, such as
Australia, the US, and Singapore. In spite of the evidence for natural resource
and market seeking OFDI, strategic asset seeking is a crucial driver of OFDI in
Chinese SOEs.
In their overseas expansion, Chinese TNCs are still the main actor. Like their
global competitors, the primary objective of the Chinese enterprises engaging
in Greenfield investment and cross-border M&As is to make a profit and
augment assets. I hypothesise that the Chinese TNCs' responses to HCMs are
'conditional compliance'. It is difficult to gain profits in short time, but, if the
corporate interests converge towards the national interests, Chinese TNCs
would make the investment. For example, exploiting overseas natural resources
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is crucial for both firms' strategies and the nation's energy security. If firms
feel unconfident or risky in investing abroad, but they have to respond actively
to the government's 'going out' policy, the divergence may result in round-
tripping investment, which strategically allows enterprises to grow in domestic
markets, but also allows for window dressing with 'going global' achievements.
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Chapter 8 Chinalco and Geely: two examples
for in-depth analysis
The previous chapter applies the multiple case studies to China's 50 largest
business groups, from different industries and holding different motivations.
As most of the sample corporations are SOEs, the understanding ofHCMs
effects on and motivations ofOFDI undertaken by China's private companies
still remains limited (Deng, 2007, 2009, 2010, Li, P.P., 2007, Rui and Yip,
2008, Sutherland, 2010, Wu and Ding, 2009). Derived from the discussion in
Chapter 7, most of China's large-scale investments have been undertaken
particularly since 2008. Meanwhile, the global financial crisis has extensively
affected the world's various industries. As such, the global leading enterprises
struggling with financial problems have to sell some assets to survive the crisis.
Chinese TNCs, as well as the Chinese government, believe that this may be an
opportunity to expand internationally through cross-border M&As.
Two cases are selected for a detailed and in-depth analysis: Chinalco's
investment in Rio Tinto and Geely's acquisition of Volvo. This chapter firstly
considers the background to two M&As, including global consolidation and the
domestic market with regard to the metals mining and auto industries. Sections
8.1 and 8.2 summarise the history ofChinalco's bid for Rio Tinto and Geely's
purchase of Volvo. In detail, these two sections present chronological events,
highlighting the role of the Chinese government and their home country
measures. Two investors' motivations and HCMs effects are also discussed.
The third section compares the two cases, especially the government's failed
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intervention in the Chinalco case and their limited but effective support in
Geely case, before reaching a conclusion.
8.1 The metals mining industry: Chinalco-Rio Tinto case
8.1.1 The financial crisis and China's metals mining industry
Along with its rapid economic development, China's iron and steel industry
has strongly interacted with other industries such as mechanical and auto
manufacturing, house building, and construction and transportation. In 2009,
China's crude steel output of 573 million tons saw it ranked as the world's
largest steel producer, accounting for 47.3% of the global total production
(figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: global production of crude steel and China's percentage (million
tons and %)
900
800
700 +----------------------
600 +-----------------
500
400
300
100
o
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EU _U.S. -%
Note: EU refers to the 27 member countries of the European Union.
Source: World Steel Association (20 I0)
50.0%
45.0%
40,0%
35.0%
30.0%
25,0%
20,0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
207
Chapter 8 Chinalco and Geely: two examples for in-depth analysis
As the key raw material of the metals mining industry, China's demand for iron
ore keeps increasing. According to a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), China
resources are estimated to be about 22 billion tons of crude ore, accounting for
around 14% of the world's total of 160 billion tons of reserves (USGS, 2011).
Due to the global economic downturn, the production of iron ore in 2009
decreased to 1.6 billion tons, 6.2% less than that of the previous year
(UNCTAD, 2010a). China was the world's largest producer for years, but only
produced 234 million tons of iron ore in 2009, following Australia, Brazil and
India. The fall in Chinese domestic production was the result of widespread
mine closures.
Due to the long mining cycle and the lack of initial investment, China's iron
and steel industry has been increasingly dependent on imported iron ore (figure
8.2). China imported 627.78 million tons of iron ore, 41.6% year-on-year
growth and accounted for 66% of the global trade (ChinaCustoms, 2010). The
global iron ore trade increased to a record level of955 million tons in 2009,
7.4% more than 2008, which was largely attributed to China's higher imports
(UNCTAD, 2010a). Furthermore, according to the China Iron and Steel
Association (CISA), China's dependency ratio on imported iron ore climbed to
a record level of 69%, compared to 58.9% in 2008 (CISA, 2010).
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Figure 8.2: China's iron ore imports and dependency ratio 1999-2009 (million
tons and %)
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However, despite China's positioning as the largest iron ore consumer and
crude steel producer, China has little influence on the pricing of iron ore, as
well as other upstream resources like copper, aluminium, nickel and zinc. The
average price of iron ore imports before 2003 was maintained at around $30
per ton. Since 2004, the price has increased from $60 in 2004 to $88 in 2007.
In 2008, the price rose 65% in the first half of 2008 and peaked at $154 in
August (China Customs, various years).
The soaring iron ore price is largely attributed to the high degree of
consolidation of the metals mining industries. Between 1995 and 2006 there
were 15 mega-mergers exceeding USD one billion in the metals mining
industries (UNCTAD, 2007b). These deals were dominated by large TNCs
from the UK, Australia, Canada and the US (table 8.1). This merger wave was
caused by numerous factors and has been referred to as a 'global big business
revolution' (Nolan, 2001 a). As a result, in 2009, the three largest iron-ore
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companies, Brazil-based Vale, UK-based Rio Tinto and Australia-
headquartered BHP Billiton, controlled 35.4 % of global iron ore production
and 61% of the world's seaborne trade (UNCTAD, 2010a). Despite the high
degree of consolidation of the global mining giants, China's low industrial
concentrations and disordered imports caused a failure in iron ore pricing
negotiations (KPMG and ChinaMetallurgicalNews, 2009). Therefore, domestic
consolidations and cross-border M&As were used to improve a firm's
competitiveness and further to reinforce the cluster's bargaining power in
negotiations for importing iron ore.
Regarding the domestic consolidation, NDRC promulgated 'the development
policy of the iron and steel industry' (WJ~rz:~tt1iil&~fe5 Gangtie chanye
fazhan zhengce) in 2005. It specifies that 'through the structural adjustment,
mergers and restructuring, [China will] expand the key business groups with
competitive strengths, and further to reach a higher degree of consolidation'. In
addition, up to 2010, the aggregate output of China's top ten steel producers
would account for more than 50% of the national production, and will account
for over 70% by 2020. To improve the industry concentration was re-
emphasised in the State Council's 'Iron and Steel Industry Adjustment and
Revitalisation Plans'. For example, in 2008, Baosteel restructured the
Guangdong Shaoguan Iron and Steel Group. The Wuhan Iron and Steel Group
reorganised Liuzhou Iron and Steel to found the Guangxi Iron and Steel Group.
Tangshan and Handan Iron and Steel merged into the Hebei Iron and Steel
Group.
75Accessed at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zctb/zctbl/zctbI200S/t200S07l9S26l8.htm.
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As discussed in Chapter 7, China's mining and metal TNCs started to be
involved in global M&As especially after the financial crisis, for example,
Sinosteel's takeover of Midwest for $1.04 billion in 2008 (appendix 2). The
global credit crunch resulted in the decreasing market value of the world's
mining and metal companies, which was regarded as a great chance for
Chinese firms to catch up with the global giants (Zhen, 2009).
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8.1.2 Chinalco's investment in Rio Tinto
The Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), one of the central enterprises
owned and controlled by SASAC, is engaged in the development of mineral
resources, non-ferrous metal smelting and processing, and trade and related
engineering services. It is now the world's second largest supplier of alumina
and the third largest aluminium supplier (www.chalco.com.cn).Chinalco
focuses on the strategic positioning of its international multi-metal mining
company. Based on the integration of domestic resources and the exploration
of its global business, Chinalco aspires to become a world-class competitive
TNC.
By contrast, Rio Tinto is a leading global mining giant, combining a UK
company and an Australian one (www.riotinto.com). Its interests are diverse in
products, including aluminium, copper, diamonds and minerals, energy and
iron ore, most of which are in Australia and North America. Table 8.2
demonstrates the comparison between the world's leading metals mining
companies and China's TNCs. Although data on Chinalco's overseas business
is not available, Chinalco is relatively smaller than Rio Tinto in terms of
revenue and total assets. Moreover, the Chinese mining groups still remained
considerably less internationalised than their developed country counterparts.
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Table 8.3 shows the timeline of Chinalco's two investments in Rio Tinto. In
2008, Chinalco played a leading role in the joint acquisition with the US Alcoa
of 9% of Rio Tinto. In this first investment, Chinalco bought the stake at close
to the peak of the market and paid $14 billion together with Alcoa. However,
due to the financial crisis, the global stock markets were to suffer their biggest
falls since 2001. Along with the subsequent drop in metal prices in the world
market, the share price of Rio Tinto dropped from over £70/share in late 2007
to less than £ 1O/share by February 2009 (Yao et al., 2010). In other words,
Chinalco's first investment in Rio Tinto lost more than 70% of its value on
paper. After that, Chinalco made a second proposed investment of$I9.5 billion
in February 2009, hoping to recoup some of the losses incurred by the first
investment (Yao et al., 2010).
Table 8.3: Chinalco, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton's struggle for control
Important dates Events
Oct 2007 Rio Tinto bought Alcan for $38.6bn, but did so incurring
$34bn of debts towards the very peak of the long
commodity boom.
Nov 2007 BHP attempted to buy Rio on a 3:1 all-share swap
Feb 2008 Chinalco, along with the US's Alcoa as a strategic partner,
invested $I4bn to buy 9% of Rio's shares.
Aug2008 Chinalco raised its stake in Rio to 11%
Nov 2008 BHP abandoned its plans to buy Rio due to Chinalco's
intervention, which was therefore hailed as a success at the
time
Feb 2009 Chinalco agreed to invest another $19.5bn in Rio: $I2.3bn
for minority stakes in iron ore, copper and aluminium
assets and $7.2bn for convertible bonds to take its equity
stake in Rio to 18% and two non-executive seats on Rio's
board.
S Jun 2009 Rio unilaterally abandoned its deal with Chinalco and
proposed an alternative, to raise $15 .2bn through right
issues and $S.8bn from BHP Billiton by forming a joint
venture with the latter in western Australia.
Source: Yao and Sutherland (2009), Yao et al. (2010)
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Out of $19.5 billion, $7.2 billion was proposed to purchase subordinated
convertible bonds in two tranches with conversion prices of $45/share and
$60/share in each of Rio Tinto PIc. (UK) and Rio Tinto Limited (Australia),
respectively. This might eventually increase ChinaIco's shareholding to 19% in
Rio Tinto PIc. and 14.9% in Rio Tinto Limited. The other $12.3 billion was
planned to be used in a number of copper, aluminium, and iron ore joint
ventures.
If the deal had been successfully completed, Chinalco would have secured
access to some of Rio Tinto's best mining assets, mineral resources, and
technology. Chinalco, and even other Chinese iron and steel companies, would
be less dependent on other global iron ore suppliers BHP Billiton and Vale.
They also expected a better position in future negotiation on iron ore prices.
With regard to Rio Tinto, the most important benefit would have been to obtain
an adequate amount of capital to payoff its debts caused by the takeover of
Alcan.
However, during the long review process of Australia's Federal Investment
Review Board (FIRB), the share price of Rio Tinto recovered. Existing
shareholders started to be concerned with their diluted ownership rights of
many important mines. As the commodity, equities and credit markets
improved dramatically, Chinalco's initial offer was less attractive to
shareholders. Moreover, the Australian government questioned the possible
damage to national interest by a foreign government. Finally, Rio Tinto
rejected Chinalco' s bid and paid Chinalco $195 million for breaking the
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agreement. Instead, Rio Tinto proposed to form a joint venture with BHP
Billiton to consolidate their iron ore assets in Western Australia.
As reported (Jun, 2009), Xiong Weiping, the chairman ofChinalco,
summarised the three main reasons that resulted in the failed investment: the
fast-changing commodity markets, the changing attitudes and requirements of
Rio Tinto shareholders, and their preference of BHP Billiton as a partner.
Rather than addressing the failure in the Australian political context, Xiong
Weiping agreed that Australia welcomed foreign investment and expected to
undertake future development when maintaining a good relationship with the
Australian government.
Similarly, Yao et al. believed that Chinalco' s failure was driven by private
interests, rather than national ones (20 10). Furthermore, the failed deal
appeared to be primarily the result of shareholders drive for better returns (Yao
et al., 20 10). Concerning the conflict of interest, Rio Tinto shareholders saw
that a tie up with BHP Billiton in an iron ore joint venture would make more
sense than one with Chinalco. If Chinalco had the rights to speak for customers,
it would harm the interests of Rio Tinto's other shareholders. Chinalco also
failed to fight Australian public relations perceptions, having launched two
other resources bids at the same time (Minmetal's bid for Oz Minerals and
Valin Steel's investment in FMG), entering into insufficient communications
with each important shareholder, and not lobbying enough (Garnaut, 2010,
Sonali, 2010).
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8.1.3 Discussion
Although the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal failed, China's other metals mining
TNCs like Minmetals, CNMC, Hunan Valin and Jinchuan did not slow down
the pace of overseas acquisitions (see discussion in section 7.2). According to
MOFCOM statistics, China's investment in the mining sector amounted to
$l3.34 billion in 2009, twice more than that in 2008 (MOFCOM et al., 2010).
According to the FIRB, China invested $26.6 billion in Australia'", three times
more than that in 2008, following the U.S. as the second largest investor (FIRB,
2010). As such, $26.3 billion, accounting for 99% of the total investment, flew
to the mineral exploration and development sector, dominated by Chinalco's
proposed investment of $19.5 billion.
• Government intervention
Among all OFDI undertaken by Chinese SOEs, the government drive is a
sensitive topic and one that is frequently questioned, especially in terms of
being used by other potential bidders or the host government as a tool to raise
the rebellious emotions of the public, like BHP Billiton in the Chinalco-Rio
Tinto deal and the US Congress in the CNOOC bid for Unocal. Due to the host
country's potential concerns about national security, the Chinese government
tends to dilute its political impacts on China's outward investment. For
example, when bidding for Unocol, CNOOC denied that the acquisition was
one that acted on behalf of China's government or on national security grounds.
76 This includes all proposed and completed investment.
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However, the denial could not effectively dispel the doubts of the protectionists.
Rather than denying the institutional effects like CNOOC, Chinalco honestly
faced the question and highlighted that they would pursue a better position to
serve their customers in China and globally with their portfolio of global assets.
As a result, I cannot ignore the government intervention in the process of
Chinalco's purchase. As iron ore holds an extremely important position in
national economic development, governments have to treat foreign investment
in iron ore or related projects very carefully. Chinalco seemed quite ambitious
as it attempted to gain a bigger equity stake and raw materials assets in one
deal. Moreover, if the deal was completed, two Chinese members would be
nominated as directors to Rio Tinto's board. As a SASAC-owned central
enterprise, Chinalco was questioned whether the deal was driven by the
Chinese government.
To financially support Chinalco's purchase of Rio Tinto, four national banks,
including two policy banks (CDB and China Exim Bank) and two state-
controlled commercial banks (Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of China)
would jointly provide Chinalco with loans of $21 billion. Charging at
preferential interest rates, Chinalco would pay 94.5 basis points (Yao et al.,
2010), which is less than a I% point over the six-month London inter-bank
offered rate (LIBOR). This is considerably competitive compared to BHP
Billiton's 345-point to pay on a five-year bond and the 390-point on a 10-year
bond (Zhen, 2009). As discussed in Chapter 6, the financial support provided
by the Chinese banks can be regarded as the active response to the
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government's call for domestic companies to 'go global' , and further to
achieve the nation's long-term development objectives (Yao, 2009). On the
other hand, this caused the increasing question of Beijing's influence as an
'invisible hand' and whether Rio Tinto would be affected or even controlled by
a foreign country.
The governmental influence is also reflected by the nomination of SOEs'
directors and senior management. Soon after Chinalco announced its
agreement with Rio Tinto in 2009, Xiao Yaqing, the former president of
Chinalco, was promoted to deputy secretary general of the State Council,
which is a core position from which to assist China's deputy Prime Minister. It
is a reward for what Xiao has done in his tenure to make Chinalco expand
successfully within and outside China. Furthermore, the Chinese government
tried to encourage other Chinese TNCs to follow the 'go global' strategy.
However, foreign media recognised it as the illustration of China's politics
enmeshing with SOEs (Gamaut, 2009), which was believed to be a key
problem to the failed deal, although this was not officially mentioned (Garnaut,
2010).
• Natural resources seeking
Based on the discussion of all the relevant government measures (chapters 5
and 6), the resource development projects are repeatedly underlined regarding
administrative management and support. For example, NDRC's 'Examination
and Approval Measures' required the projects of resource development, with
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its investment of over $200 million, to be audited by NDRC and then reported
to the State Council. The State Council's Adjustment and Revitalisation Plans
of the iron and steel industry and the nonferrous metal industry both
highlighted overseas exploration through wholly-owned or joint venture
mining operations. MOFCOM also provides online services for developing
overseas mineral resources. In compliance with these measures, China's policy
banks and state-owned commercial banks back up resource development with
low-interest loans and guarantee services.
Chinese enterprises to undertake overseas mineral exploration should have
strengths in corporate governance, financing and risk management. SOEs,
growing under the shield of the government, are more capable of acquiring
overseas mineral assets. Among the top 50 business groups conducting cross-
border M&As in the mining sector, Jiangsu Shagang is the only private
company. As a leader in the nation's aluminium mining and trade industry,
there is little room for Chinalco to reduce their energy consumption and expand
their production capacity. Chinalco has to look for other opportunities to
achieve its strategic goal of becoming an international multi-metal mining
company. Assured by SASAC, the main businesses ofChinalco include
bauxite, aluminium and rare earth metal metallurgy, processing and trade, and
technical service for relevant projects (SASAC, 2007b). Despite this, Chinalco
also endeavours to seek other overseas resources. The investment in Rio Tinto
mirrors Chinalco's intention in iron and non-ferrous metals, which is expected
to bring big profit potential. After the failure to hold a controlling share of Rio
Tinto, in 2010 Chinalco decided to cooperate with Rio Tinto as a joint venture
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in exploring iron ore in Africa. To summarise, overseas mineral assets seeking
is crucial for Chinalco's future growth.
Regarding their motivation, despite the Chinese government encouraging
Chinese TNCs to go global, Chinalco's intention to develop overseas resources
is consistent with the government's strategy. This is the main reason why
Beijing backed the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal, although such government support
may have unfavourable consequences.
8.2 The automotive industry: Geely-Volvo case
8.2.1 The energy crisis and the downturn of global auto giants
The 2000s energy crisis and the 2008 financial crisis critically affected global
automotive manufacturers. Table 8.4 showed that the year 2007 was the
turning point in the auto industry recession. In contrast to the downturn of their
famous counterparts from the US, Europe and Japan, China became the
world's largest auto market and manufacturer in 2009, surpassing the US and
Japan and leading the globe in automobile sales and production (figure 8.3).
According to the International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
(Olf'A), global auto production in 2009 fell by around 12.5% (OICA, 2011).
Meanwhile, according to China's Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIlT) (MIlT, 2010), China oversaw an increase of 46.15% in
selling vehicles and 48% in output, which accounted for 22.4% of the world's
car manufacture (table 8.4).
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Table 8.4: global auto production and China's percentage 1999-2009 (mill ion)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
World 56.3 58.4 56.3 59.0 60.7 64.5 66.5 69.2 73.3 70.5 61.7
China 1.8 2.1 2.3 3.3 4.4 5.2 5.7 7.2 8.9 9.3 13.8
10.4 12.1 13.2 22.4
% 3.3% 3.5% 4.1% 5.6% 7.3% 8.1% 8.6% % % % %
Source: OICA statistics, various years
Figure 8.3: auto production by China, the US and Japan 1999-2009 (million)
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Considering the energy crisis, according to the statistics of the Energy
Information Administration (EIA), before 2003, the price of a barrel of crude
oil was generally below USD 30 per barrel (EIA, 2011). ince 2003, the crude
oil price has kept increasing and peaked at USD 133.88 in June 2008 (EIA,
2011). This resulted in a dramatic increase in the price of automotive fuel in
the global market. For example, in the U .. the average price of gasoline (all
types) reached its highest point ofUSD 3.317 per gallon in 2008, more than
twice the price in 2002 (EIA, 20] 0).
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The U.S. motor industry was primarily affected, in particular, the 'Big Three'
automakers, namely, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. In the past 30 years,
American automakers' profit margins relied heavily on high-profit sport utility
vehicles (SUVs) and trucks, rather than compact cars. (Burtless and Ikenson,
2008, Romney, 2008, Schoenberger, 2008). However, soaring fuel prices
caused customers to move to vehicles that are more fuel-efficient. The world's
leading automakers encountered huge financial losses as a result of consumers'
seeking higher fuel economy. Furthermore, due to the credit crunch, the
availability of home equity lines of credit and car loans shrank, which also
worsened vehicle sales (Singletary, 2007).
Therefore, the 'Big Three' responded by cutting production, consolidating
production lines, closing down factories, and reducing employment. However,
regardless of how much they struggled, GM and Chrysler finally went bankrupt.
Afterwards, the United States Treasury purchased most of GM and Chrysler's
assets and reorganised the companies into 'new GM' and 'new Chrysler'.
Thanks to a large line of credit obtained earlier, Ford survived without
bankruptcy, reducing its interest in Mazda (Japan), and then selling its brands:
Aston Martin, Volvo, Jaguar, and Land Rover.
8.2.2 China's auto industry
In 2009, China's total auto sales increased to 13.64 million (MIlT, 2010).
China's biggest 5 auto manufacturers, namely, SAIC, FAW, Dongfeng,
Changan and the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co Ltd (BAIC),
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together sold 9.66 million units, accounting for 71% of the total sales (MIlT,
2010). Figure 8.4 illustrates the market share of the ten largest Chinese
automakers in 2009. Geely, my case sample, held a 2.41% market share and
ranked loth. Although Geely was surpassed by Anhui Jianghuai Automobile
(JAC) in 2010, during the first half of 20 11, GeeJy's market share increased to
4.3% with the sales of 215,500 cars, based on information provided by China
Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) (2010, 20 11).
Figure 8.4: Market share of China's top 10 automakers (value: 10,000 units)
BAIC, 124.3,
9.1%
FAW, 194.46,
14.3%
Other, 175.15,
12.8% SAIC, 270.55,
19.8%
Geely, 32.91,
2.4%
Huachen, 34.83,
2.6%
BYD,44.84,
3.3%
Chery,50.03,
3.7%
GAIG,60.66,
4.4%
Changan,
186.98, 13.7%
Dongfeng,
189.77,13.9%
Notes: FA W= First Automotive Works, BAIC= Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co Ltd,
GAIG= Guangzhou Automobile Industry Group
Source: DRC (Development Research Centre of the State Counci I), SAE (Society of
Automotive Engineers) and SAIC (20 I0)
• Domestic consolidation
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According to the State Council's Automotive Industry Adjustment and
Revitalisation Plans (the Auto Plans hereinafter), which were released in 2009,
after further mergers and restructuring there would be 2 or 3 large-scale auto
business groups, with annual vehicle production capacity exceeding 2 million.
Four to five would be able to produce one million units per year. The number
of automakers that hold a 90% market share would reduce to 10 or less. The
Auto Plans also encouraged FAW, Dongfeng, SAIC and Changan to undertake
nationwide consolidation, as well as BAIC, Guangzhou Auto, Chery and the
China National Heavy Duty Truck Group to implement regional mergers. This
mirrors the Chinese government's attitude towards enhancing the degree of
consolidation.
China's auto manufacturers actively responded to the government's planning.
Up to 2009, only SAIC produced more than two million vehicles. The auto
production capacity of 4 Chinese auto companies, FAW, Dongfeng, Changan
and BAIC exceeded one million (figure 8.4). The market share held by these
top five automakers increased from 66.1% in 2008 to 70.8% in 2009 (DRC et
al., 2009, 2010). Furthermore, Guangzhou Auto acquired 29% ofChangfeng
share for RMB 1.2 billion, which enriched their product lines with light trucks
and SUV s. The Aviation Industry Corporation of China transferred its shares of
several auto brands to Changan, which enabled 'new Changan' to manufacture
in 9 provinces, holding 21 vehicle factories and 27 subsidiaries in China, as
well as overseas branches in Malaysia, Vietnam, Iran and the Ukraine.
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Regarding R&D and technology development, the Chinese government
attempted to invest RMB 10 billion in the following three years to support the
product upgrade and improve technology in terms of energy saving,
environmental protection and safety. The average ratio of R&D/sales in 2008
was 2.07%, compared to around 1.5% in 2001 (ORC et al., 2010). In addition,
regarding three types of patents, in terms of design, utility models and
invention, China's main domestic automakers applied for 2,812 patents, a 12%
increase year over year (DRC et al., 2010).
• The catch-up of China's auto TNCs
On the other hand, compared to their globally developed country counterparts,
the internationalisation degree of auto companies from developing countries is
not significant. As none of the Chinese automakers are in the UNCTAD's top
100 TNCs list, I can assume they are not as transnational as their competitors
from South Korea or India. Furthermore, according to the list of the top 1,000
global companies by R&D investment collected by the UK's Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), although most of the world's leading
auto manufacturers cut their R&D costs due to the financial crisis, they still
spent more than GBP 1 billion on R&D in 2009, which generally accounted for
over 4% of sales (81S, 2010). By contrast, expenditure on R&D by China's
automakers was far less. The three Chinese auto companies listed were
Dongfeng, SAIC and BYD, all of which spent less than 200 million pounds.
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8.2.3 Geely's acquisition of Volvo cars
Before acquiring Volvo, Geely was hardly known outside China, although it
has been one of China's top ten automakers for six years and among the
nation's largest 500 firms for eight years. It initially manufactured refrigerator
parts when it was founded in 1986 and launched its auto manufacturing
business in 1997. Nowadays, Geely, headquartered in Zhejiang province,
operates six car assembly and power-train manufacturing plants within China.
In 2005, Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd was listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. According to its 2010 annual report, Li Shufu and Geely Holding
Group ('Geely' in short) held 50.4% shares of this Hong Kong listed company.
As 'the only Chinese car manufacturer to have developed its own range of
engines' (www.geely.com). Geely is described as an 'innovation-oriented
enterprise' and a 'national automobile export base'. Li Shufu, Geely's
chairman, ambitiously leads the company to concentrate on independent R&D
and overseas expansion. According to its development planning, by 2015
Geely will establish 5 new platforms, 42 new models, and 15 domestic and
overseas production bases. Its production capacity will expand to 2 million
units, and two thirds of its vehicles will be exported. However, it remains in
question whether these challenging goals are achievable.
Compared to Volvo, Geely is rather small in size and weak in production and
R&D. Before the acquisition happened, Geely's assets and sales were only 3%
and 1.4% of Volvo (table 8.8). Table 8.9 compares Geely and Volvo regarding
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their finances, market positioning and technology development. Volvo sold
373,525 cars globally in 2009 (Volvocars, 2010), brining in revenue of$12.4
billion and a pre-tax loss of$934 million. Geely generated a sixth of Volvo's
revenue by selling 329,100 units largely in China, but posted a net profit of
$175 million.
Geely and Volvo's choices of market positioning strategy are significantly
different. Most Geely cars are sold within China and marketed below RMB
100,000, which means that Geely mainly targets China's low-end market. By
contrast, Volvo adopts premium pricing due to its substantial competitive
advantage in driving safety, which is 6-8 times more than that of Geely.
Regarding R&D, although Geely recognises itself as an 'independently
innovative' enterprise, its development and investment in R&D is still limited,
compared to Volvo's long history and massive efforts in advancing technology.
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Table 8.6: comparison between Geely and Volvo
Geely Volvo
Degree of Very low High
internationalisation
Finance ($ million)
Revenue 2,061 12,442
Profits 175 -934
Assets 2,754 46,683
Market positioning
Target market Around 94% in China and Global market (including
the rest for export (to the US, Europe and China)
developil!.S_countries)
Brand Only known in China Luxury brand, well known
around the globe
Unit price range RMB 33,800-103,800 RMB 258,000-661,000
Segment Low cost and low quality Premium segment
se_g_ment
Technology development
Number of models 7 11 (7 in China)
Production plants 6 in China Sweden (7), Belgium (1),
Malaysia (1) and China (a
joint venture)
R&D expenditure 9.58 1,853
($ million)
R&D as % of sales 0.5% 6%
Notes: The umt price range refers to cars sold In China.
Source: Geely and Volvo 2009 financial reports; Geely website, www.geely.com; Volvo
(China) website, http://www.volvocars.comlzh-CN/Pages/defau It.aspx
• Geely-Volvo deal
The Chinese media called this acquisition 'snake eats elephant', as there was a
large gap between the acquiring and the acquired company, with regard to the
degree of globalisation, production capacity and technology development. As
most auto M&A deals have resulted in disappointments, such as the Daimler-
Chrysler alliance, Ford's purchase of Volvo and SAIC's takeover of
Ssangyong, this move, which was China's biggest overseas auto purchase,
triggered people's worries, questions and even criticisms, as well as
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expectations in regard to the catch-up of Chinese auto TNCs and the boost to
the nation's auto industry.
Accordingly, both parties struggled for a long time when discussing and
negotiating the ownership of Volvo's intellectual property rights. People
worried about technology leaking out after Geely's takeover (Economist, 2010).
In particular, Volvo and Ford have worked closely on design and production
for years since Ford's acquisition, for example, by sharing engine platforms
and components. It is not easy to unleash this type of integration. As, such an
agreed 'safeguard' was announced by Volvo to avoid leaks. Meanwhile, Ford
promised to support Volvo by providing engine and powertrain technology. On
the other hand, some global giants recognised leaking as 'a part of the price for
doing business in, and with, China', which may be worth paying, as the
Chinese market is fast-growing and has great potential (Economist, 2010).
During the period of getting control of Volvo, Geely seemed cautious rather
than ambitious (table 8.10). Before Ford announced Geely as the preferred
bidder for Volvo, Geely had denied several times that it had been in negotiation
with Ford. Despite this, as a privately-owned company with a lack of
technology competency and experience outside China, Geely was not the
preferred bidder from the view of former Volvo directors (Roberts, 2009).
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Table 8.7: Timeline of Geely getting control of Volvo
Important dates Events
25 Mar 2009 Ford confirmed it was in talks with 'a number of
parties' with regard to the sale of Volvo, including
China's Chery, Dongfeng, and Changan. Geely's name
was not revealed at that time.
Feb-Sep 2009 Geely denied its interest in purchasing Volvo a number
of times.
28 Oct 2009 Ford chose Geely as the preferred bidder for Volvo.
23 Dec 2009 All substantive commercial terms for the Volvo sale
were settled, said Ford.
31 Dec 2009 As Geely said, the Chinese government strongly
supported its acquisition of Volvo.
28 March 2010 Geely paid $1.8 billion for 100% of Volvo's shares
and relevant assets, in particular including their
intellectual property rights.
26 July 2010 Geely's takeover of Volvo obtained the approval of
MOFCOM.
2 Aug 2010 Geely completed the acquisition of Volvo, which was
the country's biggest overseas auto purchase.
Furthermore, Geeky faced resistance from Volvo's powerful labour unions,
which worried that Geely might move production to China and cut jobs in
Sweden and Belgium (Krolicki et al., 2010). Labour unions additionally
complained about a lack of information about the company's future (Klesty,
2010) and questioned Geely on financing issues (People'sDaily, 2009). Yuan
Xiaolin, Geely's spokesman for the Volvo deal, subsequently announced that
'Geely has a principle that the final agreement should serve the interest of all
relevant parties, including the labor unions.' (People'sDaily, 2009) After
receiving reassurances about job security, Volvo's labour unions backed the
deal (Krolicki et al., 2010).
Geely also faced competition from other potential bidders to some extent,
including BAle, the US Crown consortium and the Swedish Jakob consortium.
The Crown consortium is led by former Ford executives Michael Dingman and
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Shamel Rushwin. The Jakob consortium, in particular, is led by Magnus
Sundemo, head of Volvo's engineers' union, and won support from labour
unions. Both of them, however, failed to obtain enough financing to keep
Volvo from its Chinese buyer (Ward and Reed, 2009).
8.2.4 Discussion
As the Geely- Volvo case is relatively new (completed in March 2010), there is
little study on this profound cross-border deal. To the best of our knowledge,
only Wang (2011) investigated this acquisition, targeting the threats and
opportunities brought to Geely. Other scholars just used Geely- Volvo as an
example in their research, concerning the development of China's auto market
(Wang, Q., 2011), synergistic effects (Ding et al., 2011, Zhou and Zhang,
2011), enterprise culture integration (Chen and Liao, 2011), partner selection
(Wu and Yang, 2010) and social responsibility (Peng et al., 2011). None of
these scholars comprehensively investigated this deal or considered the catch-
up of the Chinese auto TNCs with their global counterparts in the background
of the financial crisis.
• Government support
The State Council's Auto Plan indicates that the Chinese government will
implement relevant policies with regard to technology development,
government procurement and financing, in order to guide auto manufacturers
to develop their own brands as a corporate strategic focus, and through
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independent development, joint development, and domestic and international
M&As. The Auto Plan shows the government's determination to build large
and strong auto giants through consolidation and restructuring. Geely taking
over Volvo cars, the biggest deal in China's auto industry, attracted the
government's attention without a doubt.
Regarding administrative support, Li Yizhong, the Minister of Industry and
Information Technology, attended the agreement signing ceremony in Sweden
on 28 March 2010. This is regarded as 'a strong show of (government) support
for a non-state-owned enterprise' (Economist, 2010). After that, MOFCOM
confirmed the approval ofGeely's takeover on 26 July 2010 (Sun, 2010).
Unlike other Chinese automakers involved in the M&A deals, like SAIC and
BAIC, Geely is a private firm. Given Geely's financial conditions, there were
some doubts about whether it would obtain enough funds to complete the deal
and further operate Volvo cars. At the press conference, after signing the
agreement, Yin Daqing, Geely's vice chairman, announced that Geely had
raised $1.8 billion to purchase Volvo cars, and another $900 million as floating
capital for future operations, which amounted to $2.7 billion in total (Ifeng,
2010, Qi, 2010). Half of the funds came from domestic sources, including
Geely's own capital and M&A Loans provided by the Bank of China and the
China Exim Bank (Ifeng, 2010, Qi, 2010). The other half was supported by
overseas investment groups from the US, Europe and Hong Kong (Ifeng, 2010,
Qi, 2010). However, no further details were available, such as what those
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foreign investment groups were, what percentage or how much funds each of
them contributed.
There is not much difference between the support for SOEs and private
companies with regard to administration and financing. As it is privately
owned, Geely did not face much questioning by the host government and
foreign media whether the acquisition was driven by Beij ing or used as a
vehicle. In this particular case, people even expected the central government to
back the deal to ensure its completion. The government and state-owned banks
participation undoubtedly built confidence for Ford as a seller, the market, and
the staff in the target company.
• New energy technology development
As private auto companies, why did the Chinese government show
significantly different attitudes to the Geely- Volvo deal from Sichuan
Tengzhong's intention to GM's Hummer (details in section 5.1.1)? One
important reason is that Geely's acquisition complies with the government's
new energy vehicle strategy. Apart from the boosting cost of crude oil, the
global concern on reducing pollution caused by vehicles also drives a change
toward the electrification of automobiles. China's Auto Plan expects the
development of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles. It also requires Chinese
auto companies to improve design, their production process and the cost
control of engines and power modules for new energy vehicles.
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In addition, MOF and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) issued
a 'Notice regarding the pilots of demonstrating and promoting energy saving
and new energy vehicles' (*+7f Ji{l1~~~#JT~~~r·=\-tf~m1if:JiJ\,8T 1f.(r-J
im.~[]77 Guanyu kaizhan jieneng yu xinnengyuan qiche shifan tuiguang shidian
gongzuo de tongzhi) in January 2009. From then on, the Chinese government
initiated the 'ten cities, thousand vehicles' program. This program intended to
promote electric vehicle development by using financial subsidies, in 10 or
more of China's big cities in three continuous years, achieving the manufacture
of 10,000 new energy cars in 2010. For example, the central government
introduced RMB 60,000 per car for purchasing battery electric vehicles and
RMB 50,000 for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (Worldbank and PRTM,
2011). Currently, China is still in the early stages of new energy vehicle
development, which is strongly backed by central and local government. In the
future, China may take advantage of its economies of scale, low-cost labour
and strong manufacturing capability to make a profit in this fast-growing
industry.
Correspondingly, Volvo cars are well known because of their premium quality,
safety and environmental concerns. Take Volvo's 2012 plan for the European
market as an example. Their pure electric power vehicles will have a high
efficiency rating and consume about one-fifth as much energy as a
corresponding engine running on fossil fuel (Volvocars, 2009). Geely sees an
opportunity in Volvo's advanced green energy technology and may adopt it
when operating new manufacturing plants in China.
77 Accessed at http://www.gov.cnlzwgkl2009-02/0S/contentI222338.htm.
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• Motivation
Targeting China's low-end and low-cost segment, Geely lacks competitiveness
in brand, technology, R&D, and service systems. Through 100% ownership of
Volvo, Geely obtained 9 series of vehicles, 3 latest production platforms, a
production capacity of 600,000 units, as well as a worldwide sales network of
over 2,000 dealers. Additionally, Volvo is a well-known brand, famous for its
advances in safety design and environment technology, which Geely not only
needs badly, but also complies with China's push for a new energy vehicle
program. Furthermore, after acquiring Volvo, Geely may be channelled to the
global market, which is the ambition of both the company and the government.
The Geely- Volvo deal reflects the Chinese automakers' will to catch up with
the global giants. It is also interesting that I can see Geely's comprehensive
motivations, rather than only one, namely, market seeking, technology seeking,
and strategic asset seeking.
8.3 Conclusion
As the credit crunch significantly hit the global economy, global giants of
various industries struggled under heavy debt loads. Due to the lack of capital,
these leading TNCs had to sell some assets to raise money. The Chinese
government and enterprises believed that the financial crisis presented an
opportunity to acquire overseas resources, technology and expertise, and
further strengthen Chinese TNCs' competitiveness. It also had potential for
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companies to catch up with their global counterparts in a shorter time and for
China to improve its international status.
This chapter investigates two OFDI undertaken by Chinese TNCs of different
industries: the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal in the metals mining industry and the
Geely-Volvo deal in the automotive industry. These two acquiring companies
are both relatively small in size and weak in competitiveness compared to their
targets. Without the Chinese government's backing, it would be difficult or
even impossible for investors to complete overseas acquisitions. Both cases, as
well as China's other OFDI, cannot be well explained by existing theories
concerning OFDI. Rather than possessing competitive advantages over the
acquired company, Chinalco and Geely tried to strengthen their
competitiveness through overseas investment. As China's OFDI is still at the
preliminary stage, currently, most of the SOEs' large-scale cross-border M&As
depends on government support. Beside the administrative approval and
financial incentives, the government may show its attitude to overseas
investment in an intangible way, such as the promotion ofXiao Yaqing and Li
Yizhong's attendance at the Geely-Volvo agreement signing ceremony.
The failure of the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal also reflects existing discussion on
the negative impact of institutional factors. Beyond the point that Chinese
TNCs are sent to fight for what the national objectives are, regardless of what
the government wants, it has to be in compliance with the enterprise's business
strategy. If not, enterprises may implement OFDI with little effectiveness or
round-tripping investment as window dressing (discussed in chapter 7). In
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other words, Chinese SOEs do not follow government guidance without
thinking of their own needs.
Some scholars believe that Chinese TNCs adopt OFDI as an escape from the
current government constraints. In particular, this may happen to private
companies. However, the in-depth study on Geely acquiring Volvo does not
provide evidence for this idea. I find that even private companies call for and
appreciate government support. The central government also contends to back
up OFDI by private companies, as long as the acquisitions comply with
relevant home country measures.
As a result, the Chinese government encourages enterprises to go global for the
purpose of using these global resources to better serve the world, although the
home country measures may bring disincentives during the process of OFDI
development due to misunderstandings by target companies and host
governments.
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Chapter 9 Conclusion, Policy Implications
and Further Research Directions
9.1 Summary of findings
In the triangular relationship in the OFDI activities, most studies concentrate
on the interrelationship between the host country and TNCs. They look, for
example, at a host country's efforts to attract FDI and the motivations of an
enterprise to make outward investments. The effects of home country measures
have not yet been comprehensively studied. This thesis discusses the effects of
the Chinese government's policies and regulations as well as their influence on
Chinese TNCs overseas expansion.
This research makes a number of contributions to our current understanding of
China's OFDI. Firstly, this research provides an expanded vision on
international business theory with a cross-sectional study of China's OFDI,
concerning political and institutional factors. Secondly, this research
contributes to the overall understanding ofHCMs effects on OFDI. I analyse
China's HCMs in terms of administration, policies to encourage OFDI,
financial support, extraterritorial controls and information service. The research
on HCMs effects is not only limited, but also concentrates on developed
countries. Our third contribution is that I study the behaviour of the Chinese
government and the relation between the government and Chinese TNCs,
which is often mentioned, though sometimes not further deeply investigated.
Fourthly, I provide a detailed description and reasonable explanation to the
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motivations of China's OFDI, as well as China's 'round-tripping' investment,
which has not been widely studied in extant literature.
In the past thirty years, China's outward FDI has been growing rapidly. SOEs
are always recognised as pioneers of China's OFDI. In the state enterprise
sector, more than 42% of the assets of all SOEs were taken by central
enterprises under SASAC's supervision at the end of2006 (Naughton, 2008).
After the establishment of SASAC, central enterprises started consolidation
and restructure. Regarding the central government's intention, the number of
central enterprises will be around 80-100 in 2010. Amongst these central
enterprises, 30-50 will be big business groups with high competitiveness. As
singled out as 'national champions', these TNCs are crucial to achieve the
nation's long-term strategic planning through overseas expansion.
To date, very little research, if any at all, has properly explained the types of
policies China has employed (Luo et al., 20 I0, Voss et al., 2008). Here I
identify the key bodies and the key policies that have been used. To study the
HCMs effects, I look at some of the Chinese government's key policies and
regulations from 2003 to 2009 with regard to supervising and encouraging
OFDI, as well as some historic and abolished documents to understand the
evolutionary development of home country measures. Chapters 5 and 6 draw
from extensive use of officially published source materials. At present, the
Chinese government has played dual roles: as a supervisor but also as a
promoter. I agree that the more liberal measures and government support result
in the considerable growth of Chinese OFDI (Luo et aI., 20 I0, Voss et al.,
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2008, Voss et al., 2009). To further analyse enterprises' responses to HCMs, I
target China's 50 largest business groups and investigate the secondary data
mainly collected from their websites and financial reports.
Chapter 5 studied the government's performance as a supervisor. Before the
reform of the OFDI examination system, the main political considerations
focused on the potential threat brought by OFDI, capital flight, and the loss of
state-owned assets and foreign exchange. Nowadays, these concerns still exist.
Behind changes of attitudes towards OFDI, the Chinese government's control
intention remains the same, but the control over the approval of overseas
projects has been significantly relaxed and shifted to post-investment
monitoring. The key findings are as follows.
First, before the relaxation, projects more than one million US dollars had to be
examined by relevant national authorities. According to new measures, the
value has been updated to USD 30 million for resource development projects
and USD 10 million for large-scale projects. In addition to the simplification of
administration procedures, SAFE has also increased the foreign exchange
quotas for OFDI, from USD 3.3 billion to 5 billion, and finally abolished the
restrictions on the scale of foreign exchange for overseas investment.
Second, the approval process has been simplified. Enterprises no longer need
to prepare the feasibility study reports. The government has focused primarily
on identifying investors, investment direction and review of compliance. The
project's economic viability and technical feasibility are no longer under
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consideration. For each step there is stringent specification for the response
time. This will prevent the inefficiency of overseas investment caused by the
approving system.
Third, due to the short-term implementation and results not disclosed, it is
difficult to assess the effects of annual inspection. I assume that the annual
inspection reflects problems like a lack of risk prevention and effective
management. Therefore, Chinese government still has a long way to go.
Fourth, regarding extraterritorial controls, this research has found evidence of
the loss of state-owned assets. Based on the study of Shougang, Tianlong and
China Aviation Oil cases, three important reasons for the loss of state-owned
assets are insufficient experience in the international market, internal
corruption and the lack of effective administration. Although the Chinese
government launched the overseas property rights registration, I doubt that this
registration is a superficial procedure, as the efforts to prevent loss are limited
and the punitive measures on the loss are weak.
Fifth, this research finds evidence on SOEs' escape from the government
administration, for example, GITIC and Yuxing's listing on the Hong Kong
stock exchange. SOEs' escape may be due to the lack of confidence in the
enforcement of regulations and regulatory certainty. However, the government
administration and supervision are also important to strengthen SOEs'
international competitiveness, as Chinese SOEs lack in experience and
expertise in the global market.
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In chapter 6, I showed how financial support from Chinese government has
dramatically increased, which has been broadly mentioned but without in-depth
discussion. None of the prior research has looked beyond what is literal or
supported their conclusions with examples.
First, among all the facilitating measures, the most important way to sponsor
OFDI is through the financial supports including the special funds and
preferential loans. The State's ministries like MOFCOM, MOF and NDRC
have worked together with policy banks to provide special funds for foreign
economic and technical cooperation, capital support for projects that
supplement domestic resources and stimulate the export of technology,
products, equipment and labour, and a credit support mechanism for overseas
investment projects.
Second, according to Adjustment and Revitalisation Plans of the top ten
industries, equipment manufacture and electronics and information would
benefit from extra government support as well. However, China's uncertain
commitment to the duration ofOFDI promotional assistance may even
diminish the beneficial impact and cause confusion and misunderstanding.
Third, for information services, Country/Region Report of China's Outward
Investment Promotion and Outward Investment Cooperation Countries
(Regions) Directory provide political, economic and cultural information of the
main target countries. These measures concentrate on the existing situations in
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key countries and industries and summarise lessons learned from past
investments. However, the international market keeps changing, in particular
the financial crisis influencing the work economy. These official reports cannot
update information swiftly and effectively. 'Foreign Market Access Report',
for example, the Chinese government publishes one report each year, which
summarises changes from selected countries (e.g. 16 countries in 2008) in the
previous year. I know little about what has taken place in other countries. The
information services also function as a supplementary approach to financial
support. The government provides preferential measures for overseas projects
that comply with Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance
Catalogues, which list the attractive target countries and encouraged industries.
In addition, the annual statistic reports can help the government understand
what Chinese TNCs have done and can pay attention to potential problems in
future policy formulation and implementation. The development of commercial
and non-commercial organisations has the potential to facilitate the official
publications.
Unlike the UNCTAD and other scholars' negative views on the government
intervention, China's institutional context for OFDI development is generally
conducive, considering the dual force of institutional constraints and incentives.
The Chinese government has transformed from a pure administrator and strict
controller to a guide and support. In particular, the globalisation of SOEs may
be more strongly prone to the simulative measures than private companies.
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In chapter 7, I employ data of the top 50 Chinese TNCs ranked by their foreign
assets in 2009 as our sample. In addition to the study of parent groups, I look
into their listed companies' annual reports to find evidence of offshore holding
subsidiaries and cross-border M&As. First, the results find that the government
can be directly involved, via ownership or controlling shares. The
administration and supervision may have negative effects on private companies.
The hindrance on SOEs is not significant. On the contrary, state-owned
business groups even expect that the government provides more effective
resolutions to eliminate competition between Chinese competitors in seizing
foreign resources. I find evidence of the government's financial support,
including policy banks and state-owned commercial banks providing special
funds, loans and/or a credit guarantee.
Second, concerning the motivation, one significant motive of central
enterprises' OFDI is natural resource seeking. To comply with the nation's
long-term objectives, the investment may focus on national strategic value
rather than profits. Other industries like manufacturing, however, do not put
national strategies or policy considerations in front of the profit maximisation.
The Chinese manufacturers are profit driven rather than policy driven.
Companies like telecommunication operators, are still in the preliminary stage
of intern ationali sat ion. Most of them undertake businesses with the Asian
market, not even beyond Hong Kong.
Third, I also find evidence of 'round-tripping' investment. They may be
attracted by preferential tax rates provided by the government to foreign-owned
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enterprises before the launch of the new taxation law. Furthermore, after being
reinforced with advanced technology, diverse products and professional
personnel, these companies may go back to domestic markets to compete with
the world's leading giants.
Fourth, this research hypothesises Chinese TNCs' responses to HCMs as being
of 'conditional compliance'. If firms' business interests are in compliance with
the State's institutional guidance and encouragement, Chinese TNCs will
undertake OFDI, even with the government's massive administrative and
financial support. By contrast, if firms' strategies conflict with the
government's planning, the investment of Chinese enterprises may round-trip
to the home country to avoid losses, as well as to comply with Beijing's
requirements superficially.
Chapter 8 investigates the Chinalco-Rio Tinto and Geely-Volvo cases. Under
the background of the global economic downturn, both of the acquired
companies suffered from financial problems. Rio Tinto's purchase of Alcan
resulted in insufficient cash flow to service its debts. Volvo was hit
dramatically by the soaring crude oil prices. Therefore, the global leading
giants had to sell some of their assets to raise capital. Backed by the
government, Chinese TNCs attempt to strengthen their competitive advantages
through the acquisition of resources and strategic assets from their counterparts
in advanced economies.
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First, in terms of the administration and support, I find that the Chinese
government has different concerns on industries, rather than the ownership of
enterprises. According to China's HCMs analysed in previous chapters,
overseas resource exploration has been emphasised more times than the
automobile industry. Four national banks provided all the money Chinalco
needed for the acquisition. As long as Geely's takeover of Volvo complied
with the government's new energy technology development, it also obtained
preferential loans from a state-owned bank and a policy bank, regardless of it
being a private company.
Second, the Chinese government influence received different treatment by
shareholders and staff of the acquired company, the host country, and foreign
media. Despite that the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal failed due to business interests,
Chinalco's tangle with the government also raised questions in the motivation
in the host country. By contrast, the government intervention was more
welcomed in the Geely- Volvo case. In addition to the administrative approval
and financial support, the Chinese government's backup may also have
profound effects for Geely and Volvo's future development.
Third, the same as the multiple cases investigated in Chapter 7, the investment
undertaken by Chinalco and Geely cannot be well explained by mainstream
international business theories concerning OFDI. Most Chinese TNCs possess
no competitive advantages over the acquired companies. Their ambition is to
strengthen their competitiveness through acquiring resources and advanced
technology during the financial crisis.
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Fourth, rather than fully compromising to the government's national planning,
during the OFDI progress, Chinese enterprises take their corporate interests as
priority, rather than the government guidance. I believe that the convergence
between the nation and enterprises' interests drives China's 'effective OFDI',
excluding round-tripping investment and projects failed to be approved by the
government departments.
9.2 Policy Implications
The outward investment undertaken by Chinese SOEs is hardly recognised as a
wholly business behaviour. This research, based on the analysis of China's
home country measures on OFDI and the enterprises' responses, indicates that
China's OFDI is driven by the convergence between the nation and enterprises'
interests. First, there is a potential for the government to take a role as a
coordinator instead of administrator. The government should give the
enterprises more of a right to decide which country and sector to invest in and
when to invest. This would reduce the conflict between the State and
enterprises' interests as well as make the OFDI more effective. With regard to
the government's worries on the losses of state-owned assets, it would be better
if the government provided consulting services to enterprises in terms of
domestic regulatory restrictions, the institutional and cultural environment of
the host country like the labour relations, and how to deal with the host
country's media. The government should also encourage the enterprises to
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consult independent and specialised agents and companies for financial advice
and information services.
Second, the government should back up and provide more support to the
outward investment undertaken by private companies. This would raise the
host country's confidence in the Chinese private companies, which seem to
lack in competency to complete the mergers and acquisitions or bring in profits
in the future. In regards to SOEs, it may not be a good idea for the government
or enterprise to deny that they are linked in countless ways. The government
may step back. When supporting the overseas M&As, the government may
allow Chinese SOEs to involve some foreign banks for advices or even loans,
rather than issuing loans completely from state-owned policy or commercial
banks. This may be more convincing that the Chinese SOEs take OFDI as a
business activity, not working as a government agent.
9.3 Further Research Directions
The study on the Chinese government's effects on OFDI has only begun. The
institutional approach will attract more attention as China's OFDI grows and
TNCs expand. Our study is the first to study comprehensive policies and
regulations in detail and to investigate Chinese TNCs' overseas businesses
based on their overseas listing companies and offshore holding subsidiaries.
Although China has made great contributions to the design and execution of
measures on supervising and supporting OFDI, China's input into these
measures is yet limited. The policy, though set out with clear objectives, did
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not pay attention to implementation. I am still, however, a long way from fully
understanding the nature of China's political factors. In particular, more work
on the nature of policies implemented by provincial and local governments to
promote the internationalisation of business groups will no doubt greatly
contribute to our understanding of the institutional effects. There is also much
work to be done on the Chinese outward investment from each industry in each
country. I still know relatively little about the nature of 'round-tripping'
investment. I assume, at the current stage, that the Chinese government expects
more competitiveness of Chinese TNCs in the global market rather than going
back to the domestic market. This needs further investigation based on the
observation of the effects brought by the new taxation law and the
government's future publications.
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Appendix 2: cross-border M&As by top 50 business groups
Ultimate Target company Value Stake Yca~~
acquiring
company
CNPC Two oil sands projects owned
by Athabasca Oil Sands $2.88 billion 60% 2009
Corp. (Canada)
Nippon Oil (Japan) N.A. 49% 2009
Singapore Petroleum Co. $1.02 billion 45.51% 2009(Singapore)
JSC MangistauMunaiGas $3.3 billion 49% 2009(MMG) (Kazakhstan)'
EnCana (Chad) $202.5 50% 2007
million
PetroKazakhstan Inc. $4.18 billion 100% 2005(Canada)
Sinopec Addax (Switzerland) $7.24 billion 100% 2009
Canadian oil sands project of N.A. 10% 2009Total SA (France)
Puffin and Talbot oil
ventures of AED Oil $561 million 60% 2008
Ltd.(Australia)
Tanganyika Oil Co. (Canada) $1.94 billion 16.2% 2008
Udmurtneft (Russia) $3.5 billion 51% 2006
First International Oil $153 million N.A. 2004Company (FlOC) (USA)
CNOOC An oil block (Angola)' $1.3 billion 20% 2009
Awilco Offshore ASA $2.5 billion 100% 2008(Norway)
Husky Energy (Canada) $125 million 50% 2008
Oil and gas field (Nigeria) $2.3 billion 45% 2006
China Mobile Paktel (Pakistan) $424.4 88.86% 2007
million
China Resources Peoples 2005Telephone Company Limited $436 million 90%
(Hong Kong)
Chalco Rio Tinto Pic (UK) $14.05 bill ion 12% 2008
Peru Copper Co. (Canada) $789.6 100% 2007
million
Sinochem Emerald Energy Pic (UK) $879 million 100% 2009
Soco Yemen Pty Ltd. $465 million 100% 2008(Australia)
GMC Global Inc. $257.9 51% 2008(Singapore) million
COFCO
Smithfield Foods Inc. (UK) $139 million 4.95% 2008
Legend
IBM PC group (US) $650 million N.A. 2005
Yunnan Copper Austar (Australia) $2.78 billion 100% 2009
Southland Coal Mine $230 million N.A. 2005(Australia)
China Minmetals OZ Minerals Ltd. (Australia2_ $1.38 billion 100% 2009
HPTec GmbH (Germany), N.A. 100% 2008
Northern Peru Copper s 408.1 95.92% 2007(Canada)" million
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OZMinerals (Australia) $1.7 billion 10%, 2008
Hunan Valin Fortescue Metals Group Ltd $929 million 17.34% 2009(FMG)
SinoSteel Midwest Corp. Ltd. $1.04 billion 98.52% 2008(Australia)
ZCE Mauritius, owned by Over $200 92% 2007Zimasco (Zimbabwe) million
Huaneng Tuas Power (Singapore) $3.04 billion 100% 2008
Monto coal mine (Australia) $22.27 25.5% 2005
million
OzGen (Australia) $227 million 50% 2003
Yanzhou Coal Felix Resources Ltd. $2.78 billion 100% 2009(Australia)
Southland Coal Mine $230 million 100% 2004(Australia)
MCC Mining Assets (Cape $369.7Lambert Iron Ore Project)
million N.A. 2008(Australia)
Chemchina Silicones Unit of Rhodia N.A. 100% 2006(France)
Adisseo Group (France) $3 billion 100% 2006
Qenos_1Australia) $170 million 100% 2005
Drakkar Holding S.A. $473 million 100% 2005(Franc~
Shougang Mount Gibson Iron Limited $45 million 12.03% 2008(Australia}
Baosteel Aquila Resources Limited $250 million 15% 2009(Australia)
Changsha Compagnia Italiana Forme $253 million 60% 2008Zoom lion Acciaio SpA (CIFA) (ltaM
CNMC Chaarat Gold Holdings Ltd $9 million 19.9% 2009(UK}
Terramin Australia Ltd. $7.03 11.15% 2009(Australia) million
Luanshya Copper Mine $50 million 80% 2009(Zambia}_
Shanghai
Ssangyong (South Korea) $500 million N.A. 2004Automotive
CIMC TGE S.A. (Germany) $28.8 million 60% 2008
Enric Energy Equipment $144 million 42.18% 2007HoldiJ!g_sLimited (HK)
Burg Industries B.V. (the $63.3 million 80% 2007Netherlands)
HPA Monon Corporation $4.22 million 100% 2003(USA)
Jiangsu Shagang Australian Bulk Minerals $108.0 90% 2007(ABM) (Australia) million
Chinagold Jinshan Gold Mines Inc. $218 million 42% 2008(Canada)
Jinchuan Tiomin Kenya Ltd (Kenya) N.A. 70% 2009
Munali Nickel Ore (Zambia) N.A. 70% 2009
Fox Resources (Australia}_ $15.7 million 11% 2008
Tyler Resources (Canada) $213.4 100% 2008
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Notes: I. CNPC and Kazjvlunaiflas (the Kazakh state-owned company) form a 50-50 venture
to undertake this purchase. 2. CNOOC and Sinopec form a 50-50 venture to undertake this
purchase.
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